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Is it a “Good” Encoding of Mixed Choice? (Technical Report) ⋆
Kirstin Peters and Uwe Nestmann
TU Berlin, Germany
Abstract. This technical report contains the proofs to the lemmata and theorems of [PN12] as well as some
additional material. As main contributions [PN12] presents an encoding of mixed choice in the context of the
pi-calculus and a criterion to measure whether the degree of distribution in process networks is preserved.
1 Technical Preliminaries
1.1 The π-Calculus
Our source language is the monadic pi-calculus as described for instance in [SW01]. As already demonstrated in
[Pal03] the most interesting operator for a comparison of the expressive power between the full pi-calculus and its
asynchronous variant is mixed choice, i.e., choice between input and output capabilities. Thus we denote the full
pi-calculus also by pim. Let N denote a countably infinite set of names with τ /∈ N and N the set of co-names, i.e.,
N = {n | n ∈ N}. We use lower case letters a, a′, a1, . . . , x, y, . . . to range over names.
Definition 1 (pim). The set of process terms of the synchronous pi-calculus (with mixed choice), denoted by Pm,
is given by
P ::= (ν n)P | P1 | P2 | [ a = b ]P | y
∗ (x) .P |
∑
i∈I
pii.Pi
where pi ::= y (x) | y 〈z〉 | τ for some names n, a, b, x, y, z ∈ N and a finite index set I .
The interpretation of the defined process terms is as usual. Moreover we consider two subcalculi of pim. The process
terms Ps of pis —the pi-calculus with separate choice—are obtained by restricting the choice primitive, such that in
each choice either no input guarded or no output guarded alternatives appear.
Definition 2 (pis). The set of process terms of the pi-calculus (with separate choice), denoted by Ps, is given by
P ::= (ν n)P | P1 | P2 | [ a = b ]P | y
∗ (x) .P |
∑
i∈I
piIi .Pi |
∑
i∈I
piOi .Pi
where piI ::= y (x) | τ and piO ::= y 〈z〉 | τ for some names n, a, b, x, y, z ∈ N and a finite index set I .
Finally, the process terms Pa of the asynchronous pi-calculus pia [Bou92,HT91] are obtained by restricting each
sum to be of length zero or one and requiring, that outputs can only guard the empty sum.
Definition 3 (pia). The set of process terms of the asynchronous pi-calculus, denoted by Pa, is given by
P ::= 0 | (ν n)P | P1 | P2 | [ a = b ]P | y 〈z˜〉 .P | y (x˜) .P | τ.P | y
∗ (x˜) .P
for some names n, a, b, y ∈ N and some finite sequences of names x˜, z˜ ⊂ N .
Note that we augment all three variants of the pi-Calculus with matching, because we need it at least in pia to
encode mixed choice. Of course, the presence of match influences the expressive power of pia. However, we do not
know, whether the use of match in the encoding of mixed choice can be circumvented, although there are reasons
indicating that this is indeed not possible. We left the consideration of this problem to further research.
We use capital letters P, P ′, P1, . . . , Q,R, . . . to range over processes. Let fn(P ), bn(P ), and n(P ) denotes the sets
of free names, bound names and all names occurring in P, respectively. Their definitions are completely standard.
Given an input prefix y (x) or an output prefix y 〈x〉 we call y the subject and x the object of the action. Moreover we
denote the subject of an action also as link or channel name, while we denote the object as value or parameter. Note
⋆ This work was supported by the DFG (German Research Foundation), grant NE-1505/2-1.
that in case the object does not matter we omit it, i.e., we abbreviate an input guarded term y (x) .P or an output
guarded term y 〈x〉 .P such that x 6∈ fn(P ) by y.P or y.P , respectively. Moreover we denote the empty sum with 0
and often omit it in continuations. As usual we sometimes notate a sum
∑
i∈{i1,...,in}
pii.Pi by pii1 .Pi1 + . . .+piin .Pin .
We use σ, σ′, σ1, . . . to range over substitutions. A substitution is a mapping {x1/y1 , . . . ,
xn/yn} from names to
names. The application of a substitution on a term {x1/y1 , . . . ,
xn/yn} (P ) is defined as the result of simultaneously
replacing all free occurrences of yi by xi for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, possibly applying alpha-conversion to avoid capture
or name clashes. For all names N \ {y1, . . . , yn} the substitution behaves as the identity mapping. Let id denote
identity, i.e. id is the empty substitution. We naturally extend substitutions to co-names, i.e. ∀n ∈ N . σ (n) = σ (n)
for all substitutions σ.
Moreover, let x˜ denote a sequence of names. For simplicity, we occasionally treat x˜ as a set. So x˜ ⊂M denotes
a sequence of names of the set M , |x˜| is the length of the sequence x˜, and y ∈ x˜ denotes that y is one of the
names within the sequence x˜. Accordingly, we use the notion of sequence to abbreviate multiple restrictions, i.e.,
(ν x˜)P , (ν x1) . . . (ν xn)P for a sequence of names x˜ = x1, . . . , xn. Moreover we naturally extend substitutions
to sequences of names, i.e., σ (x˜) , σ (x1) , . . . , σ (xn) and
{
x˜/˜y
}
P , {x1/y1 , . . . ,
xn/yn}P for two sequences of
names x˜ = x1, . . . , xn and y˜ = y1, . . . , yn.
P ≡ Q if Q can be obtained from P by renaming one or more of the bound names in P,
silently avoiding name clashes
P | 0 ≡ P P | Q ≡ Q | P P | (Q | R) ≡ (P | Q) | R [ a = a ]P ≡ P
(ν n)0 ≡ 0 (ν n) (ν m)P ≡ (ν m) (ν n)P P | (ν n)Q ≡ (ν n) (P | Q) if n /∈ fn(P )
Fig. 1. Structural congruence.
The reduction semantics of pim, pis, and pia are jointly given by the transition rules in Figure 2, where structural
congruence, denoted by ≡, is given by the rules in Figure 1. Note that the rule Coma for communication in pia is a
simplified version of the rule Comm,s for communication in pim or pis. The differences between these two rules result
from the differences in the syntax, i.e. the lack of choice and the fact that only input can be used as guard in pia.
The same can be observed for the rules Taua and Repa. As usual, we use ≡α if we refer to alpha-conversion (the
first rule of Figure 1) only.
Taum,s . . .+ τ.P + . . . 7−→ P Taua τ.P 7−→ P
Comm,s (. . .+ y (x) .P + . . .) | (. . .+ y 〈z〉 .Q+ . . .) 7−→ {
z/x}P | Q
Coma y (x˜) .P | y 〈z˜〉 7−→
{
z˜/˜x
}
P if |x˜| = |z˜|
Repm,s y
∗ (x) .P | (. . .+ y 〈z〉 .Q+ . . .) 7−→ {z/x}P | Q | y
∗ (x) .P
Repa y
∗ (x˜) .P | y 〈z˜〉 7−→
{
z˜/˜x
}
P | y∗ (x˜) .P if |x˜| = |z˜|
Par
P 7−→ P ′
P | Q 7−→ P ′ | Q
Res
P 7−→ P ′
(ν x)P 7−→ (ν x)P ′
Cong
P ≡ P ′ P ′ 7−→ Q′ Q′ ≡ Q
P 7−→ Q
Fig. 2. Concurrent reduction semantics.
Let P 7−→ (P 67−→) denote existence (non-existence) of a step from P , i.e. there is (no) P ′ ∈ P such that
P 7−→ P ′. Moreover, let Z=⇒ be the reflexive and transitive closure of 7−→ and let 7−→∞ define an infinite sequence
of steps.
In Section 1.3, we present several criteria to measure the quality of an encoding. The first of these criteria relies
on the notion of a context. A context C ([·]1, . . . , [·]n) is a pi-term, i.e., a pia-term in case of Definition 7, with n
so-called holes. Plugging the pia-terms P1, . . . , Pn in this order into the holes [·]1, . . . , [·]n of the context, respectively,
yields a term denoted C (P1, . . . , Pn). Therefore, we consider a context as a function from terms into terms, e.g., the
context C ([·]1, . . . , [·]n) ∈ Pa × . . .× Pa → Pa maps n pia-terms onto a pia-term. Sometimes, we refer to P1, . . . , Pn
as the parameters of the context C. Note that a context may bind some free names of P1, . . . , Pn. The arity of a
context is the number of its holes.
As usual we will use equivalence relations to compare pi-terms by means of their behaviour. Moreover, as explained
in Section 1.3, we use an equivalence to abstract from junk, i.e., remains of encoded terms that are no longer of any
use. Since we use a reduction semantics, a standard equivalence to compare pim-terms is barbed congruence, denoted
by ∼=. Its definition relies on the notion of an observable or barb (we refer to [SW01] for a detailed explanation).
Definition 4 (Observable). Let P ∈ Pm. Then P has an input observable y, denoted by P ↓y, if P can perform
an input on y, i.e.,
∃P ′, P ′′ ∈ Pm . ∃x˜ ⊂ N . ∃z ∈ N . P ≡ (ν x˜) (P
′ | y (z) .P ′′) ∧ y /∈ x˜
and P has an output observable y, denoted by P ↓y, if P can perform an output on y, i.e.,
∃P ′, P ′′ ∈ Pm . ∃x˜ ⊂ N . ∃z ∈ N . P ≡ (ν x˜) (P
′ | y 〈z〉 .P ′′) ∧ y /∈ x˜.
1.2 Abbreviations
To shorten the presentation and ease the readability of the rather lengthy encoding function in the next section,
we use some abbreviations on pia-terms. First note that we defined only monadic versions of the calculi pim, pis,
and pia, where over any link exactly one value is transmitted. However, within the presented encoding functions,
we treat the target language pia as if it allows for polyadic communication. More precisely, we allow asynchronous
links to carry any number of values from zero to five, of course under the requirement that within each pia-term
no link name is used twice with different multiplicities. Note that these polyadic actions can be simply translated
into monadic actions by a standard encoding as given in [SW01]. Thus, we silently use the polyadic version of pia in
the following. Second, as already done in [Nes00], we use the following abbreviations to define boolean values and
a conditional construct.
Definition 5 (Tests on Booleans). Let B , {⊤,⊥} be the set of boolean values, where ⊤ denotes true and ⊥
denotes false.
Let l , t, f ∈ N and P,Q ∈ Pa. Then a boolean instantiation of l , i.e., the allocation of a boolean value to a link
l , and a test-statement on a boolean instantiation are defined by
l 〈⊤〉 , l (t, f) .t
l 〈⊥〉 , l (t, f) .f
test l then P else Q , (ν t, f)
(
l 〈t, f〉 | t.P | f.Q
)
for some t, f /∈ fn(P ) ∪ fn(Q).
Finally, we define forwarders, i.e., a simple process to forward each received message along some specified set of
links.
Definition 6 (Forwarder). Let I be a finite index set and for all i ∈ I let y and yi be channel names with
multiplicity n ∈ N, then a forwarder is given by:
y ։ {yi | i ∈ I } , y
∗ (x1, . . . , xn) .
(∏
i∈I
yi 〈x1, . . . , xn〉
)
In case of a singleton set we omit the brackets, i.e., y ։ y′ , y ։ {y′}.
1.3 Quality Criteria for Encodings
Within this paper we consider two encodings, (1) an encoding from pis into pia presented in [Nes00], denoted byJ · Ksa, and (2) a new encoding from pim into pia, denoted by J · Kma . To measure the quality of such an encoding,
Gorla [Gor10] suggested five criteria well suited for language comparison. Accordingly, we consider an encoding to
be “good”, if it satisfies Gorla’s five criteria.
As in [Gor10], an encoding is a mapping from a source into a target language; in our case, pim and pis are source
languages and pia is the target language. To distinguish terms on these languages or definitions for the respective
encodings, we use m, s, and a as super- and subscripts. Thereby, the superscript usually refers to the source and
the subscript the target language. Moreover, we use S, S′, S1, . . . to range over terms of the source languages and
T, T ′, T1, . . . to range over terms of the target language.
The five conditions are divided into two structural and three semantic criteria. The structural criteria include
(1) compositionality and (2) name invariance. The semantic criteria include (3) operational correspondence, (4)
divergence reflection and (5) success sensitiveness. Note that for the definition of name invariance and operational
correspondence a behavioural equivalence ≍ on the target language is assumed. Its purpose is to describe the
abstract behaviour of a target process, where abstract basically means with respect to the behaviour of the source
term.
Intuitively, an encoding is compositional if the translation of an operator depends only on the translation of its
parameters. To mediate between the translations of the parameters the encoding defines a unique context for each
operator, whose arity is the arity of the operator. Moreover, the context can be parametrised on the free names of
the corresponding source term.
Definition 7 (Criterion 1: Compositionality). The encoding J · K is compositional if, for every k-ary operator
op of pim and for every subset of names N , there exists a k-ary context CNop ([·]1, . . . , [·]k) such that, for all S1, . . . , Sk
with fn(S1) ∪ . . . ∪ fn(Sk) = N , it holds that
J op (S1, . . . , Sk) K = CNop (J S1 K , . . . , J Sk K) .
If the context is again the original operator, i.e., if an operator is translated by encoding its parameters and apply
the renaming policy, as in J (ν x)P K = (ν ϕJ K (x)) J P K, we call this encoding rigid. Note that Gorla requires that
the parallel composition operator “|” is binary and unique in the source as well as in the target language. Thus,
compositionality prevents from introducing a global coordinator or to use global knowledge, i.e., knowledge about
surrounding source terms or the structure of the parameters.
The second structural criterion states that the encoding should not depend on specific names used in the source
term. This is important, since sometimes it is necessary to translate a source term name into a sequences of names
or reserve some names for the encoding function. To ensure that there are no conflicts between these reserved
names and the source term names, the encoding is equipped with a renaming policy ϕJ K, i.e., a substitution from
names into sequences of names1. Since we translate source term names only into single names, the renaming policies
introduced by J · Ksa and J · Kma are injective substitutions from names into names. Based on such a renaming policy
an encoding is independent of specific names if it preserves all substitutions σ on source terms by a substitution σ′
on target terms such that σ′ respects the changes made by the renaming policy.
Definition 8 (Criterion 2: Name Invariance). The encoding J · K is name invariant if, for every S and σ, it
holds that
J σ (S) K{≡α σ′ (J S K) if σ is injective
≍ σ′ (J S K) otherwise
where σ′ is such that ϕJ K (σ (n)) = σ
′
(
ϕJ K (n)
)
for every n ∈ N .
The first semantic criterion and usually the most elaborate one to prove is operational correspondence, which
consists of a soundness and a completeness condition. Completeness requires that every computation of a source
term can be emulated by its translation, i.e., the translation does not reduce the computations of the source term.
Note that encodings often translate single source term steps into a sequence of target term steps. We call such a
sequence an emulationof the corresponding source term step. Soundness requires that every computation of a target
term corresponds to some computation of the corresponding source term, i.e., the translation does not introduce
new computations.
1 To keep distinct names distinct Gorla assumes that ∀n,m ∈ N . n 6= m implies ϕJ K (n) ∩ ϕJ K (m) = ∅, where ϕJ K (x) is
simply considered as set here.
Definition 9 (Criterion 3: Operational Correspondence). Let J · K be an arbitrary encoding. Then, two op-
erational criteria are defined as follows.
Completeness: For all S Z=⇒ S′, it holds that J S K Z=⇒≍ J S′ K.
Soundness: For all J S K Z=⇒ T , there exists an S′ such that
S Z=⇒ S′ and T Z=⇒≍ J S′ K.
Note that the definition of operational correspondence relies on the equivalence ≍ to get rid of junk possibly left
over within computations of target terms (compare to Section 2.4 for a discussion of that equivalence). Sometimes,
we refer to the completeness criterion of operational correspondence as operational completeness and, accordingly,
for the soundness criterion as operational soundness.
The next criterion concerns the role of infinite computations in encodings.
Definition 10 (Criterion 4: Divergence Reflection). The encoding J · K reflects divergence if, for every S,J S K 7−→ω implies S 7−→ω.
The last criterion links the behaviour of source terms to the behaviour of their encodings. With Gorla [Gor10], we
assume a success operator X as part of the syntax of both the source and the target language, i.e., of pim, pis, and
pia. Since X can not be further reduced, the operational semantics is left unchanged in all three cases. Moreover,
note that n(X) = fn(X) = bn(X) = ∅, so also interplay of Xwith the rules of structural congruence is smooth and
does not require explicit treatment. The test for reachability of success is standard.
Definition 11 (Success). A process P ∈ P may lead to success, denoted as P ⇓X, if (and only if) it is reducible
to a process containing a top-level unguarded occurrence of X, i.e. ∃P ′, P ′′ ∈ P . P Z=⇒ P ′ ∧ P ′ ≡ P ′′ | X.
Note that we choose may-testing here. Finally, an encoding preserves the abstract behaviour of the source term if
it and its encoding answer the tests for success in exactly the same way.
Definition 12 (Criterion 5: Success Sensitiveness). The encoding J · K is success sensitive if, for every S,
S ⇓X if and only if J S K ⇓X.
This criterion only links the behaviours of source terms and their literal translations, but not of their continuations.
To do so, Gorla relates success sensitiveness and operational correspondence by requiring that the equivalence on
the target language never relates two processes with different success behaviours.
Definition 13 (Success Respecting). ≍ ⊆ Pa × Pa is success respecting if, for every P and Q with P ⇓X and
Q 6⇓X, it holds that P 6≍ Q.
2 Correctness of the Encodings
Let us first present the full representations of the encodings J · Ksa in Figure 3 and J · Kma in Figure 4. Note that in
[Nes00,NP00] slightly different version of pis and pia are used, namely τ is no prefix and there are neither a match
operator nor a success operator in the syntax of pis and pia. We choose the respective encodings to be rigid except
for source terms guarded by τ . Since τ guarded terms can reduce without a communication partner, we implement
their translation by a simple test-statement on their sum lock in both encodings.
In the following we will argue for the correctness of these encodings with respect to the criteria of Gorla presented
in Section 1.3.
2.1 Structural Criteria
The first two criteria to prove are the structural criteria; compositionality and name invariance. An encoding is
compositional if it defines a fixed context for each operator including holes for the translation of its parameters. By
Definition 7 of compositionality the context is allowed to depend on the free names of the parameters. However,
both presented encodings, J · Ksa and J · Kma , do not use that feature, i.e., the contexts do not depend on any names.
By Figure 3 and Figure 4 both encodings are obviously compositional.
Let us have a closer look at the contexts. In the encodings of restriction, matching and success the context is
used only to translate source term names according to the renaming policy. Apart from that the encodings are rigid.
The encoding of the sum operator inserts a positive instantiation of a fresh sum lock and splits up the encodings
of the summands in parallel because there is no sum operator in the target language. Therefore of course we have
J (ν x)P Ks
a
, (ν ϕsa (x)) J P KsaJ P | Q Ks
a
, J P Ks
a
| J Q Ks
aJ [ a = b ]P Ks
a
, [ ϕsa (a) = ϕ
s
a (b) ] J P Ksat ∑
i∈I
pii.Pi
|
s
a
, (ν l)
(
l 〈⊤〉 |
∏
i∈I
J pii.Pi Ksa
)
J τ.P Ks
a
, test l then
(
l 〈⊥〉 | J P Ks
a
)
else l 〈⊥〉
J y 〈z〉 .P Ks
a
, (ν s)
(
ϕsa (y) 〈l , s, ϕ
s
a (z)〉 | s. J P Ksa)J y (x) .P Ks
a
, (ν r)
(
r | r∗.ϕsa (y)
(
l
′, s, ϕsa (x)
)
.test l then test l ′ then l 〈⊥〉 | l ′ 〈⊥〉 | s | J P Ks
a
else l 〈⊤〉 | l ′ 〈⊥〉 | r
else l 〈⊥〉 | ϕsa (y)
〈
l
′, s, ϕsa (x)
〉 )
J y∗ (x) .P Ks
a
, ϕsa (y)
∗ (l , s, ϕsa (x)) .test l then l 〈⊥〉 | s | J P Ksa else l 〈⊥〉J XKs
a
, X
Here ϕsa is some arbitrary injective substitution such that ∀n ∈ N . ϕ
s
a (n) ∩ {l , l
′, r , s} = ∅.
Fig. 3. Encoding from pis into pia.
to consider the sum operator as binary operator with an index set and a set of its summands as parameters, or
as unary operator with the set or list2 of its summands as parameter. We left the question whether there is an
encoding from pim into pia with the binary sum operator as an open question to further research. The encodings of
input and output guarded terms and the encoding of terms guarded by τ introduce rather small contexts. However,
in case of J · Kma the contexts introduced to translate the binary parallel operator and replicated input are rather
complicated and huge. Remember that we claim in Section 1.3 that the parallel operator is binary. Comparing its
encoding with the encoding of the sum operator we observe that this claim may be crucial because it forbids the
introduction of a global coordinator for all parallel terms as the sum lock is for all the summands of a sum.
Name invariance follows by the fact that names are translated into single names again and that conflicts between
names used by the encoding functions and translated source term names are ruled out by the renaming policy.
Lemma 1. The encoding J · Ksa is name invariant.
Proof. By Definition 8 it suffice to show, that:
∀S ∈ Ps . ∀σ ⊆ N . ∃σ
′ ⊆ N . J σ (S) Ksa ≡α σ′ (J S Ksa) ∧ ∀z ∈ N . ϕsa (σ (z)) = σ′ (ϕsa (z))
Without loss of generality let σ = {y1/x1 , . . .
yn/xn} for some n ∈ N. We choose
σ′ ,
{
ϕs
a
(y1)/ϕs
a
(x1), . . . ,
ϕs
a
(yn)/ϕs
a
(xn)
}
.
So ∀z ∈ N . ϕsa (σ (z)) = σ
′ (ϕsa (z)). We proceed with an induction over the structure of S.
Base Case: Since n(X) = ∅ = n(0) and fn
(
(ν l) l 〈⊤〉
)
= ∅, we have J σ (X) Ksa = J XKsa = X= σ′ (X) = σ′ (J XKsa)
and J σ (0) Ksa = J 0 Ksa = (ν l) l 〈⊤〉 = σ′ ((ν l) l 〈⊤〉) = σ′ (J 0 Ksa).
Induction Hypothesis: ∀S ∈ Ps . ∀σ ⊆ N . ∃σ′ ⊆ N . J σ (S) Ksa ≡α σ′ (J S Ksa)
2 Usually an unordered set of summands suffice to describe a sum since usually we consider sums as being reflexive and
symmetric, i.e., A+A = A and A+B = B+A. If for some reasons we have to abandon reflexivity and/or symmetry, e.g.
in case of a randomised version of the calculi, an ordered list might be the better choice to describe a sum.
J (ν x)P Km
a
, (ν ϕma (x)) J P KmaJ P | Q Km
a
, (νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , co , ci)
(
(ν po , pi)
( J P Km
a
| pi ։ {mi , pi,up} | po ։ {mo , po,up}
)
| (ν po , pi)
( J Q Km
a
| co 〈mi〉 | co
∗ (mi) .po (y, ls, s, z) .
(
(νmi,up) (mi
∗
(
y′, lr, r
)
.
([
y′ = y
]
r 〈lr, ls, ls, s, z〉 | mi,up
〈
y′, lr, r
〉)
| (νmi) (mi,up ։ mi | co 〈mi〉))
| po,up 〈y, ls, s, z〉
)
| ci 〈mo〉 | ci
∗ (mo) .pi (y, lr, r) .
(
(νmo,up) (mo
∗
(
y′, ls, s, z
)
.
([
y′ = y
]
r 〈ls, lr, ls, s, z〉 | mo,up
〈
y′, ls, s, z
〉)
| (νmo) (mo,up ։ mo | ci 〈mo〉))
| pi,up 〈y, lr, r〉
))
| po,up ։ po | pi,up ։ pi
)
J [ a = b ]P Km
a
, [ ϕma (a) = ϕ
m
a (b) ] J P Kmat ∑
i∈I
pii.Pi
|
m
a
, (ν l)
(
l 〈⊤〉 |
∏
i∈I
J pii.Pi Kma
)
J τ.P Km
a
, test l then l 〈⊥〉 | J P Km
a
else l 〈⊥〉J y 〈z〉 .P Km
a
, (ν s)
(
po 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , l , s, ϕ
m
a (z)〉 | s. J P Kma )J y (x) .P Km
a
, (ν r)
(
pi 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , l , r〉 | r
∗ (l1, l2,−, s, ϕ
m
a (x)) .
test l1 then
(
test l2 then l1 〈⊥〉 | l2 〈⊥〉 | s | J P Kma else l1 〈⊤〉 | l2 〈⊥〉) else l1 〈⊥〉 )J y∗ (x) .P Km
a
, (ν l , r , cr1 , cr2 , ro , ri )
(
pi 〈ϕ
s
a (y) , l , r〉 | r
∗ (−,−, ls, s, ϕ
s
a (x)) .test ls then ls 〈⊥〉 | s | cr1 〈ϕ
m
a (x)〉 else ls 〈⊥〉
| ri 〈ϕ
s
a (y) , l , r〉 | l 〈⊤〉 | cr2 〈ro , ri〉
| cr1
∗ (ϕma (x)) .cr2 (ro , ri) . (νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , ro,up , ri,up , co , ci ,mo,up,mi,up)
(
ro ։ {mo, ro,up} | ri ։ {mi , ri,up}
| (ν po , pi)
( J P Km
a
| co 〈mi〉 | co
∗ (mi) .po (y, ls, s, z) .
(
(νmi,up)
(
mi
∗
(
y′, lr, r
)
.
([
y = y′
]
r 〈lr, ls, ls, s, z〉 | mi,up
〈
y′, lr, r
〉)
| (νmi) (mi,up ։ mi | co 〈mi〉)
)
| po,up 〈y, ls, s, z〉
))
| ci 〈mo〉 | ci
∗ (mo) .pi (y, lr, r) .
(
(νmo,up)
(
mo
∗
(
y′, ls, s, z
)
.
([
y = y′
]
r 〈ls, lr, ls, s, z〉 | mo,up
〈
y′, ls, s, z
〉)
| (νmo) (mo,up ։ mo | ci 〈mo〉)
)
| pi,up 〈y, lr, r〉
)
| (ν ro , ri ) (cr2 〈ro , ri 〉 | po,up ։ {po , ro} | ro,up ։ ro | pi,up ։ {pi , ri} | ri,up ։ ri )
))
J XKs
a
, X
Here ϕma is some arbitrary injective substitution such that ∀n ∈ N . ϕ
m
a (n) ∩N = ∅, where N is the set of reserved names,
i.e., N = {po , pi , po,up , pi,up ,mo ,mi ,mo,up,mi,up , co , ci , l , ls, lr, l1, l2, s, r , cr1 , cr2 , ri , ro , ri,up , ro,up , y, y
′, z, t, f}.
Fig. 4. Encoding J · Km
a
from pim into pia.
Induction Step: Let x′ ∈ N be such that x′ /∈ n(σ) ∪ fn(P ). Then ϕma (x
′) /∈ n(σ). Moreover, since ∀n ∈
N . ϕma (n) /∈ {l , l
′, r , s}, we have n(σ′) ∩ {l , l ′, r , s} = ∅. Note that:r
σ
({
x′/x
}
(P )
) zs
a
=
r {
x′/x,
yi/xi |
yi /xi ∈ σ ∧ xi 6= x
}
(P )
zs
a
≡α
{
ϕs
a(x
′)/ϕs
a
(x),
ϕs
a
(yi)/ϕs
a
(xi) |
yi /xi ∈ σ ∧ xi 6= x
}
(J P Ksa) by IH
=
{
ϕs
a(x′)/ϕs
a
(x),
ϕs
a
(yi)/ϕs
a
(xi) |
ϕs
a
(yi) /ϕs
a
(xi) ∈ σ
′ ∧ ϕsa (xi) 6= ϕ
s
a (x)
}
(J P Ksa)
= σ′
({
ϕs
a(x
′)/ϕs
a
(x)
}
(J P Ksa))
We proceed by a case split.
Case of S = (ν x)P : Then
J σ (S) Ksa = J σ ((ν x)P ) Ksa ≡α r σ ((ν x′){x′/x} (P )) zs
a
=
r
(ν x′)σ
({
x′/x
}
(P )
) zs
a
= (ν ϕsa (x
′))
r
σ
({
x′/x
}
(P )
) zs
a
≡α (ν ϕ
s
a (x
′))σ′
({
ϕs
a(x
′)/ϕs
a
(x)
}
(J P Ksa))
= σ′
(
(ν ϕsa (x
′))
{
ϕs
a(x′)/ϕs
a
(x)
}
(J P Ksa)) ≡α σ′ ((ν ϕsa (x)) J P Ksa) = σ′ (J S Ksa) .
Case of S = P | Q: Then
J σ (S) Ksa = J σ (P | Q) Ksa = J σ (P ) | σ (Q) Ksa = J σ (P ) Ksa | J σ (Q) Ksa ≡α σ′ (J P Ksa) | σ′ (J Q Ksa)
= σ′ (J P Ksa | J Q Ksa) = σ′ (J P | Q Ksa) .
Case of S = [ a = b ]P : Then
J σ (S) Ksa = J σ ([ a = b ]P ) Ksa = J [ σ (a) = σ (b) ]σ (P ) Ksa = [ ϕsa (σ (a)) = ϕsa (σ (b)) ] J σ (P ) Ksa
≡α [ σ
′ (ϕsa (a)) = σ
′ (ϕsa (b)) ]σ
′ (J P Ksa) = σ′ ([ ϕsa (a) = ϕsa (b) ] J P Ksa) = σ′ (J S Ksa) .
Case of S =
∑
i∈I pii.Pi: Then
J σ (S) Ksa =
t
σ
(∑
i∈I
pii.Pi
) |s
a
=
t∑
i∈I
σ (pii.Pi)
|s
a
= (ν l)
(
l 〈⊤〉 |
∏
i∈I
J σ (pii.Pi) Ksa
)
≡α (ν l)
(
l 〈⊤〉 |
∏
i∈I
σ′ (J pii.Pi Ksa)
)
= σ′
(
(ν l)
(
l 〈⊤〉 |
∏
i∈I
J pii.Pi Ksa
))
= σ′ (J S Ksa) .
Case of S = τ.P : Then
J σ (S) Ksa = J σ (τ.P ) Ksa = J τ.σ (P ) Ksa = test l then l 〈⊥〉 | J σ (P ) Ksa else l 〈⊥〉
≡α test l then l 〈⊥〉 | σ
′ (J P Ksa) else l 〈⊥〉 = σ′ (test l then l 〈⊥〉 | J P Ksa else l 〈⊥〉)
= σ′ (J S Ksa) .
Case of S = y 〈z〉 .P : Then
J σ (S) Ksa = J σ (y 〈z〉 .P ) Ksa = r σ (y) 〈σ (z)〉 .σ (P ) zs
a
= (ν s)
(
ϕsa (σ (y)) 〈l , s , ϕ
s
a (σ (x))〉 | test s then J σ (P ) Ksa else 0)
≡α (ν s)
(
σ′ (ϕsa (y)) 〈l , s , σ
′ (ϕsa (x))〉 | test s then σ
′ (J P Ksa) else 0)
= σ′
(
(ν s)
(
ϕsa (y) 〈l , s , ϕ
s
a (x)〉 | test s then J P Ksa else 0)) = σ′ (J S Ksa) .
Case of S = y (x) .P : Then
J σ (S) Ksa = J σ (y (x) .P ) Ksa ≡α r σ (y (x′) .{x′/x} (P )) zs
a
=
r
σ (y) (x′) .σ
({
x′/x
}
(P )
) zs
a
= (ν r)
(
r | r∗.ϕsa (σ (y)) (l
′, s , ϕsa (x
′)) .
test l then test l ′ then l 〈⊥〉 | l ′ 〈⊥〉 | s 〈⊤〉 |
r
σ
({
x′/x
}
(P )
) zs
a
else l 〈⊤〉 | l ′ 〈⊥〉 | s 〈⊥〉 | r
else l 〈⊥〉 | ϕsa (σ (y)) 〈l
′, s , ϕsa (x
′)〉
)
≡α (ν r)
(
r | r∗.σ′ (ϕsa (y)) (l
′, s , ϕsa (x
′)) .
test l then test l ′ then l 〈⊥〉 | l ′ 〈⊥〉 | s 〈⊤〉 | σ′
({
ϕs
a(x′)/ϕs
a
(x)
}
(J P Ksa))
else l 〈⊤〉 | l ′ 〈⊥〉 | s 〈⊥〉 | r
else l 〈⊥〉 | σ′ (ϕsa (y)) 〈l
′, s , ϕsa (x
′)〉
)
= σ′
(
(ν r)
(
r | r∗.ϕsa (y) (l
′, s , ϕsa (x
′)) .
test l then test l ′ then l 〈⊥〉 | l ′ 〈⊥〉 | s 〈⊤〉 |
{
ϕs
a(x
′)/ϕs
a
(x)
}
(J P Ksa)
else l 〈⊤〉 | l ′ 〈⊥〉 | s 〈⊥〉 | r
else l 〈⊥〉 | ϕsa (y) 〈l
′, s , ϕsa (x
′)〉
))
≡α σ
′
(
(ν r)
(
r | r∗.ϕsa (y) (l
′, s , ϕsa (x)) .
test l then test l ′ then l 〈⊥〉 | l ′ 〈⊥〉 | s 〈⊤〉 | J P Ksa else l 〈⊤〉 | l ′ 〈⊥〉 | s 〈⊥〉 | r
else l 〈⊥〉 | ϕsa (y) 〈l
′, s , ϕsa (x)〉
))
= σ′ (J S Ksa) .
Case of S = y∗ (x) .P : Then
J σ (S) Ksa = J σ (y∗ (x) .P ) Ksa ≡α r σ (y∗ (x′) .{x′/x} (P )) zs
a
=
r
σ (y)
∗
(x′) .σ
({
x′/x
}
(P )
) zs
a
= ϕsa (σ (y))
∗ (l , s , ϕsa (x
′)) .test l then l 〈⊥〉 | s 〈⊥〉 |
r
σ
({
x′/x
}
(P )
) zs
a
else l 〈⊥〉 | s 〈⊥〉
≡α σ
′ (ϕsa (y))
∗
(l , s , ϕsa (x
′)) .test l then l 〈⊥〉 | s 〈⊥〉 | σ′
({
ϕs
a(x
′)/ϕs
a
(x)
}
(J P Ksa)) else l 〈⊥〉 | s 〈⊥〉
= σ′
(
ϕsa (y)
∗
(l , s , ϕsa (x
′)) .test l then l 〈⊥〉 | s 〈⊥〉 |
{
ϕs
a(x
′)/ϕs
a
(x)
}
(J P Ksa) else l 〈⊥〉 | s 〈⊥〉)
≡α σ
′
(
ϕsa (y)
∗ (l , s , ϕsa (x)) .test l then l 〈⊥〉 | s 〈⊥〉 | J P Ksa else l 〈⊥〉 | s 〈⊥〉)
= σ′ (J S Ksa) .
⊓⊔
Lemma 2. The encoding J · Kma is name invariant.
Proof. By Definition 8 it suffice to show, that:
∀S ∈ Pm . ∀σ ⊆ N . ∃σ
′ ⊆ N . J σ (S) Kma ≡α σ′ (J S Kma ) ∧ ∀z ∈ N . ϕma (σ (z)) = σ′ (ϕma (z))
Without loss of generality let σ = {y1/x1 , . . .
yn/xn} for some n ∈ N. We choose
σ′ ,
{
ϕm
a
(y1)/ϕm
a
(x1), . . . ,
ϕm
a
(yn)/ϕm
a
(xn)
}
.
So ∀z ∈ N . ϕma (σ (z)) = σ
′ (ϕma (z)). We proceed with an induction over the structure of S.
Base Case: Since n(X) = ∅ = n(0) and fn
(
(ν l) l 〈⊤〉
)
= ∅, we have J σ (X) Kma = J XKma = X= σ′ (X) = σ′ (J XKma )
and J σ (0) Kma = J 0 Kma = (ν l) l 〈⊤〉 = σ′ ((ν l) l 〈⊤〉) = σ′ (J 0 Kma ).
Induction Hypothesis: ∀S ∈ Pm . ∀σ ⊆ N . ∃σ′ ⊆ N . J σ (S) Kma ≡α σ′ (J S Kma )
Induction Step: Let x′ ∈ N be such that x′ /∈ n(σ) ∪ fn(P ). Then ϕma (x
′) /∈ n(σ). Moreover, since ∀z ∈
N . ϕma (z) /∈ N , where
N = {po , pi , po,up , pi,up ,mo ,mi ,mo,up ,mi,up , co , ci , l , ls, lr, l1, l2, s , r , cr1 , cr2 , ri , ro , ri,up , ro,up , y, y
′, z, t, f} ,
we have n(σ′) ∩N = ∅. Note that:r
σ
({
x′/x
}
(P )
) zm
a
=
r {
x′/x,
yi/xi |
yi /xi ∈ σ ∧ xi 6= x
}
(P )
zm
a
≡α
{
ϕm
a (x
′)/ϕm
a
(x),
ϕm
a
(yi)/ϕm
a
(xi) |
yi /xi ∈ σ ∧ xi 6= x
}
(J P Kma ) by IH
=
{
ϕm
a (x
′)/ϕm
a
(x),
ϕm
a
(yi)/ϕm
a
(xi) |
ϕm
a
(yi) /ϕm
a
(xi) ∈ σ
′ ∧ ϕma (xi) 6= ϕ
m
a (x)
}
(J P Kma )
= σ′
({
ϕm
a (x′)/ϕm
a
(x)
}
(J P Kma ))
We proceed by a case split.
Case of S = (ν x)P : Then
J σ (S) Kma = J σ ((ν x)P ) Kma ≡α r σ ((ν x′){x′/x} (P )) zm
a
=
r
(ν x′)σ
({
x′/x
}
(P )
) zm
a
= (ν ϕma (x
′))
r
σ
({
x′/x
}
(P )
) zm
a
≡α (ν ϕ
m
a (x
′))σ′
({
ϕm
a (x
′)/ϕm
a
(x)
}
(J P Kma ))
= σ′
(
(ν ϕma (x
′))
{
ϕm
a (x
′)/ϕm
a
(x)
}
(J P Kma )) ≡α σ′ ((ν ϕma (x)) J P Kma ) = σ′ (J S Kma ) .
Case of S = P | Q: Then
J σ (S) Kma = J σ (P | Q) Kma = J σ (P ) | σ (Q) Kma
= (ν c,mo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up)
(
c | (ν po , pi)
( J σ (P ) Kma | procLeftOutReq | procLeftInReq)
| (ν po , pi)
( J σ (Q) Kma | procRightOutReq | procRightInReq)
| pushReq
)
≡α (ν c,mo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up)
(
c | (ν po , pi)
(
σ (J P Kma ) | procLeftOutReq | procLeftInReq)
| (ν po , pi)
(
σ′ (J Q Kma ) | procRightOutReq | procRightInReq)
| pushReq
)
= σ′
(
(ν c,mo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up)
(
c | (ν po , pi)
( J P Kma | procLeftOutReq | procLeftInReq)
| (ν po , pi)
( J Q Kma | procRightOutReq | procRightInReq)
| pushReq
))
= σ′ (J S Kma ) .
Case of S = [ a = b ]P : Then
J σ (S) Kma = J σ ([ a = b ]P ) Kma = J [ σ (a) = σ (b) ]σ (P ) Kma = [ ϕma (σ (a)) = ϕma (σ (b)) ] J σ (P ) Kma
≡α [ σ
′ (ϕma (a)) = σ
′ (ϕma (b)) ]σ
′ (J P Kma ) = σ′ ([ ϕma (a) = ϕma (b) ] J P Kma ) = σ′ (J S Kma ) .
Case of S =
∑
i∈I pii.Pi: Then
J σ (S) Kma =
t
σ
(∑
i∈I
pii.Pi
) |m
a
=
t∑
i∈I
σ (pii.Pi)
|m
a
= (ν l)
(
l 〈⊤〉 |
∏
i∈I
J σ (pii.Pi) Kma
)
≡α (ν l)
(
l 〈⊤〉 |
∏
i∈I
σ′ (J pii.Pi Kma )
)
= σ′
(
(ν l)
(
l 〈⊤〉 |
∏
i∈I
J pii.Pi Kma
))
= σ′ (J S Kma ) .
Case of S = τ.P : Then
J σ (S) Kma = J σ (τ.P ) Kma = J τ.σ (P ) Kma = test l then l 〈⊥〉 | J σ (P ) Kma else l 〈⊥〉
≡α test l then l 〈⊥〉 | σ
′ (J P Kma ) else l 〈⊥〉 = σ′ (test l then l 〈⊥〉 | J P Kma else l 〈⊥〉)
= σ′ (J S Kma ) .
Case of S = y 〈z〉 .P : Then
J σ (S) Kma = J σ (y 〈z〉 .P ) Kma = r σ (y) 〈σ (z)〉 .σ (P ) zm
a
= (ν s) (po 〈ϕ
m
a (σ (y)) , l , s , ϕ
m
a (σ (z))〉 | s . J σ (P ) Kma )
≡α (ν s) (po 〈σ
′ (ϕma (y)) , l , s , σ
′ (ϕma (z))〉 | s .σ
′ (J P Kma ))
= σ′ ((ν s) (po 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , l , s , ϕ
m
a (z)〉 | s . J P Kma )) = σ′ (J S Kma ) .
Case of S = y (x) .P : Then
J σ (S) Kma = J σ (y (x) .P ) Kma ≡α r σ (y (x′) .{x′/x} (P )) zm
a
=
r
σ (y) (x′) .σ
({
x′/x
}
(P )
) zm
a
= (ν r)
(
pi 〈ϕ
m
a (σ (y)) , l , r〉 | r
∗ (l1, l2,−, s, ϕ
m
a (x
′)) .
test l1 then test l2 then l1 〈⊥〉 | l2 〈⊥〉 | s |
r
σ
({
x′/x
}
(P )
) zm
a
else l1 〈⊤〉 | l2 〈⊥〉
else l1 〈⊥〉
)
≡α (ν r)
(
pi 〈σ
′ (ϕma (y)) , l , r〉 | r
∗ (l1, l2,−, s, ϕ
m
a (x
′)) .
test l1 then test l2 then l1 〈⊥〉 | l2 〈⊥〉 | s | σ
′
({
ϕm
a (x
′)/ϕm
a
(x)
}
(J P Kma )) else l1 〈⊤〉 | l2 〈⊥〉
else l1 〈⊥〉
)
= σ′
(
(ν r)
(
pi 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , l , r〉 | r
∗ (l1, l2,−, s, ϕ
m
a (x
′)) .
test l1 then test l2 then l1 〈⊥〉 | l2 〈⊥〉 | s |
{
ϕm
a (x
′)/ϕm
a
(x)
}
(J P Kma ) else l1 〈⊤〉 | l2 〈⊥〉
else l1 〈⊥〉
))
≡α σ
′
(
(ν r)
(
pi 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , l , r〉 | r
∗ (l1, l2,−, s, ϕ
m
a (x)) .
test l1 then
(
test l2 then l1 〈⊥〉 | l2 〈⊥〉 | s | J P Kma else l1 〈⊤〉 | l2 〈⊥〉) else l1 〈⊥〉 ))
= σ′ (J S Kma ) .
Case of S = y∗ (x) .P : Then
J σ (S) Kma = J σ (y∗ (x) .P ) Kma ≡α r σ (y∗ (x′) .{x′/x} (P )) zm
a
=
r
σ (y)
∗
(x′) .σ
({
x′/x
}
(P )
) zm
a
= (ν l , r , cr1 , cr2 , ro , ri)
(
pi 〈ϕ
m
a (σ (y)) , l , r〉 | r
∗ (−,−, ls, s, ϕ
m
a (x
′)) .test ls then ls 〈⊥〉 | s | cr1 〈ϕ
m
a (x
′)〉 else ls 〈⊥〉
| ri 〈ϕ
m
a (σ (y)) , l , r〉 | l 〈⊤〉 | cr2 〈ro , ri〉
| cr1
∗ (ϕma (x
′)) .cr2 (ro , ri) . (νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , ro,up , ri,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up)
(
pushReqIn
| (ν po , pi)
(r
σ
({
x′/x
}
(P )
) zm
a
| procRightOutReq | procRightInReq
)
| (ν ro , ri) (cr2 〈ro , ri〉 | pushReqOut)
))
≡α (ν l , r , cr1 , cr2 , ro , ri)
(
pi 〈σ
′ (ϕma (y)) , l , r〉 | r
∗ (−,−, ls, s, ϕ
m
a (x
′)) .test ls then ls 〈⊥〉 | s | cr1 〈ϕ
m
a (x
′)〉 else ls 〈⊥〉
| ri 〈σ
′ (ϕma (y)) , l , r〉 | l 〈⊤〉 | cr2 〈ro , ri〉
| cr1
∗ (ϕma (x
′)) .cr2 (ro , ri) . (νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , ro,up , ri,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up)
(
pushReqIn
| (ν po , pi)
(
σ′
({
ϕm
a (x′)/ϕm
a
(x)
}
(J P Kma ))
| procRightOutReq | procRightInReq
)
| (ν ro , ri) (cr2 〈ro , ri〉 | pushReqOut)
))
= σ′
(
(ν l , r , cr1 , cr2 , ro , ri)
(
pi 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , l , r〉 | r
∗ (−,−, ls, s, ϕ
m
a (x
′)) .test ls then ls 〈⊥〉 | s | cr1 〈ϕ
m
a (x
′)〉 else ls 〈⊥〉
| ri 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , l , r〉 | l 〈⊤〉 | cr2 〈ro , ri〉
| cr1
∗ (ϕma (x
′)) .cr2 (ro , ri) . (νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , ro,up , ri,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up)
(
pushReqIn
| (ν po , pi)
({
ϕm
a (x′)/ϕm
a
(x)
}
(J P Kma )
| procRightOutReq | procRightInReq
)
| (ν ro , ri) (cr2 〈ro , ri〉 | pushReqOut)
)))
≡α σ
′
(
(ν l , r , cr1 , cr2 , ro , ri)
(
pi 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , l , r〉 | r
∗ (−,−, ls, s, ϕ
m
a (x)) .test ls then ls 〈⊥〉 | s | cr1 〈ϕ
m
a (x)〉 else ls 〈⊥〉
| ri 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , l , r〉 | l 〈⊤〉 | cr2 〈ro , ri〉
| cr1
∗ (ϕma (x)) .cr2 (ro , ri) . (νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , ro,up , ri,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up)
(
pushReqIn
| (ν po , pi)
( J P Kma | procRightOutReq | procRightInReq)
| (ν ro , ri) (cr2 〈ro , ri〉 | pushReqOut)
)))
= σ′ (J S Kma ) .
⊓⊔
Analysing these proofs we observe (1) that σ′ depends only on σ and the respective renaming policy, and (2)
that we can prove the first case of name invariance (compare to Definition 8) for all kinds of substitutions σ, i.e.,
it suffice to consider equivalence modulo alpha conversion.
Corollary 1 (Encoding substitutions). For all substitutions σ = {y1/x1, . . . ,
yn/xn} it holds that
∀S ∈ Ps . J σ (S) Ksa ≡α ϕsa (σ) (J S Ksa) and ∀S ∈ Pm . J σ (S) Kma ≡α ϕma (σ) (J S Kma ) ,
where ϕsa (σ) =
{
ϕs
a
(y1)/ϕs
a
(x1), . . . ,
ϕs
a
(yn)/ϕs
a
(xn)
}
and ϕma (σ) =
{
ϕm
a
(y1)/ϕm
a
(x1), . . . ,
ϕm
a
(yn)/ϕm
a
(xn)
}
.
2.2 Basic Properties
In the following we prove correctness with respect to the three semantical criteria. We observe, that in order to do
so we do not have to prove conditions on arbitrary pia-terms but on encoded source terms and their derivatives. To
simplify the argumentation we will denote such terms as target terms.
Definition 14 (Target Terms). Let T ∈ Pa. Then T is a target term, denoted by T ∈ Pa↾J · Km
a
(or T ∈ Pa↾J · Ks
a
),
if ∃S ∈ Pm . T ≡ J S Kma ∨ J S Kma Z=⇒ T (or ∃S ∈ Ps . T ≡ J S Ksa ∨ J S Ksa Z=⇒ T ).
Requests. Note that the encoding J · Ksa translates source term observables by adding an instantiation of a sum lock
(except from observables due to replicated inputs) to keep track of the information, whether this observable is still
active, i.e., whether the corresponding in- or output can still be used to emulate a source term step. Besides that
additional information J · Ksa does not change the observables. In contrast, the encoding J · Kma translates source term
observables into requests, which are again augmented by sum locks. Requests are outputs with either three or four
parameters. Input requests, i.e., requests that originate from the translation of an input guarded term or replicated
input, are outputs with three parameters. Output requests, i.e., requests that originate from the translation of an
output guarded term, are outputs with four parameters. Note that we can indeed consider any output of three
or four parameters as request, because the encoding function does not use these multiplicities for other purposes
(compare to Figure 4).
Definition 15 (Request). An input request is an unguarded output with three parameters, i.e., an output of kind
y 〈x1, x2, x3〉 for some y, x1, x2, x3 ∈ N , and an output request is an unguarded output with four parameters, i.e.,
an output of kind y 〈x1, x2, x3, x4〉 for some y, x1, x2, x3, x4 ∈ N . We refer to guarded variants of those outputs as
guarded requests and to y as request channel.
Note that the channels introduced by the encoding function are somehow well typed in the sense, that each name
once used as link with multiplicity n will never appear as link with a multiplicity different from n. Because of that,
it make sense to denote the channel y here as request channel, because whenever it is used as link name a request
is transferred above that link. Moreover note, that the first parameter x1 of a request is always the translation of
the respective source term channel and the second parameter x2 always refers to the sum lock that is connected to
that requests, i.e., that covers the information about the liveness of the corresponding observable. Note that in case
of an input request that originate from an replicated input the second parameter refers to a fake sum lock, which is
never checked. In case of an input request the third parameter x3 refers to the corresponding receiver lock and in
case of an output request the third parameter x3 refers to the corresponding sender lock and the fourth parameter
x4 is the translation of the send value.
An interesting fact is, that requests are preserved by the encoding function, i.e., each derivative of a target
term has all the requests of its predecessor. Note that we consider here two requests that only differ by their link
name but not their values as the same request. Requests are pushed upwards along and from right to left within
the parallel structure of the term but they are never completely consumed. If the message refers to an inactive
observable the respective sum lock is instantiated false to ensure that such a request can no longer be used to
emulate a source term step. The corresponding output messages of the encoding, i.e., the requests, remain as junk
(compare to Lemma 25).
Lemma 3 (J · Kma preserves requests).
∀T1, T2 ∈ Pa↾J · Km
a
. ∀pi , y, l , r ∈ N . (∃T
′
1 ∈ Pa . ∃x˜ ⊂ N . T1 ≡ (ν x˜) (T
′
1 | pi 〈y, l , r〉)) ∧ T1 Z=⇒ T2
implies
(
∃T ′2 ∈ Pa . ∃x˜ ⊂ N . ∃pi
′ ∈ N . T2 ≡ (ν x˜)
(
T ′2 | pi
′ 〈y, l , r〉
))
and
∀T1, T2 ∈ Pa↾J · Km
a
. ∀po , y, l , s , z ∈ N . (∃T
′
1 ∈ Pa . ∃x˜ ⊂ N . T1 ≡ (ν x˜) (T
′
1 | po 〈y, l , s , z〉)) ∧ T1 Z=⇒ T2
implies
(
∃T ′2 ∈ Pa . ∃x˜ ⊂ N . ∃po
′ ∈ N . T2 ≡ (ν x˜)
(
T ′2 | po
′ 〈y, l , s , z〉
))
Proof. First note, that due to Figure 4 the translations of source term names are used as values only. So any in- or
output of a target term is generated by the encoding function on special names reserved for the encoding. In case
T1 = T2, i.e., in case the sequence T1 Z=⇒ T2 is empty, the lemma holds trivially. Let us consider the case of a single
step, i.e., T1 7−→ T2. The Lemma then follows by induction over the number of steps in the sequence T1 Z=⇒ T2.
Analysing the encoding function in Figure 4 we observe, that any input with three or four parameters is due to
the encoding of the parallel operator or a replicated input. In case of a forwarder the lemma again trivially holds,
because each forwarder immediately restores each consumed message. The only remain inputs in the encoding of a
parallel operator or a replicated input are due to the processing of right requests, i.e., due to procRightOutReq and
procRightInReq.
procRightOutReq , co 〈mi〉 | co
∗ (mi) .po (y, ls, s , z) .
(
(νmi,up)
(
mi
∗ (y′, lr, r) . ([ y
′ = y ] r 〈lr, ls, ls, s , z〉 | mi,up 〈y
′, lr, r〉)
| (νmi) (mi,up ։ mi | co 〈mi〉)
)
| po,up 〈y, ls, s , z〉
)
In case of procRightOutReq there are two inputs on request channels, namely po (y, ls, s , z) and mi
∗ (y′, lr, r). In
the first case, whenever a request is consumed by po (y, ls, s , z) it is immediately restored by po,up 〈y, ls, s , z〉.
In the second case any consumed request is immediately restored by mi,up 〈y′, lr, r〉. So the Lemma holds. The
argumentation for procRightInReq is similar. ⊓⊔
A closer look at this proof and the encoding function in Figure 4 reveals, that (1) any initial request is due to
the encoding of a guarded term or a replicated input and (2) any other request is a copy of an existing request.
Because of that, as long as we are only interested in the values a request may carry and do not concern the link
over it is currently transmitted, then we can conclude that any request originate to the encoding of a guarded term
or a replicated input.
Corollary 2. Any request originates to the encoding of a guarded term or a replicated input.
Sum locks. Sum locks—for both considered encodings—are channels carrying a boolean value. They are used by
the encoding functions to ensure that at most one summand of each sum is chosen for communication. Note that
any channel used to transport a boolean value is a sum lock. However, since by Definition 5 at page 3 booleans and
test-statements are just abbreviations, we use some simple type informations to unambiguous identify sum locks in
both encodings. So, to be precise, instantiations on sum locks are inputs carrying two values, that are links with
multiplicity zero. So sum locks are the only channels of multiplicity two, that carry only values of multiplicity zero.
Definition 16 (Sum lock). Let T ∈ Pa↾J · Km
a
(or T ∈ Pa↾J · Ks
a
). A sum lock of T is a name l that is used in T as
link with multiplicity two carrying two links with multiplicity zero.
Let l be a sum lock. Then we refer to unguarded occurrences of l 〈⊤〉 as positive instantiation and accordingly to
unguarded occurrences of l 〈⊥〉 as negative instantiation of l . An instantiation of a sum lock l is either a positive
or negative instantiation of l .
Note that in most of the following definitions and proofs we hide the definition of booleans as well as of the
corresponding test-statement. To show that sum locks meet our intuition we prove that in each target term T there
is at most one instantiation of each sum lock.
Lemma 4. For each target term each sum lock is instantiated at most once, i.e.,
∀T ∈ Pa↾J · Km
a
(
or T ∈ Pa↾J · Ks
a
)
. ∀l ∈ N . ∀T ′ ∈ Pa . ∀x˜ ⊂ N . ∀b1, b2 ∈ B . T 6≡ (ν x˜)
(
T ′ | l 〈b1〉 | l 〈b2〉
)
.
Proof. By Figure 3 and Figure 4 this condition holds for all encoded source terms, i.e., for all target terms J S Ksa
for some S ∈ Ps or S ∈ Pm, because for each sum there is exactly one positive instantiation of each sum lock and,
since all sum locks appear restricted, the sum locks of different sums are different. All remainig instantiations of
sum locks are guarded by a test-statement. To prove the condition for arbitrary target terms we take a closer look
on these test-statements. We observe that for both encodings for each test-statement and for each of its possible
outcomes the reduction of a test-statement unguards exactly one instantiation of a each sum lock that has to be
consumed to reduce the respective test-statement. So for each new unguarded instantiation of a sum lock a former
instantiation of the same lock was consumed.
[Nes00] proves that the encoding J · Ksa does not introduce deadlock, i.e., whenever a test-statement consumes a
sum lock a new instantiation of the same lock is eventually unguarded. Moreover, it shows that a complete ordering
of the sum locks as implemented in J · Kma suffice to ensure that even in the case of source terms from Pm the test-
statements can not cause a deadlock. So again for each consumed instantiation of a sum lock a new instantiation
of the same lock is eventually unguarded. ⊓⊔
Note that, analysing the encoding functions obviously any instantiation of a sum lock is a positive or negative
instantiation. The prove of Lemma 4 also shows that (1) all instantiations of sum locks in encoded source terms are
positive—negative instantiations are only due to reduction steps, (2) all sum locks are initially instantiated, and
(3) for each consumed instantiation of a sum lock eventually a new instantiation is unguarded.
Corollary 3. Any sum lock is initially instantiated positive, i.e.,
∀S ∈ Ps . ∀l ∈ N . ∀b ∈ B . ∀T ∈ Pa . ∀x˜ ⊂ N . J S Ksa ≡ (ν x˜) (T | l 〈b〉) implies b = ⊤
and
∀S ∈ Pm . ∀l ∈ N . ∀b ∈ B . ∀T ∈ Pa . ∀x˜ ⊂ N . J S Kma ≡ (ν x˜) (T | l 〈b〉) implies b = ⊤.
Corollary 4. Let T be a target term, i.e., T ∈ Pa↾J · Ks
a
or T ∈ Pa↾J · Km
a
, and let L ⊂ N be the set of all sum locks
of T . Then
∀l ∈ L . ∃T ′ ∈ Pa . ∃x˜ ⊂ N . ∃b ∈ B . T Z=⇒ (ν x˜) (T ′ | l 〈b〉) .
In the proof of Lemma 4 we observe that new instantiations of sum locks are unguarded by test-statements. So
reducing a test-statement is the only possibility to change an instantiation of sum lock. A closer look reveals that
positive instantiations can be changed into negative but never the other way around.
Lemma 5. A negative instantiation of a sum lock can not be changed into a positive instantiation, i.e.,
∀T1, T2 ∈ Pa↾J · Km
a
(
or T1, T2 ∈ Pa↾J · Ks
a
)
. ∀l ∈ N . ∀T ′1, T
′
2 ∈ Pa . ∀x˜1, x˜2 ⊂ N . ∀b ∈ B .
T1 ≡ (ν x˜1)
(
T ′1 | l 〈⊥〉
)
∧ T1 Z=⇒ T2 ∧ T2 ≡ (ν x˜2) (T ′2 | l 〈b〉) implies b = ⊥
Proof. Revisiting the argumentation in the proof of Lemma 4 we observe that the reduction of a test-statement
is the only way to change the instantiation of a sum lock. A closer look at the test-statements in Figure 4 and
Figure 3 reveals that for both encoding functions and for each test-statements the then-case can change a positive
instantiation of sum lock into negative instantiation but the else-cases always simply restore all consumed instances.
Note that in case of the nested test-statement of the encoding of an input guarded term a positive instantiation
of the first tested lock is changed only if the second tested lock is again positive instantiated. In this case both
instantiations are changed into negative instantiations. Moreover note that all the other (single) test-statements
change any consumed positive instantiation into a negative one. Because of that, it is possible to change a positive
instantiation into a negative one but not the other way around. ⊓⊔
Sender and Receiver Locks. The third parameter of an output request refers to a sender lock, while the third
parameter of an input request refers to a receiver lock. In both encodings, sender and receiver locks are used to
guard the encoded continuation of output or input guarded source terms or replicated inputs. Sender locks are links
with multiplicity zero in both encodings, in opposite receiver locks are links with multiplicity zero in J · Ksa and five
in J · Kma . Note that in J · Kma only sender locks appear as third parameter of an output request. Since by Lemma 3
the encoding function J · Kma preserves requests, they unambiguous define sender locks. In the encoding J · Ksa also
receiver locks are links that never transport any values (compare to Figure 3). Moreover, the reserved names t and
f—necessary to implement booleans—are used as links without parameters in both encodings. To distinguish them
in J · Ksa note, that sender locks are used as input links, while receiver locks are used as replicated inputs only, and
that in each case of a test-statement there is an unrestricted instantiation of a sum lock, whereas all instantiations
of sum locks within an encoded source term appear restricted.
Definition 17 (Sender Lock). Let T ∈ Pa↾J · Ks
a
. Then any name s is a sender lock of T if
∃T ′, T ′′ ∈ Pa . ∃x˜ ⊂ N . T Z=⇒ (ν x˜) (T ′ | s .T ′′) and ∀l ∈ fn(T ′′) . ∀b ∈ B . ∀T ′′′ ∈ Pa . T ′′ 6≡ (T ′′′ | l 〈b〉) .
Let T ∈ Pa↾J · Km
a
. Then any name s is a sender lock of T if
∃T ′ ∈ Pa . ∃x˜ ⊂ N . ∃po , y, l , z ∈ N . T ≡ (ν x˜) (T
′ | po 〈y, l , s , z〉) .
An instantiation of a sender lock is an output on a sender lock.
Beside the blocking of the encoded continuation, in J · Kma the receiver lock is used by the encoding of the parallel
operator and its pendant in the encoding of a replicated input to transmit the order of the sum locks back to the
encoding of an input guarded source term. Remember, that the encoding of an input guarded source term tests
these sum locks to emulate a communication step of the source term and that the ordering of sum locks is necessary
to avoid deadlock. In case of J · Kma , receiver locks are again unambiguous identified by input requests. However they
are also the only links in J · Kma carrying five parameters. In J · Ksa receiver locks are the only links of multiplicity
zero, that are used as replicated inputs.
Definition 18 (Receiver lock). Let T ∈ Pa↾J · Ks
a
. Then any name r is a receiver lock of T if
∃T ′, T ′′ ∈ Pa . ∃x˜ ⊂ N . T ≡ (ν x˜) (T
′ | r∗.T ′′) .
Let T ∈ Pa↾J · Km
a
. Then any name r is a receiver lock of T if
∃T ′ ∈ Pa . ∃x˜ ⊂ N . ∃pi , y, l ∈ N . T ≡ (ν x˜) (T
′ | pi 〈y, l , r〉) .
An instantiation of a receiver lock is an output on a receiver lock.
Note that—for both encodings—for each input or output guarded source term exactly one receiver or sender lock
is generated. Similarly, for each sum a unique sum lock is generated. However, since a sum may contain several input
and/or output guarded summands, the encodings of different input or output guarded terms may share the same
sum lock. But each encoded guarded term is connected to exactly one sum lock. The encoding J · Kma is obviously
more complex than the encoding J · Ksa. But on the other hand the existence of requests outlines the connection
between sum locks and sender or receiver locks—and with it to the corresponding encodings of guarded terms—more
clearly.
Definition 19. Let T ∈ Pa↾J · Km
a
and let l , r , s ∈ N . If T contains an unguarded input request with l as second and
r as third parameter, i.e., if
∃T ′ ∈ Pa . ∃x˜ ⊂ N . ∃pi , y ∈ N . T ≡ (ν x˜) (T
′ | pi 〈y, l , r〉) ,
then we call the sum lock l and the receiver lock r connected. Sometime we also say that l is the sum lock of the
receiver lock r.
Accordingly, if T contains an unguarded output request with l as second and s as third parameter, i.e., if
∃T ′ ∈ Pa . ∃x˜ ⊂ N . ∃po , y, z ∈ N . T ≡ (ν x˜) (T
′ | po 〈y, l , s , z〉) ,
then we call the sum lock l and the sender lock s connected. Sometime we also say that l is the sum lock of the
sender lock s.
Of course, the connection of sum locks to sender or receiver locks is unambiguous.
Lemma 6. Let T ∈ Pa↾J · Km
a
be a target term. Then each receiver lock r and each sender lock s of T is connected
to exactly one sum lock l of T , i.e.,
∀T1, T2 ∈ Pa↾J · Km
a
. ∀r , pi1, pi2, y1, y2, l1, l2 ∈ N . ∀T
′
1, T
′
2 ∈ Pa . ∀x˜1, x˜2 ⊂ N .
T1 ≡ (ν x˜1) (T
′
1 | pi1 〈y1, l1, r〉) ∧ T1 Z=⇒ T2 ∧ T2 ≡ (ν x˜2) (T ′2 | pi2 〈y2, l2, r〉) implies y1 = y2 ∧ l1 = l2
and
∀T1, T2 ∈ Pa↾J · Km
a
. ∀s , po1, po2, y1, y2, l1, l2, z1, z2 ∈ N . ∀T
′
1, T
′
2 ∈ Pa . ∀x˜1, x˜2 ⊂ N .
T1 ≡ (ν x˜1) (T
′
1 | po1 〈y1, l1, s , z1〉) ∧ T1 Z=⇒ T2 ∧ T2 ≡ (ν x˜2) (T ′2 | po2 〈y2, l2, s , z2〉)
implies y1 = y2 ∧ l1 = l2 ∧ z1 = z2.
Proof. Analysing the encoding function J · Kma in Figure 4 we observe that initially, i.e., for each target term J S Kma
for some source term S ∈ Pm, for each receiver lock, i.e., for each encoding of an input guarded term or a replicated
input, and for each sender lock, i.e., for each encoding of an output guarded term, exactly one request is generated.
Since the receiver and sender locks are generated under restriction, for each encoded source term there are not two
requests with the same receiver or the same sender lock, i.e., no two requests share their third parameter. Because
of that the lemma holds for all T1 = T2 = J S Kma for some source term S ∈ Pm. By Corollary 2 then the lemma
holds for all target terms T1 and T2 such that T1 Z=⇒ T2. ⊓⊔
Note that this lemma does not only shows that the connection between sum locks and sender or receiver locks is
unambiguous but moreover that the information carried by requests is persistent. It does not change while requests
wander to the structure of the encoded term generated by the parallel operator nesting of the corresponding source
term.
Since, in case of J · Kma receiver locks are not only used to guard the encoding of the continuation of an input
guarded term or replicated input but also to send the order of the locks back to the corresponding test-statement,
they carry all necessary informations to perform the test.
Lemma 7. Let T ∈ Pa↾J · Km
a
and r ∈ N be a receiver lock of T . Then the first three parameters of r are sum locks,
the fourth parameter is a sender lock s, and the last parameter is a translated source term name. Moreover, the
third sum lock belongs to s and among the first to sum locks one belongs to r and the other one is again the sum
lock of s.
Proof. There are four different outputs on receiver locks, i.e., outputs of five parameters, one in each of pro-
cRightOutReq and procRightInReq in the encoding of a parallel operator and in the encoding of a replicated input
(compare to Figure 4).
procRightOutReq , co 〈mi〉 | co
∗ (mi) .po (y, ls, s , z) .
(
(νmi,up)
(
mi
∗ (y′, lr, r) . ([ y
′ = y ] r 〈lr, ls, ls, s , z〉 | mi,up 〈y
′, lr, r〉)
| (νmi) (mi,up ։ mi | co 〈mi〉)
)
| po,up 〈y, ls, s , z〉
)
In procRightOutReq the output r 〈lr, ls, ls, s , z〉 is guarded by a replicated input mi∗ (y′, lr, r) of three parameters
which is in turn guarded by an input po (y, ls, s , z) of four parameters. So to unguard the output on the receiver lock
two requests—first an output request and then an input request—have to consumed. The values of the parameters
of the output r 〈lr, ls, ls, s , z〉 are completely determined by these two requests. Because of that the first three
parameters are sum locks, the fourth parameter is a sender lock s , and the last parameter is a translated source
term name. Moreover, the first parameter is the sum lock of the receiver lock and the second and third parameter
are the sum lock of the sender lock.
procRightInReq , ci 〈mo〉 | ci
∗ (mo) .pi (y, lr, r) .
(
(νmo,up)
(
mo
∗ (y′, ls, s , z) . ([ y
′ = y ] r 〈ls, lr, ls, s , z〉 | mo,up 〈y
′, ls, s , z〉)
| (νmo) (mo,up ։ mo | ci 〈mo〉)
)
| pi,up 〈y, lr, r〉
)
The case of procRightInReqis similar but here the input request has to be consumed first, and the first and the third
parameter are the sum lock of the sender lock and the second parameter is the sum lock of the receiver lock. ⊓⊔
In order to ease the proof of Lemma 10 at page 21 we introduce another kind of lock. J · Kma translates source
term observables into requests, which are then combined to search for potential communication partners. In order
to avoid divergence, requests can not be copied arbitrary often. To ensure that indeed each left request is combined
with each possible matching right request, the right requests—in the encoding of a parallel operator as well as in
the encoding of a replicated input—are linked within some kind of chain or list, along which the left requests are
forwarded. Again to avoid divergence these chains or lists can not be infinitely long, so the links co and ci are
introduced by the encoding function to extent these chain or list by a new right request as soon as its last place
is occupied. We will denote these links as chain locks. Similarly, the chain lock cr1 in the encoding of a replicated
input is used to establish some kind of chain on encoded source terms—the encoded continuations of that replicated
input—instead of right requests. Note that chain locks are the only links in target terms with multiplicity one.
Definition 20 (Chain Lock). Let T ∈ Pa↾J · Km
a
. Then any name co is a chain lock of T if ∃T ′ ∈ Pa . ∃x˜ ⊂
N . ∃mi ∈ N . T Z=⇒ (ν x˜) (T ′ | co 〈mi〉).
An instantiation of a chain lock is an output on a chain lock.
Note that the value of a chain lock used to establish a chain of right requests is always a request channel, while
the value of a chain lock used to establish a chain of encoded source terms is always a translated source term name,
i.e., a value never used as link. Because of that, we can easily distinguish these two kinds of chain locks by a simple
type information.
2.3 Steps of an Emulation
Before we formally define receiver and sender locks in the last section we argue that they are introduced by the
encoding function to guard the encoding of the continuation of a guarded source term. To mimic the behaviour of
the source term, the encodings of continuations have to stay guarded until the source term step unguarding them
in the source term is emulated by its encoding. As already mentioned both encodings translate a single source
term step into a sequence of target term steps called emulation. However, in both encodings we can unambiguous
allocate the main responsibility for an emulation to a single step of that emulation and call all the other steps pre-
or postprocessing steps of that emulation. In the following we will refer to the first kind of target term steps as
core steps, since they perform the main task of an emulation and because of that constitute the transition from
the emulation of a source term to the emulation of its successor. It turns out, that for both encodings the core
steps are connected to the test-statements. More precisely, in case of an emulation of a step on a term guarded
by τ or a replicated input, it is the consumption of the positive instantiation of a sum lock by the corresponding
test-statement that performs the main task of the emulation. In case of an emulation of a step on an input guarded
source term, it is the consumption of the second positive instantiation in the nested test-statement that we call core
step.
Definition 21 (Core Step). Let T1, T2 ∈ Pa↾J · Km
a
(or T1, T2 ∈ Pa↾J · Ks
a
). A step T1 7−→ T2 is a core step, denoted
by T1
7→
7−→ T2, if this step consumes a positive instantiation of a sum lock either within a single test-statement or
within the second test of a nested test-statement.
Note that, since negative instantiations of sum locks refer to encoded in- or outputs, that remains of a former
emulation as junk, we do not consider any consummation of a negative sum lock as core step. According, test-
statements consuming a negative instantiation of a sum lock only restore all consumed information. In the following
we prove our intuition of core steps by showing that encoded continuations can only be unguarded after a core step.
Lemma 8. Only core steps may lead to the unguarding of the encoding of a continuation of some source term.
Proof. Analysing the encoding functions in Figure 3 and Figure 4 we observe that the encoded continuations of
output guarded source terms appear guarded by the respective sender lock. Moreover we observe that all instan-
tiations of sender locks are guarded by test-statements. More precisely, they are guarded by the then-case of a
single test-statement (due to the encoding of a replicated input) or the then-case of the second test in a nested
test-statement (due to the encoding of an input guarded term). Note that in case of J · Kma , by Lemma 7 the input
on the receiver lock that guards the test-statements unambiguous identifies the following outputs of multiplicity
zero as sender locks. So a core step is necessary to unguard them.
In case of a source term guarded by τ or an input guarded source term the respective encoded continuations
appear directly as required in the respective then-cases of the test-statements. So, in these cases, the lemma holds
directly by the Definition of the encoding functions. ⊓⊔
Note that to our intuition for each emulation of a source term step, there is exactly one core step. However,
we will need some further information to prove that statement (compare to Lemma 32 at page 48). So let us
have a closer look at the remaining pre- and post processing steps. There is one step of an emulation, namely the
unguarding of the encoded continuation of an output guarded source term by communication over a sender lock,
that for certainty has to be performed after the core step of the corresponding emulation. Because of that we can call
reductions on sender locks postprocessing steps. There are also steps, as for instance reductions over receiver locks,
that for certainty have to be performed before the corresponding core step. So we can call all reductions on receiver
locks preprocessing steps. However, there are some steps that may be performed before or after the corresponding
core step. Moreover, the fact whether a non core step was performed before or after the corresponding core step is
usually not important and often hard to prove. So pre- or postprocessing steps is not a good characterisation for our
purposes. Instead we will refer to those steps as administrative steps, since they perform administrative tasks, that
are necessary to perform an emulation, but they do not carry the main responsibility for the emulation, i.e., they
do—at least for the general case—not inevitably implement the decision to emulate a specific source term step.
Definition 22 (Administrative Step). Let T1, T2 ∈ Pa↾J · Km
a
(or T1, T2 ∈ Pa↾J · Ks
a
). A step T1 7−→ T2 is a
administrative step, denoted by T1 ˙7−→. T2, if it is no core step.
Let T1 ˙Z=⇒. T2 denote a sequence of administrative steps, i.e., ˙Z=⇒. is the transitive and reflexive closure of ˙7−→. .
In the easiest case, none of the administrative steps influences the decision to emulate a specific source term
steps. That means: Consider a source term that can perform alternative but conflicting steps. So the encoding can
perform different but conflicting emulations. In this case none of the administrative steps should influences which of
the emulations may be completed, i.e., no sequence of administrative steps should be able to rule out the completion
of one of these emulations.
Unfortunately, for both of the presented encodings this turns out to be wrong. It is always a core step that
finally decides which of the conflicting emulations is completed by preventing any other conflicting emulation from
completion. However, in case there are more than two possible conflicting emulations, a sequence of administrative
steps may rule out one alternative while allowing for different still possible emulations.
Example 1. Let us consider the source term S = (a.S1 + a.S2) | a.S3 | a.S4 for some S1, S2, S3, S4 ∈ Ps. So S ∈ Ps
as well as S ∈ Pm. The encoding of S, regardless whether it is encoded by J · Ksa or J · Kma , generates three sum locks,
one for each sum. Let us assume, the sum lock generated for a.S1 + a.S2 is l1, the sum lock for a.S3 is l2, and l3 is
generated for a.S4. S can perform three conflicting steps leading to S1 | S3, S2 | S3, or S3 | S4, respectively. Each
of these steps can be emulated by both of the encodings. To emulate the step to S1 | S3 for both encodings the
positive instantiation of the sum lock l1 is consumed first and to complete the emulation a positive instantiation of
the sum lock l2 has to be consumed. However, it is possible, that the encoded term instead performs another (nested)
test-statement and consume both positive instantiations of l2 and l3 to emulate the step to S3 | S4 instead. Because
of that, in case of a nested test-statement, we do not consider the first consumption of a positive instantiation of
a sum lock as a core step. Even, if at this point the sum lock, that is tested next by this test-statement, is still
instantiated positive, it can become negative by an interleaving other test-statement.
So after the consumption of the positive instantiation of l1 in order to emulate the source term step to S1 | S3,
there is still the possibility to complete instead the emulation of the source term step to S3 | S4. However, there
is no possibility to complete the emulation of the source term step to S2 | S3. Note that, to emulate the step to
S2 | S3, a positive instantiation of each of the locks l1 and l2 is necessary. Here, the instantiation of l1 is consumed.
The only possibility to restore the positive instantiation is to consume a negative instantiation of l2 (compare to
the nested test-statements in the encodings of input guarded terms in Figure 3 and Figure 4). By Lemma 5, then
there is no possibility to change that negative instantiation back into a positive one. So, as soon as l1 is consumed,
one of the three possible emulations is ruled out while there are still two possible emulations left.
J S Km
a
T1
T2
J S3 | S4 Kma
J S1 | S3 Kma
J S2 | S3 Kma
Fig. 5. Intermediate States.
We visualise this phenomenon in Figure 5 (for the case of J · Kma ). Here the red lines denote sequences of steps
with (exactly) one core step, the blue lines denote sequences without core steps but with at least one impure
administrative step, and the green lines denote sequences of only pure administrative steps (compare to Definition
24). Between the encoding of the source term S and the encodings of its reducts S1 | S3, S2 | S3, and S3 | S4 there
are two intermediate states, i.e., two states that differ from each encoded source term within that picture. Note that
the observability of such an intermediate state depends on the chosen equivalence on target terms.
Definition 23 (Intermediate State). A term T ′ is an intermediate state, if
∃T, T1, T2, T3 . T Z=⇒ T1 ∧ T Z=⇒ T2 ∧ T Z=⇒ T3 ∧ T Z=⇒ T ′ ∧ T ′ Z=⇒ T1 ∧ T ′ Z=⇒ T2 ∧ T ′ 6Z=⇒ T3,
i.e. if
T
T ′
T2
T1
T3
Remarkably, the existence of intermediate states in J · Ksa is independent of structural congruence—if two source
terms are structural congruent, then their encodings have the same intermediate states—while this is not true
for J · Kma . Here the locks are always tested according to a total ordering created along the structure induced by
the nesting of parallel operators of the source term. Because of that, this ordering of sum locks differ for source
terms, that are structural congruent but differ in the order of their subprocesses, i.e. differ by rule P | Q ≡ Q | P .
So structural congruent source terms can differ in the number and nature of reachable intermediate states; e. g.
S′ = a.S3 | (a.S1 + a.S2) | a.S4, which is structural congruent to S from Example 1, does not reach any of the
above intermediate states. Instead, in S′ the first consumption of a positive instantiation of a sum lock, which is no
core step here, completely determines which emulation can be completed.
To capture that fact we further distinguish administrative steps, into pure administrative steps—that never rule
out the completion of any possible emulation—and impure administrative steps—that due to the consumption of
a positive instantiation of a sum lock may possibly rule out the completion of an emulation. Note that in case ofJ · Kma requests are copied to ensure that each possible combination of input and output requests is checked exactly
once. Because of that steps on requests are pure administrative steps. In opposite, J · Ksa does not translate source
term observables into requests. To check for a potential pair of translated communication partners a communication
of the translated channel names is performed. Similar to the consumption of positive instantiations of sum locks
this might rule out alternative emulations. Because of that we consider steps on translated source term names as
impure administrative steps of J · Ksa. Also note, that in J · Kma translated source term names are used as values only;
so there are no steps on translated source term names.
Definition 24 (Pure and Impure Administrative Step). Let T1, T2 ∈ Pa↾J · Km
a
(or T1, T2 ∈ Pa↾J · Ks
a
). A step
T1 ˙7−→. T2 is a pure administrative step, denoted by T1 7−→. T2, if it is neither on a sum lock nor on a translated
source term name, else it is an impure administrative step, denoted by T1 ˙7−→T2.
Let T1 Z=⇒. T2 denote a sequence of pure administrative steps, i.e., Z=⇒. is the transitive and reflexive closure of
7−→. .
To show that the definition of pure administrative steps meets our intuition, we prove some kind of local
confluence property for most of the pure administrative steps. Intuitively, it states that indeed none of the pure
administrative steps can rule out the completion of any emulation, because they are (in most cases) not conflicting,
i.e., does not rule out any other sequence of steps.
Lemma 9. Within target terms pure administrative steps are not conflicting, i.e.,
∀T, T1, T2 ∈ Pa↾J · Ks
a
. T 7−→. T1 ∧ T Z=⇒ T2 implies ∃T ′ ∈ Pa↾J · Ks
a
. T1 Z=⇒ T ′ ∧ T2 7−→. T ′.
Proof. In comparison to J · Kma the encoding J · Ksa introduces only a few pure administrative steps and all of them
are not conflicting. First note that, since in pia there are no sums, two target term steps can only be in conflict if
one of it consumes some input or output necessary to perform the other step. So it suffice to concentrate on steps
on the same channel. Analysing the encoding function in Figure 3 we discover that steps on receiver or sender locks
(compare to Definitions 18 and 17) are pure administrative steps.
In case of receiver lock, since they are generated under restriction, for each receiver lock there is exactly one
replicated input and no other input. Because of that it does not matter how many other steps on (the same) receiver
lock may appear within the sequence T Z=⇒ T2 the step T 7−→. T1 can be performed before or after that sequence
and in both cases the same term T ′ is reached.
In case of sender locks, there is exactly one input and no replicated input for each sender lock. Moreover, we
observe that initially there is no instantiation of a sender lock, and there is exactly one output (on a translated
source term name) which carries the sender lock as value. This output is consumed to unguard a test-statement and
that test-statement can then ungard again at most one output which carries the sender lock as value and which can
itself unguard another test-statement. The only instantiations of sender locks are due to the then-case of a single
test-statement in the encoding of a replicated input or the then-case of the second test-statement in the encoding
of an input guarded term, and in both cases only a single instantiation of a sender lock is unguarded. So for each
target term and each sender lock there can be at most one instantiation of a sender lock. Moreover note, that the
output on the translated source term names does not only carry the sender lock, but also a sum lock. In order to
obtain an instantiation of the sender lock this sum lock has to be instantiated positive. But whenever a sender lock
is instantiated the encoding also generates a negative instantiation of that sum lock. By Lemma 5 that negative
instantiation can never be turned into a positive one again; so there is no chance to generate a second instantiation
on the same sender lock. Because of that, if T 7−→. T1 is a step on a sender lock, then none of the steps in T Z=⇒ T2
is a step on that sender lock. So the lemma holds.
Besides these to steps there is another kind of pure administrative steps that is not that obvious in Figure 3
because that kind of steps is hidden by the abbreviation used to introduce booleans and test-statements (compare
to Definition 5). We observe, that a test-statement is reduced within two steps. The first consumes the instantiation
of the sum lock and is thus no pure administrative step. The second step unguards the corresponding then- or
else-case. In both cases that step is a pure administrative step. However the names t and f are restricted for each
test-statement, are not used any there else by the encoding function, and thanks to the renaming policy are different
from each translated source term name. Because of that, we can again conclude that, if T 7−→. T1 is a step on a
version of t or f , then none of the steps in T Z=⇒ T2 is a step on the same name. So the lemma holds. ⊓⊔
Lemma 10. Within target terms pure administrative steps, that either are on sender locks or booleans, or do not
unguard an instantiation of a chain lock carrying a request channel, are not conflicting, i.e.,
∀T, T1, T2 ∈ Pa↾J · Km
a
. T 7−→. T1 ∧ T Z=⇒ T2
∧
(
T 7−→ T1 is a step on a sender lock or booleans
∨
(
∀T ′1 ∈ Pa . ∀x˜ ⊂ N . ∀co ,mi ∈ N . T1 ≡ (ν x˜) (T
′
1 | co 〈mi〉) , where mi is a request channel
implies (∃T ′ ∈ Pa . ∃x˜1 ⊂ N . T ≡ (ν x˜1) (T
′ | co 〈mi〉))
))
implies ∃T3 ∈ Pa↾J · Km
a
. T1 Z=⇒ T3 ∧ T2 7−→. T3.
Proof. J · Kma relies on much more pure administrative steps than J · Ksa. First note that, the encoding of a parallel
operator generates unguarded instantiations of chain locks carrying a request channel. Since a step on a sender
lock and a step on t to unguard the then-case of a test-statement unguards an encoded continuation, they unguard
instantiations of such chain locks, if the corresponding source term in the continuation contains a parallel operator.
Nevertheless, we want to prove the condition also for steps on sender locks and booleans.
Since source term names are translated into values, never used as links, it suffice to consider steps on names
introduced by the encoding function. A look at the definition of the corresponding renaming policy in Figure 4
suggests the following case split3 on the subject of the step T 7−→ T1.
Case of po , pi , po,up , pi,up ,mo ,mi ,mo,up ,mi,up , ri , ro , ri,up , ro,up : All these names are request channels, i.e., there
are introduced by J · Kma to transport requests. Note that the encoding function puts much effort in the direction
of requests. Usually there is exactly one way for them, namely: (1) upwards in the structure generated by the
nesting of parallel operators in the corresponding source term, (2) within the encoding of a parallel operator
or each branch of the encoding of a replicated input from the left side to each right request, which are linked
within a chain, and (3) within the encoding of a replicated input from each branch to each next branch, where
each branch represents an encoding of the continuation of that replicated input and the branches are again
linked within some kind of chain.
Indeed there is only one point, at which the way of a requests is not completely determined. That is the point
at which right requests are linked within a chain (compare to the encoding of a parallel operator or a replicated
input). The order in which the right requests are consumed determines their order in the chain, so these steps
are conflicting. They are steps on the first input on output requests in procRightOutReq and on the first input
on input requests in procLeftOutReq.
procRightOutReq , co 〈mi〉 | co
∗ (mi) .po (y, ls, s , z) .
(
(νmi,up)
(
mi
∗ (y′, lr, r) . ([ y
′ = y ] r 〈lr, ls, ls, s , z〉 | mi,up 〈y
′, lr, r〉)
| (νmi) (mi,up ։ mi | co 〈mi〉)
)
| po,up 〈y, ls, s , z〉
)
procRightInReq , ci 〈mo〉 | ci
∗ (mo) .pi (y, lr, r) .
(
(νmo,up)
(
mo
∗ (y′, ls, s , z) . ([ y
′ = y ] r 〈ls, lr, ls, s , z〉 | mo,up 〈y
′, ls, s , z〉)
| (νmo) (mo,up ։ mo | ci 〈mo〉)
)
| pi,up 〈y, lr, r〉
)
In both cases immediately an instantiation of a chain lock carrying a request channel is unguarded. So the
lemma holds, because its precondition is violated.
Let us have a look at the remaining request channels. Within the left side of the encoding of a parallel operator
there are two restricted different replicated inputs on requests channels. Note that, the encoding function
places all inputs or replicated inputs under restriction, i.e., for all source terms their encoding has no inputs
or replicated inputs on free names. Because of that, for the request channels restricted at the left side of the
parallel operator encoding there is exactly one replicated input and no other input. Thus it does not matter
how many other steps on the same request channel may appear within the sequence T Z=⇒ T2, the step T 7−→. T1
can be performed before or after that sequence and in both cases the same term T3 is reached.
3 Note that in most cases the considered names are restricted, so a simple alpha conversion may change them. Because of
that the use of concrete names in the following case split should not imply that we consider steps on these specific names.
Instead the names refer to the meaning which is related to them by the encoding function.
Beside the already considered possibly conflicting input, there are two different replicated inputs on request
channels and no other input on request channels within procRightOutReq. The link of the first is bounded by
a guarding replicated input on a chain lock. The link of the second is restricted. So we can again apply the
argumentation of the case before. The same applies to procRightInReq. The two links of replicated inputs in
pushReq and the four links of replicated inputs pushReqOut are restricted, apart from that, this case is similar to
the cases before. In opposite, in case of pushReqIn the links of both replicated inputs are bounded by a guarding
input, apart from that, this case is similar to the cases before.
Case of co , ci : These names is used as chain locks carrying a request channel (compare to Definition 20). Those
chain locks are used by the encoding function to direct the combinations of left and right requests in the encoding
of a parallel operator as well as in the encoding of a replicated input. In order to avoid divergence, requests
can not be copied arbitrary often. To ensure that indeed each left request is combined which each possible
matching right request, the right requests are linked within some kind of chain or list, along which the left
requests are forwarded. Again to avoid divergence these chains can not be infinitely long, so co and ci allow to
extent these chains by a new right request as soon as its last place is occupied. Since these names are generated
under restriction, for each of them there is exactly one replicated input and no other input. Because of that it
does not matter how many other steps on the same names may appear within the sequence T Z=⇒ T2, the step
T 7−→. T1 can be performed before or after that sequence and in both cases the same term T3 is reached.
Case of l , ls, lr, l1, l2: Any of these names refer to a sum lock in the encoding given in Figure 4. By Definition 24
steps on sum locks are no pure administrative steps.
Case of s: s is used by the encoding function to introduce sender locks. For steps on sender locks it suffice to
repeat the argumentation given in the proof of Lemma 9 for sender locks.
Case of r : In case of receiver lock, since they are generated under restriction, for each receiver lock there is exactly
one replicated input and no other input. Because of that it does not matter how many other steps on (the same)
receiver lock may appear within the sequence T Z=⇒ T2, the step T 7−→. T1 can be performed before or after that
sequence and in both cases the same term T3 is reached.
Case of cr1 : cr1 again is a chain lock, this time carrying a translated source term name. Intuitively, it is used by
the encoding function for a purpose similar to the usage of chain locks carrying a request channel. Instead of a
chain of right requests, cr1 as well as cr2 are used to build up a some kind of chain of the encoded continuations
of several reductions on the same encoded replicated input. As already explained our encoding J · Kma relies on
the structure with is build by the parallel operators in the corresponding source term. Each reduction of a
replicated input changes this structure. To allow for different encoded continuations to communicate among
each other or with the encoded replicated input we link the encodings of the continuations. This time we have
to add a new member, i.e., an encoded continuation, to the chain whenever the encoded replicated input is used
to emulate a step. Therefore cr1 is instantiated within the then-case of the test-statement in the encoding of a
replicated input. Since cr1 is generated under restriction, for each cr1 there is exactly one replicated input and
no other input. Because of that, it does not matter how many other steps on the same name may appear within
the sequence T Z=⇒ T2, the step T 7−→. T1 can be performed before or after that sequence and in both cases the
same term T3 is reached.
Case of cr2 : To link the members in the chain of right requests for each new member a new mo or mi is restricted
and transmitted over co or ci . The encoded continuations of a replicated input are linked over ri and ro , which
are again restricted for each encoded continuation. cr2 is used to transmit these new restricted names to the
respective next member of the chain. Note that, this kind of link is generated always under restriction. Initially
there is exactly one unguarded output and one input, guarded by a replicated input on a chain lock. Reducing
this input immediately unguards some instantiations of chain locks, so the lemma holds, because its precondition
is violated. Also note that, due to several emulations on the encoded replicated input, there may be several
unguarded inputs on cr2 . The order in which these inputs are consumed determines the order of the encoded
continuations within the constructed chain. Because of that steps on cr2 can be indeed conflicting.
Case of y, y′, z: These names are used by the encoding function as values only, but never as links. So there are no
(pure administrative) steps on these names.
Case of t, f : These names are used only to implement the test-statements and the instantiation of sum locks. The
reduction of a test-statement is performed in two steps. The first consumes the instantiation of a sum lock and
is thus not a pure administrative step. For the second one—necessary to unguard the then- or else-case of a
test-statement—it suffice to repeat the argumentation given in the proof of Lemma 9 for these kind of steps.
⊓⊔
Note that the proof above provides a detailed explanation of the purposes of the names reserved by the encoding
function J · Kma . Moreover note that the pure administrative steps that are conflicting are exactly the steps that
introduce additional causal dependencies (compare to [PSN11] and thus prevent the preservation of the degree of
distribution (compare to Section 4 in [PN12]). In the following we strongly rely on the Lemmata 9 and 10, because
they basically allow us to ignore all not conflicting steps while considering the reachability of success or translated
observables in the next section.
In order to show that the remaining pure administrative steps do not cause any problems but in fact, as described
in the proof of Lemma 10, do only influence the order of right requests in the chain of right request or the order of
encoded continuations of a replicated input generated by its encoding, we prove that those steps never cause any
deadlock. Note that, [Nes00] proves that the encoding J · Ksa does not introduce deadlocks.
Lemma 11. Pure administrative steps do not introduce deadlocks.
Proof. In case of a step on a sender lock or a step which does not unguard an instantiation of a chain lock, this
lemma directly follows by Lemma 10.
In case of a step on a request channel which does unguard an instantiation of a chain lock (compare to the first
case of the proof of Lemma 10), a step on the unguarded chain lock unguards another input on the same request
channel. Moreover the corresponding continuations differ only on a single name free to that continuation. Let us
denote the first such continuation by A and the second by B, and the free link name by p. Then it turns out, that
B is connected to A by p and either A is connected in a similar way to another such continuation or A is connected
to the requests from the left. The only requests travelling along p are left requests. However as soon as they arrive
A they are copied and transmitted to B. Because of that the order of A and B in that chain does not matter (at
least as long as we do not consider causal dependencies). Of course, the step on the chain lock unguarding B is
not forced to be performed immediately after the step on the request channel, but by Lemma 10 it will eventually
happen. So the step on the request channel blocks alternative steps on this request channel for some time but not
for ever, i.e., it does not introduce deadlock.
In case of a step on a channel of multiplicity two—let us denote it c—which does unguard an instantiation of
a chain lock (compare to case cr2 of the proof of Lemma 10), immediately an other output on c is unguarded. As
in the case before by the communication on the chain lock, the communication over c links the encodings of the
continuations of the respective replicated input, in this case by two request channels. Apart from that, the situation
is exactly the same as before. If there is an other encoded continuation of that replicated input—caused by another
emulation—it will eventually be linked within the chain and all requests that arrive at a previous member of that
chain are forwarded to that member. Note that the encoded continuations initially are all equal. So the chains
resulting from different orders of two members, that were available at the same time, are equal. We conclude that
a step on c can not introduce deadlock. ⊓⊔
Lemma 12. Impure administrative steps do not introduce deadlocks.
Proof. In J · Kma any impure administrative step reduces a test-statement by consuming an instantiation of a sum lock
(compare to Definition 24). Deadlock occurs, if—due to interleaving of these test-statements—the instantiations of
a subset of the sum locks are consumed, such that none of the involved test-statements can be resolved. As already
stated in [Nes00] a total ordering on the sum locks suffice to circumvent any potential deadlock. Note that the
encodings of parallel operator and replicated input implement such a total ordering on sum locks. They somehow
reuse the structure generated by the parallel operators of the corresponding source term to force the nested test-
statements to always test the lock first, which is according to that parallel structure left to the other one. Since the
parallel operator is binary, this structure is a binary tree. So testing always the left lock first, indeed implements a
total ordering. ⊓⊔
Note that, by Lemma 32 at page 48, core steps and the source term steps of the corresponding emulations
coincide. So Lemma 32 in combination with the Lemma 11 and Lemma 12 proves that the encoding J · Kma does not
introduce deadlocks.
2.4 Translated Observables and Choosing a Bisimulation
In order to prove the presented encodings correct with respect to the criteria of Gorla we have to choose an
equivalence ≍ for operational correspondence (compare to Definition 9). In [Gor10] Gorla describes ≍ as follows:
“≍ is a behavioural equivalence needed to describe the abstract behaviour of a process. Usually, ≍
is a congruence at least with respect to parallel composition; it is often defined in the form of a barbed
equivalence or can be derived directly from the reduction semantics.”
Moreover, by the criteria in Section 1.3, we know that ≍ should be success respecting (compare to Definition 13).
The main purpose of ≍ in the definition of operational correspondence is to abstract from junk, i.e., remains left
over by former emulations that do not influence the abstract behaviour of a target term. Usually, two kinds of junks
are distinguished inactive junk, i.e., remains that neither can perform further reductions on its own nor interact
with the surrounding target term, and active junk, i.e., remains that may by reduced or even interact with the
surrounding target term. Of course, proving an encoding to be good requires to prove that its active junk does no
harm, i.e., does not influence the abstract behaviour of the target term. However, the presented encodings J · Ksa andJ · Kma induce the consideration of a second dimension of junk, namely observable and inobservable junk. In most
cases developers of encodings make sure that all produced junk is inobservable, i.e., using the standard notions of
observables for the target language neither the steps on junk nor the junk itself is observable. Unfortunately, as for
the presented encodings, it is not always possible to define the encoding function such that all produced junk is
inobservable.
In the pi-calculus observables are usually defined to be the unguarded input or output guards of a term, whose
channel name is not restricted (compare to Definition 4). To encode sums both encodings split up the summands
into parallel. Of course, while doing so, the information which of these summands originally belongs to the same
sum gets lost. To recover it, the encodings introduce sum locks, which cover a boolean value to indicate whether the
respective summands of that sum can still be used to complete an emulation or whether a former emulation already
consume one of the summands and thus no other can be used any more. Thus the encoding functions translate a
source term observable into an observable—in case of J · Ksa—or a request—in case of J · Kma —both times augment
with the information covered by the sum lock. So source term observables are not translated into single observables
again.
Definition 25 (Translated Observables). Let T ∈ Pa↾J · Ks
a
. Then T has a translated input observables y,
denoted by T ↓sy, if
∃T ′, T ′1, T
′
2 ∈ Pa . ∃x˜ ⊂ N . ∃l , l
′, s , z ∈ N .(
T ≡ (ν x˜)
(
T ′ | y (l ′, s , z) .test l then T ′1 else T
′
2 | l 〈⊤〉
)
∨ T ≡ (ν x˜) (T ′ | y∗ (l ′, s , z))
)
∧ y /∈ x˜
and T has a translated output observables y, denoted by T ↓sy, if
∃T ′ ∈ Pa . ∃x˜ ⊂ N . ∃l , s , z ∈ N . T ≡ (ν x˜)
(
T ′ | y 〈l , s , z〉 | l 〈⊤〉
)
∧ y /∈ x˜.
Let T ∈ Pa↾J · Km
a
. Then T has a translated input observables y, denoted by T ↓my , if
∃T ′ ∈ Pa . x˜ ⊂ N . ∃pi , l , r ∈ N . T ≡ (ν x˜)
(
T ′ | pi 〈y, l , r〉 | l 〈⊤〉
)
∧ y /∈ x˜
and T has a translated output observables y, denoted by T ↓my , if
∃T ′ ∈ Pa . x˜ ⊂ N . ∃po , l , s , z ∈ N . T ≡ (ν x˜)
(
T ′ | po 〈y, l , s , z〉 | l 〈⊤〉
)
∧ y /∈ x˜.
Moreover for some input or output observable µ we define T ⇓sµ , ∃T
′ ∈ pia . T Z=⇒ T ′ ∧ T ′ ↓sµ and T ⇓mµ , ∃T ′ ∈
pia . T Z=⇒ T ′ ∧ T ′ ↓mµ .
Note that for all target terms T ∈ Pa↾J · Km
a
any output with three parameters is an input request and any
output with four parameters is an output request. So a simple typing suffice to securely identify requests. Since
requests already contain a reference to their related sum lock, the identification of the related sum lock instantiation
is unambiguous as well. The condition y /∈ x˜ is necessary to rule out translated observables that corresponds to
invisible in- or outputs of the source term (compare to Definition 4 at page 3). To show that the notion of translated
observables indeed captures our intuition we prove that the set of observables reachable for a source term coincides
with the set of translated observables reachable for its encoding.
Lemma 13. The set of reachable observables of a source term and of reachable translated observables of its encoding
coincide, i.e.,
∀S ∈ Ps . ∀µ ∈ N ∪N . S ⇓µ iff J S Ksa ⇓sµ
and
∀S ∈ Pm . ∀µ ∈ N ∪N . S ⇓µ iff J S Kma ⇓mµ .
Proof. By Corollary 3 stating that initially all sum locks are instantiated positive and Figure 4 the set of observables
of a source term S ∈ Pm and the set of translated observables of J S Kma coincide, i.e.,
∀S ∈ Pm . ∀µ ∈ N ∪N . S ↓µ iff J S Kma ↓mµ .
In case of J · Ksa we obtain a similar result after reducing all instantiation of receiver locks, since they guard the
respective inputs (compare to Figure 3). The lemma then follows by operational correspondence, i.e. by the Lemmata
30 at page 37, 31 at page 40, and 33 at page 494. ⊓⊔
The problem now is, that the completion of an emulation changes positive instantiations of sum locks into
negative ones and so obviously influences the translated observables, but the corresponding requests—in case ofJ · Kma —or in- and outputs of other summands—in case of J · Ksa—remain as observable junk. While active junk often
aggravates the proof of correctness of an encoding, due to intricate proofs to show that it does no harm, observable
junk turns out to be even worse for an encoding, because it prevents for the use of standard equivalences to describe
the abstract behaviour of a target term.
Since the target language is the asynchronous pi-calculus, it seems natural to choose weak asynchronous bisim-
ilarity ≈a or asynchronous barbed congruence ∼=a. Unfortunately for both choices the presented encodings are
not good. Consider for example the source term S = (ν x) (x+ y | x). It can perform a reduction to 0. But, all
derivatives of its encoding, i.e., all T ∈ Pa with J S Ksa Z=⇒ T or J S Kma Z=⇒ T , are neither asynchronous bisimi-
lar nor synchronous barbed congruent to the encoding of 0, i.e., T 6≈a (ν l)
(
l 〈⊤〉
)
and T 6∼=a (ν l)
(
l 〈⊤〉
)
, whereJ 0 Ksa = (ν l) (l 〈⊤〉) = J 0 Kma . Note that this is not due to the encoding of 0, which is indeed weak asynchronous
bisimilar to 0 again, but to the observable junk, which suffice to distinguish the remains of emulations from 0.
Because of this, a proof of the correctness of these encodings with respect to ≈a or ∼=a fails due to operational
correspondence (compare to the Definition 9). Of course, you might argue that an encoding that can not get rid
of observable junk is no good encoding. On the other side, Nestmann in [Nes00] gives some good reasons to acceptJ · Ksa as a good encoding. Moreover, the translation of observables into something different seems to be a quite
natural manner of encoding functions. And indeed rephrasing a standard equivalence to take instead of observables
translated observables into account suffice to turn it into an equivalence that describes the abstract behaviour of
encoded terms. The same holds if we do not consider observables at all, but e.g. only reachability of success.
Note that to test a sum lock it has to be consumed first. Analysing the encoding function we observe that in each
case an instantiation of sum lock is consumed, another instantiation of that lock is restored as soon as the respective
test statement is completed. However, since there may lay many steps between the start and the completion of a
test statement, instantiations of locks may temporally not be available. Because of that, we will use the notion of
P ⇓mµ instead of P ↓
m
µ in the following.
Definition 26 (Translated Barbed Bisimilarity). Let P,Q ∈ Pa. Then P and Q are translated barbed bisim-
ilar with respect to J · Ksa, denoted by P ≈˙sa Q, if
1. P ⇓X iff Q ⇓X,
2. for all µ ∈ N ∪N , P ⇓sµ iff Q ⇓
s
µ,
3. for all P ′ ∈ Pa, P 7−→ P ′ implies Q Z=⇒ ≈˙sa P ′, and
4. for all Q′ ∈ Pa, Q 7−→ Q′ implies P Z=⇒ ≈˙sa Q′.
And P and Q are translated barbed bisimilar with respect to J · Kma , denoted by P ≈˙ma,1 Q, if
1. P ⇓X iff Q ⇓X,
2. for all µ ∈ N ∪N , P ⇓mµ iff Q ⇓
m
µ ,
3. for all P ′ ∈ Pa, P 7−→ P ′ implies Q Z=⇒ ≈˙ma,1 P ′, and
4. for all Q′ ∈ Pa, Q 7−→ Q′ implies P Z=⇒ ≈˙ma,1 Q′.
Note that the first condition of each equivalence ensures that it is success respecting as required in Section 1.3
by Definition 13. Conditions 2. to 4. than define a version of weak barbed bisimilarity which utilises translated
observables instead of standard barbs. Note that we consider the translation of input as well as output observables,
although our target language is asynchronous. However, since in case of J · Kma both kinds of source term actions are
translated into requests and instantiations of sum locks, i.e., into outputs, the presented kind of barbed bisimilarity
does consider barbs on outputs only. So it is an asynchronous variant of barbed bisimulation. Moreover note, that
due to the definition above we do not consider any barbs except for translated barbs. However, analysing the
4 Note that we present this fact just to visualize our intuition. We do not use it within another proof.
encoding function J · Kma , we observe, that for all target terms all free in- or outputs are on the request channels pi
and po . So, since we do only consider target terms, requests are indeed the only interesting barbs of J · Kma .
Alternatively, we could decide not to consider barbs at all, by omitting the second condition of ≈˙sa and ≈˙
m
a,1 .
We result then in an equivalence that considers only reachability of Xas abstract behaviour of a term. Note that this
intuition goes along very well with the criteria defined by Gorla as they also do only require a similar reachability
of X, because reachability of success is defined independent of a specific source or target language. An advantage of
such an equivalence is the fact, that it is independent of the considered encoding function. However, the resulting
equivalence is obviously strictly weaker then ≈˙sa and ≈˙
m
a,1 . Moreover, ≈˙
s
a and ≈˙
m
a,1 much better describe how
the encoding function proceeds source terms and emulate source term steps. So we will use these equivalences in
the following.
In case of J · Kma we are faced with an other problem concerning the choice of an appropriate equivalence, although
that problem is by far not that crucial as observable junk. As explained above, the encodings of structural congruent
source terms can differ in the number and nature of reachable intermediate states (compare to Example 1, Definition
23, and the following discussion above). Operational Soundness explicitly allows for intermediate states, i.e., target
term states that due not map to the encodings of any of the corresponding source terms. However, if ≍ does
distinguish target terms by reachability of intermediate states, we have a problem with the Cong rule of Figure 2
and operational completeness of Definition 9. Let us consider the source terms S = (a.S1 + a.S2) | a.S3 | a.S4 and
S′ = a.S3 | (a.S1 + a.S2) | a.S4 again. The source term b.S | b can reduce to S but by the Cong rule it can reduce
to S′ as well. J · Kma can emulate the first step modulo ≈˙ma,1 but not the second step. Note that the Cong rule
is used to shorten the presentation of the reduction semantics, but it is neither necessary nor was it the originally
choice. So the most natural way to circumvent this problem is to rephrase the rules of the reduction semantics by
avoiding the Cong rule and with it the possibility to arbitrary reorder the subprocesses during reductions. However
we can also circumvent this problem by using an equivalence which does not distinguishes terms by the reachability
of intermediate states.
Definition 27 (Translated Barbed Bisimilarity). Let P,Q ∈ Pa. Then P and Q are translated barbed bisim-
ilar with respect to J · Kma , denoted by P ≈˙ma,2 Q, if
1. P ⇓X iff Q ⇓X,
2. for all µ ∈ N ∪N , P ⇓mµ iff Q ⇓
m
µ ,
3. for all P ′ ∈ Pa, P Z=⇒ P ′ implies that there exists some P ′′ ∈ Pa such that Q Z=⇒ ≈˙ma,2 P ′′ and P ′ Z=⇒ P ′′, and
4. for all Q′ ∈ Pa, Q Z=⇒ Q′ implies that there exists some Q′′ ∈ Pa such that P Z=⇒ ≈˙ma,2 Q′′ and Q′ Z=⇒ Q′′.
Note that the second version of ≈˙ma is strictly weaker then the first version and that we only use it to circumvent
the problem with the Cong rule in operational completeness (and the therefore necessary Lemma 21). Because of
this we prove the remaining results using the stricter equivalence; silently omitting the subscript 1.
Before we use these relations, we prove that they are indeed equivalences.
Lemma 14. All presented translated barbed bisimulations are equivalence relations.
Proof. We have to show that ≈˙sa , ≈˙
m
a,1 , and ≈˙
m
a,2 are reflexive, symmetric, and transitive. Reflexivity and
transitivity follow directly by definition. For transitivity of ≈˙ma,1 assume P,Q,R ∈ Pa such that P ≈˙
m
a,1 Q and
Q ≈˙ma,1 R. By the first condition we have P ⇓X iff Q ⇓X iff R ⇓X. And by the second condition for all µ ∈ N ∪ N
we have P ⇓mµ iff Q ⇓
m
µ iff R ⇓
m
µ . So we can conclude that P ⇓X iff R ⇓X and P ⇓
m
µ iff R ⇓
m
µ .
By the third condition for all P ′ ∈ Pa with P 7−→ P ′ there is some Q′ ∈ Pa such that Q Z=⇒ Q′ and P ′ ≈˙ma,1 Q′.
Without loss of generality let us assume, that the sequence Q Z=⇒ Q′ is of length n, i.e., there are Q1, . . . , Qn ∈ Pa
such that Q0 7−→ Q1 7−→ . . . 7−→ Qn, Q0 = Q, and Qn = Q′. Let R = R0 and R′ = Rn. Then, by the third
condition, for each step in Q Z=⇒ Q′, i.e., for each Qi−1 7−→ Qi with 0 < i ≤ n, there is some Ri ∈ Pa such that
Ri−1 Z=⇒ Ri with Ri ≈˙ma,1 Qi. So we conclude that for all P ′ ∈ Pa with P 7−→ P ′ there is some R′ ∈ Pa such that
R Z=⇒ R′ and P ′ ≈˙ma,1 R′. The argumentation for the last condition is similar.
The argumentation for ≈˙sa and ≈˙
m
a,2 is similar. ⊓⊔
The observable junk does not only rule out standard equivalences but also congruences with respect to contexts,
that allow for interaction with observable junk. In both encodings such an interaction can for instance lead to a
positive instantiation of a formerly negative instantiation of a sum lock and so turn observable junk into a translated
observable, or it can instantiate a sender lock and so complete emulations on junk.
Example 2. Let us consider the target terms T1 = (ν l)
(J y.XKsa | l 〈⊥〉) and T2 = (ν l) (J y.XKma | l 〈⊥〉). By the
Lemmata 26 and 27 in the next section, we prove that both terms are junk. They be produced as remains of emula-
tions (or a part of such a remain), e.g. for a source term x+ y.X | x. Since neither T1 nor T2 reaches any translated
observables or unguarded occurrence of X, we have T1 ≈˙
s
a J 0 Ksa and T2 ≈˙ma J 0 Kma . However, we can distinguish T1
from J 0 Ksa by the context C1 ([·]) = [·] | ϕsa (y) (−, s ,−) .s , because C1 (T1) ⇓X but C1 (0) 6⇓X. So C1 (T1) ˙6≈sa C1 (0).
Accordingly, we can distinguish T2 from J 0 Kma by the context C2 ([·]) = [·] | po (−,−, s ,−) .s , where po is the free
output request channel of J y.XKma . Again we have C2 (T2) ⇓X but C2 (0) 6⇓X, i.e., C2 (T2) ˙6≈ma C2 (0).
Because of this, in order to prove operational completeness, we have to reduce the number of contexts we consider
to obtain a congruence. Intuitively, we consider only contexts that respect the protocol of the encoding function.
Thus, we consider only contexts that, if their argument is a target term as for instance the encoding of 0, result in
a target term.
Definition 28 (Translated Barbed Congruence). Two terms T1, T2 ∈ Pa are translated barbed congruent
with respect to J · Ksa, denoted as T1 ∼=sa T2, if
∀C ([·]) ∈ Pa → Pa . C (J 0 Ksa) ∈ Pa↾J · Ksa implies C (T1) ≈˙sa C (T2) .
Two target terms T1, T2 ∈ Pa are translated barbed congruent with respect to J · Kma , denoted as T1 ∼=ma,1 T2, if
∀C ([·]) ∈ Pa → Pa . C (J 0 Kma ) ∈ Pa↾J · Kma implies C (T1) ≈˙ma,1 C (T2) .
Two target terms T1, T2 ∈ Pa are translated barbed congruent with respect to J · Kma , denoted as T1 ∼=ma,2 T2, if
∀C ([·]) ∈ Pa → Pa . C (J 0 Kma ) ∈ Pa↾J · Kma implies C (T1) ≈˙ma,2 C (T2) .
Note that we again usually only consider the stricter first variant of the congruence ∼=ma , while silently omitting the
subscript 1. Operational correspondence considers only target terms, so it would suffice to define the congruence
over target terms only. However, in defining it over all terms of the target language we gain more flexibility. We
will use these flexibility in the proof of operational completeness to stepwise reduce junk which in some cases leads
to non target terms. Since these non target terms are behavioural equivalent to the considered target terms, they
serve as connecting pieces to link the target terms modulo ∼=sa or
∼=ma . Moreover note that the respective congruence
relations are strictly weaker than their corresponding equivalences.
Example 3. Let us consider the target terms T1 = J y.XKsa, T ′1 = J y.0 Ksa, T2 = J y.XKma , and T ′2 = J y.0 Kma .
Obviously T1 ≈˙
s
a T
′
1 and T2 ≈˙
m
a T
′
2. But neither T1
∼=sa T
′
1 nor T2
∼=ma T
′
2, because in both cases the context has
only to provide a translated input observable on ϕsa (y) or ϕ
m
a (y), respectively. So in case of J · Ksa the context
C ([·]) = [·] | J x Ksa suffice to distinguish T1 and T ′1, because C (T1) ⇓X but C (T ′1) 6⇓X. The argumentation for J · Kma
is similar, but due to the complex encoding of the parallel operator the respective distinguishing context is rather
large. Because of that, intuitively, two equivalent target terms are congruent, only if the encoded continuations of
their translated observables are again equivalent.
Of course, all presented congruences are again equivalences.
Lemma 15. All presented translated barbed congruences are equivalence relations.
Proof. Let T1, T2, T3 ∈ Pa. Then C (T1) ≈˙
s
a C (T1) for all contexts C ([·]) ∈ Pa → Pa; so T1
∼=sa T1. Moreover, if
T1 ∼=
s
a T2, then C (T1) ≈˙
s
a C (T2) for all contexts C ([·]) ∈ Pa → Pa such that C (J 0 Ksa) ∈ Pa↾J · Ksa . Since ≈˙sa is an
equivalence, then also C (T2) ≈˙
s
a C (T1) for all such contexts, i.e., T2
∼=sa T1. Finally, if T1
∼=sa T2 and T2
∼=sa T3, then
C (T1) ≈˙
s
a C (T2) for all contexts C ([·]) ∈ Pa → Pa such that C (J 0 Ksa) ∈ Pa↾J · Ksa , and C (T2) ≈˙sa C (T3) for all such
contexts. So also C (T1) ≈˙
s
a C (T3) for all such contexts, i.e., T1
∼=sa T3. We conclude that
∼=sa is an equivalence.
The argumentation for ∼=ma,1 and
∼=ma,2 is similar. ⊓⊔
Moreover, the presented congruences include the structural congruence on the target language, because it is
already included in the respective bisimulations.
Lemma 16. Translated barbed bisimulation includes structural congruence, i.e.,
∀T1, T2 ∈ Pa . T1 ≡ T2 implies T1 ≈˙
s
a T2 ∧ T1 ≈˙
m
a T2.
Proof. Let us assume T1 ≡ T2. Then, by rule Cong in Figure 2, T1 and T2 can perform exactly the same steps
such that the successors are again structural congruent. Note that this holds even in case of J · Kma and is obviously
a stronger feature than the third and fourth condition of ≈˙ma,2 (compare to Definition 27). Since, by Definition 11,
reachability of success is defined modulo structural congruence, T1 and T2 have the same chance to reach success,
i.e., T1 ⇓X iff T2 ⇓X. Similarly, translated observables are defined modulo structural congruence for both encodings
in Definition 25. Note that we do not consider translated observables on restricted names, since the corresponding
in- and outputs in the source terms are no observables as well. Because of that translated observables can not be
changed by alpha conversion. So T1 and T2 have the same set of translated observables and the same chance to
reach a translated observable, i.e.,
(
T1 ↓sµ iff T2 ↓
s
µ
)
,
(
T1 ↓mµ iff T2 ↓
m
µ
)
,
(
T1 ⇓sµ iff T2 ⇓
s
µ
)
, and
(
T1 ⇓mµ iff T2 ⇓
m
µ
)
for all µ ∈ N ∪N . So T1 ≈˙
s
a T2 and T1 ≈˙
m
a T2. ⊓⊔
Lemma 17. Weak translated barbed congruence includes structural congruence, i.e.,
∀T1, T2 ∈ Pa . T1 ≡ T2 implies T1 ∼=
s
a T2 ∧ T1
∼=ma T2.
Proof. By Definition 28, ∼=sa is the largest congruence on contexts restricted to target terms included in ≈˙
s
a , and
∼=ma
is the largest congruence on contexts restricted to target terms included in ≈˙ma . Note that Definition 28 restricts
only the contexts but not the considered terms. Thus, since by Lemma 16 structural congruence ≡ is included in
≈˙sa and ≈˙
m
a , it is included in
∼=sa and ∼=
m
a . ⊓⊔
Remember, that to our intuition pure administrative steps are only pre- or postprocessing steps that do not
influence which emulations can be completed. To underpin that intuition, we prove that pure administrative steps
do not change the state of a target term modulo the considered equivalences and congruences.
Lemma 18. Pure administrative steps do not influence the state of a target term modulo translated barbed bisimi-
larity or translated barbed congruence with respect to J · Ksa, i.e.,
∀T, T ′ ∈ Pa↾J · Ks
a
. T Z=⇒. T ′ implies T ≈˙sa T ′ ∧ T ∼=sa T ′.
Proof. Translated barbed bisimilarity is some kind of weak bisimilarity that takes instead of observables the reach-
ability of X and the reachability of translated observables into account. Note that it is not possible to reduce X.
So, in case T Z=⇒ T ′, the only way that leads to ¬ (T ⇓X iff T ′ ⇓X) is that in the sequence of steps from T to T ′
there is a step that rules out a former possible way to unguard some occurrence of X. Since by Definition 25 pure
administrative steps can not consume translated observables, the same holds for the consideration of translated
observables. We have to show, that it not possible when using only pure administrative steps to rule out a way to
a translated observable or an unguarded occurrence of X.
Obviously, in case none of the pure administrative steps rules out any other sequence of steps, i.e. if none of the
administrative steps is in conflict to any other sequence of step, this condition holds. Because of that, by Lemma
9, T Z=⇒. T ′ implies (T ⇓X iff T ′ ⇓X).
For the same reason, and since pure administrative steps do neither consumes positive instantiations of sum
locks nor outputs on translated source terms, they do not influence the set of reachable translated observables, i.e.,
T ⇓sµ iff T
′ ⇓sµ for all µ ∈ N ∪N . Note, that such a step can restore a positive or negative instantiation of a sum lock
by resolving a test on a negative instantiated sum lock or can unguard new requests and sum lock instantiations
by a step on a sender lock, so pure administrative steps influence the set of translated observables. But, since they
do not rule out a run that leads to a translated observable, they do not influence the set of reachable translated
observables. So T ≈˙sa T
′.
Since pure administrative steps do not influence the state of arbitrary target terms modulo ≈˙sa and since the
congruence ∼=sa does only consider target term contexts (compare to Definition 28), pure administrative steps do
not influence the state of target terns modulo ∼=sa, i.e., T
∼=sa T
′. ⊓⊔
Lemma 19. Pure administrative steps do not influence the state of a target term modulo translated barbed bisimi-
larity or translated barbed congruence with respect to J · Kma , i.e.,
∀T, T ′ ∈ Pa↾J · Km
a
. T Z=⇒. T ′ implies T ≈˙ma T ′ ∧ T ∼=ma T ′.
Proof. Translated barbed bisimilarity is some kind of weak bisimilarity that takes instead of observables the reach-
ability of X and the reachability of translated observables into account. Note that it is not possible to reduce X.
So, in case T Z=⇒ T ′, the only way that leads to ¬ (T ⇓X iff T ′ ⇓X) is that in the sequence of steps from T to T ′
there is a step that rules out a former possible way to unguard some occurrence of X. Since by Definition 25 pure
administrative steps can not consume translated observables, the same holds for the consideration of translated
observables. We have to show, that it not possible when using only pure administrative steps to rule out a way to
a translated observable or an unguarded occurrence of X.
Obviously, in case none of the pure administrative steps rules out any other sequence of steps, i.e. if none of
the pure administrative steps is in conflict to any other sequence of steps, this condition holds. Fortunately, indeed
most of the pure administrative steps are not conflicting. By Lemma 10, the condition T ≈˙ma T
′ holds for all steps
that are on a sender lock or do not unguard an instantiation of a chain lock carrying a request channel.
Revisiting the argumentation in the proof of Lemma 10 we observe that the remaining steps either influence
the order of requests in chains of right requests (compare to procRightOutReq and procRightInReq) or the order of
encoded continuations in the chain build up by the encoding of a replicated input. By Lemma 11, these steps do not
introduce deadlock, moreover revisiting the argumentation of the proof of this lemma we observe, that their impact
on the ordering within the chain is indeed their only impact on the behaviour of target terms. Since all encoded
continuations of a replicated input are initially the same, their order does not matter for the reachability of X or
translated observables. The same holds for the order of requests, because regardless of their order eventually each
combination is checked. Indeed, a different order may only lead to more or less necessary invisible steps on requests
channels to combine a specific pair of requests. Because of that, even the pure administrative steps that unguards
an instantiation of a chain lock do not influence the state of the target term modulo ≈˙ma . So T ≈˙
m
a T
′.
Since pure administrative steps do not influence the state of arbitrary target terms modulo ≈˙ma and since the
congruence ∼=ma does only consider target term contexts (compare to Definition 28), pure administrative steps do
not influence the state of target terns modulo ∼=ma , i.e., T
∼=ma T
′. ⊓⊔
Note that due to these two lemmata we can mostly ignore pure administrative steps in the following proofs,
since they are invisible modulo the considered equivalence and congruence relations. To handle the Cong rule in
the proof of operational completeness we prove that both encodings preserve structural congruence of source terms
modulo the presented equivalences and congruences.
Lemma 20. The encoding J · Ksa preserves structural congruence of source terms modulo translated barbed bisimi-
larity and translated barbed congruence, i.e.,
∀S, S′ ∈ Ps . S ≡ S
′ implies J S Ksa ≈˙sa J S′ Ksa ∧ J S Ksa ∼=sa J S′ Ksa .
Proof. The strict use of the renaming policy ϕsa, i.e., the fact that source term names are translated into single
names not used by the encoding function for special purposes, ensures the preservation of equality modulo alpha
conversion. Since the parallel operator, the match operator, and restriction are translated rigidly, the encoding J · Ksa
preserves structural congruence of source terms for all rules except for P | 0 ≡ P , i.e., if S and S′ are structural
congruent without using the rule P | 0 ≡ P , then J S Ksa ≡ J S′ Ksa. By Lemma 16, then J S Ksa ≈˙sa J S′ Ksa and, by
Lemma 17, then J S Ksa ∼=sa J S′ Ksa.
The rule P | 0 ≡ P is not preserved, because the empty sum 0 is not translated rigidly, so e.g. 0 | 0 ≡ 0 butJ 0 | 0 Ksa = (ν l) l 〈⊤〉 | (ν l) l 〈⊤〉 6≡ (ν l) l 〈⊤〉 = J 0 Ksa. Note that, because of the renaming policy ϕsa and the rigid
translation of restriction, the rule (ν n)0 ≡ 0 is preserved, i.e., since ϕsa (n) /∈ fn(J 0 Ksa), we have J (ν n)0 Ksa =
(ν ϕsa (n)) (ν l) l 〈⊤〉 ≡ (ν l) l 〈⊤〉 = J 0 Ksa. However, since 0 is translated into a closed term that can not perform
any step, its encoding behaves as 0. In particular J 0 Ksa can not interact with any context and does not reach success
or any translated observable on its own. So, even in this case, we have J S Ksa ≈˙sa J S′ Ksa and J S Ksa ∼=sa J S′ Ksa. ⊓⊔
Since J · Kma does not translate the parallel operator rigidly, it does not directly preserve structural congru-
ence of source terms. But, since the encoding preserves the abstract behaviour of source terms, the encodings of
structural congruent source terms are similar modulo equivalences measuring only these abstract behaviour. As
already explained, to prove the following statement, the equivalence must not distinguish terms by their reachable
intermediate states.
Lemma 21. The encoding J · Kma preserves structural congruence of source terms modulo translated barbed bisimi-
larity and translated barbed congruence, i.e.,
∀S, S′ ∈ Pm . S ≡ S
′ implies J S Kma ≈˙ma,2 J S′ Kma ∧ J S Kma ∼=ma,2 J S′ Kma .
Proof. Again, the strict use of the renaming policy ϕma , i.e., the fact that source term names are translated into single
names not used by the encoding function for special purposes, ensures the preservation of equality modulo alpha
conversion. So S ≡α S′ implies J S Kma ≡α J S′ Kma . Also, the rigid translation of the match operator and restriction
ensures the preservation of structural congruence modulo the rules [ a = a ]P ≡ P , (ν n)0 = 0, (ν n) (ν m)P ≡
(ν m) (ν n)P , and P | (ν n)Q ≡ (ν n) (P | Q) if n /∈ fn(P ). So, if S and S′ do only differ due to one or more of these
four rules, then J S Kma ≡ J S′ Kma . By Lemma 16, we conclude J S Kma ≈˙ma,2 J S′ Kma and, by Lemma 17, we concludeJ S Kma ∼=ma,2 J S′ Kma for both of the above cases.
With the preservation of these rules in mind we show the lemma by an induction over the proof tree of S ≡ S′,
i.e., over the number of structural congruence rules which are applied to show S ≡ S′.
Base Case: If S = S′, then J S Kma = J S′ Kma . So, by reflexivity, J S Kma ≈˙ma,2 J S′ Kma and J S Kma ∼=ma,2 J S′ Kma .
Induction Hypothesis: If S and S′ can be proved to be structural congruent within n applications of structural
congruence rules, then J S Kma ≈˙ma,2 J S′ Kma and J S Kma ∼=ma,2 J S′ Kma .
Induction Step: S and S′ can be proved to be structural congruent within n+1 applications of structural congru-
ence rules. Let S′′ ∈ Pm be such that S and S′′ can be proved to be structural congruent within n applications
of structural congruence rules and S′′ and S′ can be proved to be structural congruent directly by one applica-
tion of a structural congruence rule, i.e., S ≡ S′′ ≡ S′. By the induction hypothesis, J S Kma ≈˙ma,2 J S′′ Kma andJ S Kma ∼=ma,2 J S′′ Kma . We proceed with a case split over the rule necessary to prove S′′ ≡ S′.
Case of Rule P | 0 ≡ P : In this case S′′ = P | 0 and S′ = P for some P ∈ Pm. By Figure 4,
J S′′ Kma = (νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up) (
(ν po , pi) (J P Kma | procLeftOutReq | procLeftInReq)
| (ν po , pi)
(
(ν l) l 〈⊤〉 | procRightOutReq | procRightInReq
)
| pushReq
)
and J S′ Kma = J P Kma . Obviously J S′′ Kma and J S′ Kma are not structural congruent. However, J P Kma appears
unguarded within J S′′ Kma , so if J S′ Kma reaches Xor a translated observable then so does J S′′ Kma . Moreover
we observe, that, since the encoding of 0 does not emit any requests, the hole right branch of J S′′ Kma
(ν po , pi)
(
(ν l) l 〈⊤〉 | procRightOutReq | procRightInReq
)
can do nothing but two steps on chain locks. Because of that requests of J P Kma are prepared to be trans-
mitted to the right side by procLeftOutReq and procLeftInReq but they are never received at the right
side. What remains is the upward pushing of all requests of J P Kma by the interplay of procLeftOutReq,
procLeftInReq, and pushReq. Because of that, for all target term contexts J P | 0 Kma behaves as J P Kma , i.e.,J S′′ Kma ≈˙ma,2 J S′ Kma and J S′′ Kma ∼=ma,2 J S′ Kma . Since ≈˙ma,2 and ∼=ma,2 are equivalences (compare to Lemmata
14 and 15), by transitivity, we conclude J S Kma ≈˙ma,2 J S′ Kma and J S Kma ∼=ma,2 J S′ Kma .
Case of Rule P | Q ≡ Q | P : In this case S′′ = P | Q and S′ = Q | P for some P,Q ∈ Pm. Their encodings
are given by:
J S′′ Kma = (νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up) (
(ν po , pi) (J P Kma | procLeftOutReq | procLeftInReq)
| (ν po , pi) (J Q Kma | procRightOutReq | procRightInReq)
| pushReq
)
J S′ Kma = (νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up) (
(ν po , pi) (J Q Kma | procLeftOutReq | procLeftInReq)
| (ν po , pi) (J P Kma | procRightOutReq | procRightInReq)
| pushReq
)
Since all combinations of left and right requests are checked, J S′′ Kma can emulate the same source term
steps as J S′ Kma . However, since J P Kma and J Q Kma are exchanged at the outermost parallel operator the
roles of left and right requests are exchanged. As a consequence, if a combination of requests from J P Kma
and J Q Kma leads to a test on the respective sum locks, the order in which these locks are tested is different
in J S′′ Kma and J S′ Kma . So J S′′ Kma and J S′ Kma differ in their total ordering of sum locks. The ordering inJ S′′ Kma is based on the structure induced by the nesting of parallel operators in P | Q; while the ordering
in J S′ Kma is based on the structure induced by the parallel operator nesting in Q | P . Note that, since in
both cases this structure is a binary tree, by Lemma 12, the encoding does not introduce deadlock. But as
explained in Example 1 the different orderings may lead to different reachable intermediate states. Apart
from intermediate states J S′′ Kma and J S′ Kma are similar, i.e., they have the same chance to reach success
or translated observables.
By Definition 27, ≈˙ma,2 explicitly allows for different reachable intermediate states. Because of that,J S′′ Kma ≈˙ma,2 J S′ Kma . Analysing the encoding function in Figure 4 we observe that any encoded source
term has at most two free names that are used as channels—remember that translated source term names
are never used as channels within J · Kma . Because of that, when placed within a target term context, J S′′ Kma
and J S′ Kma can start an interaction with the context only by transmitting their requests. Because we con-
sider only target term contexts, i.e., contexts C ([·]) ∈ Pa → Pa such that C (J 0 Kma ) ∈ Pa↾J · Kma , the context
respects the protocol implemented by the encoding function. So, if J S′′ Kma provides a translated observable
and the context has the matching translated observable, then the context can interact with J S′′ Kma to
emulate a source term step. Doing so, an encoded continuation, i.e., an encoded source term, is unguarded
within the continuation of J S′′ Kma . Since S′′ ≡ S′, the same context can emulate the same source term step
when interacting with J S′ Kma . Moreover, doing so, again an encoded source term is unguarded within the
continuation of J S′ Kma and the respective source terms of these continuations in case of J S′′ Kma and J S′ Kma
are again structural congruent. Because of this we can prove the preservation of structural congruence of
source terms is also preserved modulo ∼=ma,2 by assuming an arbitrary context and perform an induction
over the number of emulations resulting from an interaction of the context with J S′′ Kma . So we concludeJ S′′ Kma ∼=ma,2 J S′ Kma .
Since ≈˙ma,2 and ∼=
m
a,2 are equivalences (compare to Lemmata 14 and 15), by transitivity, we concludeJ S Kma ≈˙ma,2 J S′ Kma and J S Kma ∼=ma,2 J S′ Kma .
Case of Rule P | (Q | R) ≡ (P | Q) | R: In this S′′ = P (Q | R) and S′ = (P | Q) | R for some P,Q,R ∈ Pm.
Their encodings are given by
J S′′ Kma = (νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up) (
(ν po , pi) (J P Kma | procLeftOutReq | procLeftInReq)
| (ν po , pi)
(
(νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up)
(
(ν po , pi) (J Q Kma | procLeftOutReq | procLeftInReq)
| (ν po , pi) (J R Kma | procRightOutReq | procRightInReq)
| pushReq
)
| procRightOutReq | procRightInReq
)
| pushReq
)
and
J S′ Kma = (νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up) (
(ν po , pi)
(
(νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up)
(
(ν po , pi) (J P Kma | procLeftOutReq | procLeftInReq)
| (ν po , pi) (J Q Kma | procRightOutReq | procRightInReq)
| pushReq
)
| procLeftOutReq | procLeftInReq
)
| (ν po , pi) (J R Kma | procRightOutReq | procRightInReq)
| pushReq
)
.
In J S′′ Kma the encoding of Q appears left and the encoding of R appears right within the encoding of a
parallel operator. Together they form the right branch of a surrounding encoding of a parallel operator, there
the left branch is filled with J P Kma . In opposite in J S′ Kma the terms J P Kma and J Q Kma are left and right
of a parallel operator encoding which is the left branch of a surrounding parallel operator encoding, whereJ R Kma appears right. However, since all requests are pushed upwards to each surrounding parallel operator
encoding, again all combinations of requests among the three encoded subterms J P Kma , J Q Kma , and J R Kma
are checked in J S′′ Kma as well as in J S′ Kma . Moreover, we observe that in both encodings J S′′ Kma and J S′ Kma
the encoding of P is always left to the encodings of Q and R, and the encoding of Q is always left to the
encoding of R. So in this case J S′′ Kma and J S′ Kma do not differ by the underlying total ordering of sum locks,
i.e., they reach the same intermediate states. So the behaviour of J S′′ Kma and J S′ Kma does only differ by
pure administrative steps on requests but they have the same chance to reach Xand translated observables,
i.e., J S′′ Kma ≈˙ma,2 J S′ Kma . Revisiting the argumentation of the case before we also get J S′′ Kma ∼=ma,2 J S′ Kma .
Since ≈˙ma,2 and
∼=ma,2 are equivalences (compare to Lemmata 14 and 15), by transitivity, we concludeJ S Kma ≈˙ma,2 J S′ Kma and J S Kma ∼=ma,2 J S′ Kma .
Else: For the reaming rules we can apply the above argumentation to show that J S′′ Ksa ≡ J S′ Ksa. By the
Lemmata 16 and 17, we have J S′′ Kma ≈˙ma,2 J S′ Kma and J S′′ Kma ∼=ma,2 J S′ Kma . By Lemma 14 and Lemma
15, ≈˙ma,2 and ∼=
m
a,2 are equivalences. Thus, by transitivity, we conclude J S Kma ≈˙ma,2 J S′ Kma and J S Kma ∼=ma,2J S′ Kma .
⊓⊔
These two lemmata finally prove that the intermediate states in combination with the application of the Cong
rule on source terms do not falsify the criterion on operational completeness modulo ≈˙ma,2 .
2.5 Junk
We consider remains of emulations that behave modulo ≈˙sa and ≈˙
m
a like 0 and do not influence the possibility
or inability to emulate further source term steps as junk. The emulation of source term steps may leave different
kinds of junk. So, e.g. in order to show operational completeness, we have to prove that junk does no harm.
Of course we are only interested in kinds of junk that appear in target terms, i.e., that are pieces of target terms.
However, to ease the argumentation on the proof of operational completeness we want to allow to stepwise reduce
junk. Unfortunately, as soon as we reduce a target term by the first piece of junk it is often no target term any
more. So, in order to allow for a stepwise reduction of junk, we give a recursive definition of what it means to be a
piece of a target term.
Definition 29 (Piece of a Target Term). A term T ∈ Pa is a piece of a target term of J · Ksa, denoted by
T ∈ P
(
Pa↾J · Ks
a
)
, if
T ∈ Pa↾J · Ks
a
∨
(
∃T ′, J ∈ Pa . ∃x˜ ⊂ N . T ≡ (ν x˜)T
′ ∧ T ∼=sa (ν x˜) (T
′ | J) ∧ (ν x˜) (T ′ | J) ∈ P
(
Pa↾J · Ks
a
))
.
Accordingly, a term T ∈ Pa is a piece of a target term of J · Kma , denoted by T ∈ P (Pa↾J · Kma ), if
T ∈ Pa↾J · Km
a
∨
(
∃T ′, J ∈ Pa . ∃x˜ ⊂ N . T ≡ (ν x˜)T
′ ∧ T ∼=ma (ν x˜) (T
′ | J) ∧ (ν x˜) (T ′ | J) ∈ P
(
Pa↾J · Km
a
))
.
Intuitively, the definition above allows for a piece of a target term to recover the corresponding target term by
stepwise restoring the reduced junk. Moreover note, that, although the relations ∼=sa and
∼=ma are not sensitive to
divergence, they are sensitive to deadlock. That is why we require T ∼=sa (ν x˜) (T
′ | J) or T ∼=ma (ν x˜) (T
′ | J) to
ensure that indeed only junk is removed and so, no deadlock is introduced.
Definition 30 (Junk). A term J ∈ Pa is called junk of the encoding J · Ksa modulo ≈˙sa , if J behaves modulo ≈˙sa
similar to 0 for all pieces of target terms, i.e.,
∀C ([·]) ∈ Pa → Pa . C (J) ∈ P
(
Pa↾J · Ks
a
)
implies C (J) ≈˙sa C (0) .
A term J ∈ Pa is called junk of the encoding J · Kma modulo ≈˙ma , if J behaves modulo ≈˙ma similar to 0 for all
pieces of target terms, i.e.,
∀C ([·]) ∈ Pa → Pa . C (J) ∈ P
(
Pa↾J · Km
a
)
implies C (J) ≈˙ma C (0) .
Since we do not consider junk modulo equivalences different from ≈˙sa and ≈˙
m
a , we omit the equivalence in the
following. Moreover we omit the encoding function if the considered junk appears within both encodings.
Of course, whenever we reduce a piece of a target term by removing junk, the result is again a piece of a target
term. Moreover, reducing junk does not change the behaviour of such a term modulo ∼=sa or ∼=
m
a .
Lemma 22. Let T be a piece of a target term including some junk J ∈ Pa. Then removing this junk results a piece
of a target term which is congruent to T , i.e.,
∀T ∈ P
(
Pa↾J · Ks
a
)
. ∀T ′ ∈ Pa . ∀x˜ ⊂ N . T ≡ (ν x˜) (T
′ | J) implies (ν x˜)T ′ ∈ P
(
Pa↾J · Ks
a
)
∧ T ∼=sa (ν x˜)T
′
and
∀T ∈ P
(
Pa↾J · Km
a
)
. ∀T ′ ∈ Pa . ∀x˜ ⊂ N . T ≡ (ν x˜) (T
′ | J) implies (ν x˜)T ′ ∈ P
(
Pa↾J · Km
a
)
∧ T ∼=ma (ν x˜)T
′.
Proof. Let J ∈ Pa be junk. And let T ∈ P
(
Pa↾J · Ks
a
)
, T ′ ∈ Pa, and x˜ ⊂ N such that T ≡ (ν x˜) (T ′ | J). We show
the lemma for J · Ksa. The argumentation for J · Kma is then similar.
Since, by Lemma 17, ∼=sa includes structural congruence, T ≡ (ν x˜) (T
′ | J) implies T ∼=sa (ν x˜) (T
′ | J). By
Definition 28, then C (T ) ≈˙sa C ((ν x˜) (T
′ | J)) for all contexts C ([·]) ∈ Pa → Pa such that C (J 0 Ksa) ∈ Pa↾J · Ksa . Let
C
′
([·]) = (ν x˜) (T ′ | [·]). Then C′ is a context, i.e., C
′
([·]) ∈ Pa → Pa, and, since T ∈ P
(
Pa↾J · Km
a
)
and T = C
′
(J),
we have C
′
(J) ∈ P
(
Pa↾J · Km
a
)
. Thus, C (T ) ≈˙sa C
(
C
′
(J)
)
for all contexts C ([·]) ∈ Pa → Pa such that C (J 0 Ksa) ∈
Pa↾J · Ks
a
. Moreover, C
′
(J) ∈ P
(
Pa↾J · Km
a
)
implies C
(
C
′
(J)
)
∈ P
(
Pa↾J · Km
a
)
for all such contexts C. By Definition 30
of junk, then C
(
C
′
(J)
)
≈˙sa C
(
C
′
(0)
)
for all such contexts C. Since C
(
C
′
(0)
)
= C ((ν x˜) (T ′ | 0)) ≡ C ((ν x˜)T ′)
and since, by Lemma 16, ≈˙sa includes structural congruence, we deduce C
(
C
′
(J)
)
≈˙sa C ((ν x˜)T
′) for all such
contexts C. Because ≈˙sa is, by Lemma 14, an equivalence, C (T ) ≈˙
s
a C
(
C
′
(J)
)
for all such contexts C and
C
(
C
′
(J)
)
≈˙sa C ((ν x˜)T
′) for all such contexts C implies C (T ) ≈˙sa C ((ν x˜)T
′) for all such contexts C. Thus, by
Definition 28, we conclude T ∼=sa (ν x˜)T
′.
Finally, since ∼=sa includes structural congruence and is an equivalence, T
∼=sa (ν x˜)T
′ implies (ν x˜)T ′ ∼=sa
(ν x˜) (T ′ | J). Thus, since (ν x˜) (T ′ | J) ∈ P
(
Pa↾J · Ks
a
)
, we conclude (ν x˜)T ′ ∈ P
(
Pa↾J · Ks
a
)
. ⊓⊔
Using this lemma we can remove junk from a target term T . As result we obtain a piece of a target term T ′ such
that T ∼=sa T
′ or T ∼=ma T
′, respectively. Then we can further reduce T ′ by removing junk such that we result in a
piece of a target term T ′′ with T ′ ∼=sa T
′′ or T ′ ∼=ma T
′′ and so forth. Note that, we spend some effort in defining the
notion of a piece of a target term to allow the stepwise remove of junk. This allows us to consider different kinds of
junks separately. If we instead consider all possible junk of a target term at one go, then for the definition of junk
it suffice to require that the context C is such that C (J) is a target term. However, it seems to be more efficient
and more descriptive to consider the different kinds of junk separated.
In the simplest case junk is a closed process that can not perform any step, i.e., junk is invisible and inactive. Such
kind of junk is produced e.g. as remain of a test-statement. By Definition 5, a test-statement and the corresponding
instantiations of booleans are defined as:
l 〈⊤〉 , l (t, f) .t
l 〈⊥〉 , l (t, f) .f
test l then P else Q , (ν t, f)
(
l 〈t, f〉 | t.P | f.Q
)
for some t, f /∈ fn(P ) ∪ fn(Q)
Depending on whether we test a positive or a negative instantiation we result either in the then-case (ν t, f) (P | f.Q)
or the else-case (ν t, f) (t.P | Q). Due to the renaming policy within target terms t and f are neither free in P nor
in Q. So we can pull out the interesting cases P or Q and (ν t, f) f.Q or (ν t, f) t.P remain as inobservable and
inactive junk.
Lemma 23. For any t, f ∈ N and any P,Q ∈ Pa the terms (ν t, f) f.Q and (ν t, f) t.P are junk.
Proof. Let J1 = (ν t, f) f.Q and J2 = (ν t, f) t.P . J1 as well as J2 are closed terms, which can not perform any step.
Moreover, they reach neither success nor any translated observable, i.e., J1 6⇓X, J2 6⇓X, J1 6⇓sµ, J2 6⇓
s
µ, J1 6⇓
m
µ , and
J2 6⇓mµ for all µ ∈ N ∪N . Because of that, for all contexts C ([·]) ∈ Pa → Pa we have C (J1) ≈˙
s
a C (0) ≈˙
s
a C (J2) and
C (J1) ≈˙
m
a C (0) ≈˙
m
a C (J2). Thus, by Definition 30, J1 and J2 are junk. ⊓⊔
Note that, due to this lemma, we can securely omit the remains of test-statements in the following. An other
kind of inobservable and inactive junk is produced by the translation of the empty sum 0. It results in a positive
instantiation of a sum lock that is not used anywhere. However, let us generalise this case a little bit to an arbitrary
instantiation of a sum lock (either positive or negative) that is not used anywhere.
Lemma 24. For any name l the term (ν l)
(
l 〈z〉
)
, where z ∈ B, is junk.
Proof. Let J = (ν l)
(
l 〈z〉
)
. J is a closed term, which can not perform any step. Moreover, this term can reach
neither success nor any translated observable, i.e., J 6⇓X, J 6⇓sµ, and J 6⇓
m
µ for all µ ∈ N ∪ N . So for all contexts
C ([·]) ∈ Pa → Pa we have C (J) ≈˙
s
a C (0) and C (J) ≈˙
m
a C (0). Thus, by Definition 30, J is junk. ⊓⊔
Note that this lemma especially shows that the translation of the empty sum is junk, i.e., we translate nothing into
nothing but junk. Moreover we will use it to reduce the remains left over by emulations. In the following lemma we
prove, that requests on negative instantiations of sum locks are junk of the encoding from pim into pia. Note that in
this case we consider potentially observable and active junk.
Lemma 25. Requests on negative instantiations of sum locks are junk of J · Kma , i.e.,
∀C1 ([·]) ∈ Pa → Pa . ∀pi , y, l , r ∈ N .
C1 (pi 〈y, l , r〉) ∈ P
(
Pa↾J · Km
a
)
∧
(
∃T ∈ Pa . ∃x˜ ⊂ N . C1 (0) ≡ (ν x˜)
(
T | l 〈⊥〉
))
implies C1 (pi 〈y, l , r〉) ≈˙
m
a C1 (0)
and
∀C2 ([·]) ∈ Pa → Pa . ∀po , y, l , s , z ∈ N .
C2 (po 〈y, l , s , z〉) ∈ P
(
Pa↾J · Km
a
)
∧
(
∃T ∈ Pa . ∃x˜ ⊂ N . C2 (0) ≡ (ν x˜)
(
T | l 〈⊥〉
))
implies C2 (po 〈y, l , s , z〉) ≈˙
m
a C2 (0) .
Proof. Let J1 = pi 〈y, l , r〉 and J2 = po 〈y, l , s , z〉.
Since we require C1 (J1) , C2 (J2) ∈ P
(
Pa↾J · Km
a
)
, we consider only contexts that respect the protocol implemented
by the encoding function J · Kma . By analysing the encoding function in Figure 4, we observe that there are many
forwarders for requests, i.e., many replicated inputs that consume requests and immediately restore a request on a
different channel but with exactly the same values. Note that by such forwarders requests are multiplied. Most of
these copies turn out to be junk. However, note that the encoding function restricts the request channels—except
for the outermost—and provides for each such channel exactly one (replicate) input and no inputs or replicated
inputs for unrestricted request channels. Because of that, the way a request may travel is completely determined,
i.e., given a target term there is no choice about which way a request may take.
Moreover, if the context puts the requests at the outermost position, then they can not be consumed at all,
i.e., in this case the requests are observable but inactive junk. By Lemma 4, the negative instantiation of the sum
lock l is the only instantiation of that lock and, by Lemma 5, it can not be changed by the context into a positive
instantiation. So, by Definition 25, the requests are not considered as translated observables, i.e., J1 6⇓mµ and J2 6⇓
m
µ
for all µ ∈ N ∪ N . Obviously, J1 and J2 also have no possibility to reach X, i.e., J1 6⇓X and J2 6⇓X. Thus for all
contexts C1 ([·]) , C2 ([·]) ∈ Pa → Pa such that C1 (J1) , C2 (J2) ∈ P
(
Pa↾J · Km
a
)
, pi ∈ fn(C1 (J1)), and po ∈ fn(C2 (J2)),
we have C1 (J1) ≈˙
m
a C1 (0) and C2 (J2) ≈˙
m
a C2 (0).
Note that we consider only contexts C1 and C2, such that C1 (J1) and C2 (J2) are pieces of target terms. So all
requests—including J1 and J2—origin from the translation of input or output guarded terms or replicated inputs. All
inputs on request channels, i.e., channels that can transport either three or four values, origin from the translation
of the parallel operator or a replicated input. We observe that, for each request, the encoding of a parallel operator
receives from one of its encoded parameters, one copy of that request is pushed upwards. Similarly, for each request
of each branch of an encoded replicated input one copy is pushed to the right. Because of that, requests never
vanish. As soon as a request in a target term is unguarded for the first time, there will always be a copy of that
request possibly on another channel but with the same values (compare to Lemma 3).
Note that all inputs on request channels are replicated inputs except for the first inputs in the processing of right
in- or output requests in the encoding of a parallel operator or a replicated input (compare to procRightOutReq and
procRightInReq). However, even in these two cases the consumption of a request enables—after one internal step
on a chain lock—the processing of another request in exactly the same way modulo some forwarding processes. So
the order in which requests are consumed does not matter (compare to Lemma 11). Moreover note, that the step
on the chain lock is completely determined again, i.e., there is no choice about eventually doing it or how to do it.
Because of that, the fact, that a request was already pushed further or not, does neither influence the reachability
of success nor the reachability of translated observables.
Except from transferring them the encoding function can proceed requests only by combining them. J · Kma
ensures, that each pair of requests is combined at most once and that each pair of an input and an output requests,
which do not both origin from the same leaf concerning the structure of parallel operator encodings, is eventually
combined. Because of that, again the order in which those combinations are performed does not matter. However,
the order in which tests on sum locks are induced does indeed matter, because a test induced on only positive
instantiations of sum locks turns them into negative instantiations and so a former such test may influences later
tests. Since the test is always induced on the sum locks related to the respective request, all test that are induced
because of the requests J1 or J2 are on at least one negative instantiation of a sum lock, i.e., on l in the current case.
Note that, by Lemma 4, the negative instantiation of the sum lock l is the only instantiation of that lock and, by
Lemma 5, it can not be changed by the context into a positive instantiation. If we now analyse the test-statements
in the encodings of an input guarded term or a replicated input, we observe that this false instantiation of l reduces
the test-statements to some kind of forwarders that consumes one or two instantiations of sum locks and since
there are no deadlocks on these test-statements eventually restores them on exactly the same channel and with
exactly the same value. So again the processing of J1 or J2 do neither influence the reachability of success nor the
reachability of translated observables.
So for all contexts C1 ([·]) , C2 ([·]) ∈ Pa → Pa, such that C1 (J1) , C2 (J2) ∈ P
(
Pa↾J · Km
a
)
, we have
(C1 (J1) ⇓X iff C1 (0) ⇓X) ∧ (C2 (J2) ⇓X iff C2 (0) ⇓X) and(
C1 (J1) ⇓
m
µ iff C1 (0) ⇓
m
µ
)
∧
(
C2 (J2) ⇓
m
µ iff C2 (0) ⇓
m
µ
)
for all µ ∈ N ∪ N . Since all steps that results from an interaction with J1 and J2 are administrative steps, that
neither rule out a way leading to an unguarded occurrence of Xnor to a translated observable, they do not influence
the state of a term modulo ≈˙ma . Thus, we conclude C1 (J1) ≈˙
m
a C1 (0) and C2 (J2) ≈˙
m
a C2 (0). ⊓⊔
Next we show, that—for both encodings—encoded guarded terms linked to negative instantiations of sum locks
are junk, as well. Note that such encoded guarded terms linked to negative instantiations of sum locks result from
encoded sums of which already one summand was used to emulate a source term step.
Lemma 26. For any name l, any finite index set I , all guards pii, and all processes Pi ∈ Ps the term
(ν l)
(∏
i∈I
J pii.Pi Ksa | l 〈⊥〉
)
is junk of J · Ksa.
Proof. Let J = (ν l)
(∏
i∈I J pii.Pi Ksa | l 〈⊥〉). By Definition 30, we have to show that for all contexts C ([·]) ∈ Pa →
Pa such that C (J) ∈ P
(
Pa↾J · Ks
a
)
we have C (J) ≈˙sa C (0).
By Lemma 4, the negative instantiation of the sum lock l is the only instantiation of that lock and, by Lemma
5, it can not be changed by the context into a positive instantiation. Analysing the encoding function in Figure
3 we observe, that all unguarded in- or outputs with three parameters in J are connected to l 〈⊥〉. Thus J has
no translated observables, i.e., J 6↓sµ for all µ ∈ N ∪ N . Moreover, because of the guards pii, J has no unguarded
occurrence of X and can not reach some on its own, i.e., J 6⇓X.
J can perform a step on its own only if for some j ∈ I the guard pij is equal to τ or is an input guard. Note that in
the second case J can only perform finitely many steps on receiver locks. Since l is instantiated by ⊥, J τ.Pj Kma can
reduce to 0 only. Therefore, J τ.Pj Kma has to consume l 〈⊥〉 but the instantiation is always eventually restored. Be-
cause of that, we can ignore all J pii.Pi Kma for pii = τ , i.e., they are junk. Let J ′ = (ν l)(∏i∈I ,pii 6=τ J pii.Pi Kma | l 〈⊥〉).
Moreover, obtain J ′′ from J ′ by reducing all free inputs on receiver locks.
Then J ′′ can not perform any step, since either all remaining guards are output guards and so all unguarded
inputs in the encoded subterms are on not instantiated sender locks, or all remaining guards are input guards and
so the encoded subterms are input guarded, i.e., J ′′ 67−→. In case the index set {i | i ∈ I ∧ pii 6= τ} is empty, we
can apply Lemma 24. Else, there are either free outputs or free inputs on translated source term names. So J ′′
can communicate with the context over these translated source term names. As a result of such a communication
a test-statement is unguarded. In case this test-statement is within J ′′, the sum lock l is tested first. Since l is
instantiated by ⊥, the test-statement restores both, the consumed negative instantiation of l and the output on
the translated source term name, which was consumed to unguard this test-statement. Else, if the unguarded test-
statement is not within J ′′, then—besides the negative instantiation of the sum lock—J ′′ includes only encodings
of output guarded source terms. In this case all these encodings of output guarded source terms provide exactly
one output on a translated source term name, which sends as first value the sum lock l . In the communication
with the context one of these outputs was consumed and, because of that, the unguarded test-statement is either
a nested test-statement testing l as second lock or it is a single test-statement testing only l . In both cases all
information necessary to unguard and to reduce the test-statement except for the output on the source term name
is restored. Because of that, each such output can be used as most once. In both cases no step that results from
an interaction with J ′′ influences the reachability of success or of translated observables. Moreover each such step
is either a pure administrative step, which by Lemma 18 do not influence the state of a term modulo ≈˙sa , or it is
an impure administrative step. Since reachability of X is not influenced at all and all translated observables of the
context which are consumed to unguard the test-statement are eventually restored, i.e., reachability of translated
observables is not affected, even these impure administrative steps do not influence the state of the context modulo
≈˙sa here.
Thus for all contexts C ([·]) ∈ Pa → Pa, such that C (J) ∈ P
(
Pa↾J · Ks
a
)
, we have (C (J) ⇓X iff C (0) ⇓X) and(
C (J) ⇓sµ iff C (0) ⇓
s
µ
)
for all µ ∈ N ∪N . Moreover no step of J on its own or that results from an interaction with
J does influence the state of the context modulo ≈˙sa . So, C (J) ≈˙
s
a C (0). ⊓⊔
Lemma 27. For any name l, any finite index set I , all guards pii, and all processes Pi ∈ Pm the term
(ν l)
(∏
i∈I
J pii.Pi Kma | l 〈⊥〉
)
is junk of J · Kma .
Proof. Let J = (ν l)
(∏
i∈I J pii.Pi Kma | l 〈⊥〉). By Definition 30, we have to show that for all contexts C ([·]) ∈ Pa →
Pa such that C (J) ∈ P
(
Pa↾J · Km
a
)
we have C (J) ≈˙ma C (0).
By Lemma 4, the negative instantiation of the sum lock l is the only instantiation of that lock and, by Lemma
5, it can not be changed by the context into a positive instantiation. Analysing the encoding function in Figure
4 we observe, that all unguarded requests in J are connected to l 〈⊥〉 (compare to Definition 19 and Lemma 6).
Thus J has no translated observables, i.e., J 6↓sµ for all µ ∈ N ∪ N . Moreover, because of the guards pii, J has no
unguarded occurrence of X and can not reach some on its own, i.e., J 6⇓X.
J can perform a step on its own only if for some j ∈ I the guard pij is equal to τ . Since l is instanti-
ated by ⊥, J τ.Pj Kma can reduce to 0 only. Therefore, J τ.Pj Kma has to consume l 〈⊥〉 but the instantiation is
always eventually restored. Because of that, we can ignore all J pii.Pi Kma for pii = τ , i.e., they are junk. Let
J ′ = (ν l)
(∏
i∈I ,pii 6=τ
J pii.Pi Kma | l 〈⊥〉).
Then J ′ can not perform any step, i.e., J ′ 67−→. There are no unguarded inputs on free names of J ′. In case
the index set {i | i ∈ I ∧ pii 6= τ} is empty, we can apply Lemma 24. Else, there are free requests, i.e., free outputs
on requests channels. So J ′ can communicate with the context by transmitting its requests. By Lemma 25 these
requests are junk. Moreover by revisiting the argumentation in the proof of Lemma 25 we observe, that the false
instantiation of l reduces all tests on that lock to simple forwarders. As a consequence no such test can unguard the
encoding of a guarded source term, i.e., no such test can unguard new requests or former unguarded occurrences
of success. So again we observe that no interaction with J or J ′ can influence the ability of the context to reach
success or translated observables and no step that results from an interaction with J or J ′ influences the state of
the context modulo ≈˙ma .
Thus for all contexts C ([·]) ∈ Pa → Pa, such that C (J) ∈ P
(
Pa↾J · Km
a
)
, we have (C (J) ⇓X iff C (0) ⇓X) and(
C (J) ⇓mµ iff C (0) ⇓
m
µ
)
for all µ ∈ N ∪ N . Moreover no step of J on its own or that results from an interaction
with J does influence the state of the context modulo ≈˙ma . So, C (J) ≈˙
m
a C (0). ⊓⊔
Analysing the encoding function we observe, that the input on a receiver lock of an encoded input guarded
source term, that guards a test-statement, is a replicated input. Of course, such a test-statement can only be used
once to emulate a source term step. After such an emulation this replicated input becomes junk.
Lemma 28. For any l1, l2, r , s , ϕ
m
a (x) ∈ N and any P ∈ Pm the term
J = r∗ (l1, l2,−, s , ϕ
m
a (x)) .test l1 then test l2 then l1 〈⊥〉 | l2 〈⊥〉 | s | J P Kma else l1 〈⊤〉 | l2 〈⊥〉 else l1 〈⊥〉
in combination with a negative instantiation of the sum lock that belongs to r is junk of J · Kma , i.e.,
∀C ([·]) ∈ Pa → Pa . ∀l1, l2, r , s , ϕ
m
a (x) ∈ N . ∀P ∈ Pm . ∀J ∈ Pa .
J = r∗ (l1, l2,−, s , ϕ
m
a (x)) .test l1 then test l2 then l1 〈⊥〉 | l2 〈⊥〉 | s | J P Kma else l1 〈⊤〉 | l2 〈⊥〉 else l1 〈⊥〉
∧ C (J) ∈ P
(
Pa↾J · Km
a
)
∧
(
∃T ∈ Pa . ∃x˜ ⊂ N . ∃pi , y, l ∈ N . C (0) ≡ (ν x˜)
(
T | pi 〈y, l , r〉 | l 〈⊥〉
))
implies C (J) ≈˙ma C (0)
Proof. Analysing the encoding function in Figure 4 we observe that the request pi 〈y, l , r〉 implies that each test
induced on r tests the sum lock l (compare to Lemma 6). Since that lock is already instantiated by false, we can
revisit the argumentation of the proof of Lemma 27 to conclude that each test induced on r reduces to a simple
forwarder, which restores all consumed information. So J can be ignored, i.e., J is Junk. ⊓⊔
Another remain of an emulation, which we can simply consider as junk, is the preparation of a test on a negative
instantiated sum lock.
Lemma 29. The preparation of a test on a negative instantiation of a sum lock is junk of J · Kma , i.e.,
∀C ([·]) ∈ pia → pia . ∀mi ,mi,up , y, y
′, l , lr, r , s , z ∈ N . ∀J ∈ Pa .
J = mi
∗ (y′, lr, r) . ([ y
′ = y ] r 〈lr, l , l , s , z〉 | mi,up 〈y
′, lr, r〉) ∧ C (J) ∈ P
(
Pa↾J · Km
a
)
∧
(
∃T ∈ Pa . ∃x˜ ⊂ N . C (0) ≡ (ν x˜)
(
T | l 〈⊥〉
))
implies C (J) ≈˙ma C (mi ։ mi,up)
and
∀C ([·]) ∈ pia → pia . ∀mo ,mo,up , y, y
′, l , ls, r , s , z ∈ N . ∀J ∈ Pa .
J = mo
∗ (y′, ls, s , z) . ([ y
′ = y ] r 〈ls, l , ls, s , z〉 | mo,up 〈y
′, ls, s , z〉) ∧ C (J) ∈ P
(
Pa↾J · Km
a
)
∧
(
∃T ∈ Pa . ∃x˜ ⊂ N . C (0) ≡ (ν x˜)
(
T | l 〈⊥〉
))
implies C (J) ≈˙ma C (mo ։ mo,up)
Proof. First note that here not J but only [ y′ = y ] r 〈lr, l , l , s , z〉 and [ y
′ = y ] r 〈ls, l , ls, s , z〉 are considered as junk.
If these terms are omitted then the respective J reduces to the forwarder mi ։ mi,up or mo ։ mo,up .
In the first case—regardless whether the receiver lock r belongs to an encoded input guarded term or an encoded
replicated input—the output r 〈ls, l , ls, s , z〉 induces a test on the sum lock l . Since that lock is already instantiated
by false we can revisit the argumentation of the proof of Lemma 27 to conclude that we can ignore this induced
test. So we can also ignore the inducing output r 〈ls, l , ls, s , z〉. The remainig term mi∗ (y′, lr, r) .mi,up 〈y′, lr, r〉 is
equal to the forwarder mi ։ mi,up .
For the second case, since there is a negative instantiation of l , the receiver lock r was not created by the
encoding of a replicated input. So again the output r 〈ls, l , ls, s , z〉 induces a test on the sum lock l . The rest of that
case is similar to the case before. ⊓⊔
Unfortunately, we can not declare any remains of emulations as junk, because we can not ignore the forwarding
of left requests in the chains of right requests which is left over by former considered right requests. However,
after extracting the junk, by Lemma 29, there is indeed nothing more left, than a simple forwarder, which can not
influence the state of the process modulo ≈˙ma . That suffice to prove operational completeness.
2.6 Semantical Criteria
Among the semantical criteria operational correspondence is the most elaborate to prove. Therefore we show the
both its conditions, operational completeness and operational soundness, separately. In order to show operational
completeness, we have to show how source terms steps are emulated by the encodings.
Lemma 30 (Operational Completeness). The encoding J · Ksa fulfils operational completeness.
Proof. By Definition 9 it suffice to show that:
∀S, S′ ∈ Ps . S 7−→ S
′ implies ∃T ∈ Pa . J S Ksa Z=⇒ T ∧ T ∼=sa J S′ Ksa
The lemma then holds by induction over the number of steps in S Z=⇒ S′. To prove the condition above, we perform
an induction over the proof tree that leads to the step S 7−→ S′.
Base Case: By the rules in Figure 2 each step on S is based either on Rule Taum,s, Comm,s, or Repm,s.
Case of Rule Taum,s: In this case S is a single sum, of which one summand is guarded by τ , and S
′ is the
continuation of this τ guarded summand, i.e., there are some finite index set I, some guards pii, and some
processes Pi ∈ Ps such that S =
∑
i∈I pii.Pi with pij = τ for some j ∈ I and S
′ = Pj . The corresponding
encodings are given by the following terms:
J S Ksa ≡ (ν l)

l 〈⊤〉 | ∏
i∈I ,i6=j
J pii.Pi Ksa | test l then l 〈⊥〉 | J Pj Ksa else l 〈⊥〉


J S′ Ksa = J Pj Ksa
We observe that J S Ksa can emulate the step S 7−→ S′ by reducing the test-statement in the encoding of the
j’s summand, i.e., by
J S Ksa 7−→2 (ν l)

 ∏
i∈I ,i6=j
J pii.Pi Ksa | l 〈⊥〉 | J Pj Ksa

 = T.
Note that, since the test-statement and the implementation of booleans are no native pi-terms but abbrevi-
ations for pi-constructs, this reduction indeed requires two steps. Moreover note, that we silently omit junk
that results from the reduction of test-statements (compare to Lemma 23) here and in the following proofs.
Further, we observe that T ≡ (ν l)
(∏
i∈I ,i6=j J pii.Pi Ksa | l 〈⊥〉) | J Pj Ksa, since, due to the renaming policy
ϕsa, the name l is not free in J Pj Ksa. So the emulation leaves over the term (ν l)(∏i∈I ,i6=j J pii.Pi Ksa | l 〈⊥〉),
which is by Lemma 26 junk. By Lemma 22, we conclude that T ∼=sa J S′ Ksa.
Case of Rule Comm,s: Here S is a parallel composition of two sums and S
′ is the parallel composition of the
continuations of an input guarded summand of the first and a matching output guarded summand of the
second sum, i.e., there are two finite index sets I1, I2, some guards pii, and some processes Pi, Qi ∈ Ps such
that S =
∑
i∈I1
pii.Pi |
∑
i∈I2
pii.Qi with pij1 = y (x) and pij2 = y 〈z〉 for some j1 ∈ I1, some j2 ∈ I2, and
x, y, z ∈ N and S′ = {z/x}Pj1 | Qj2 . The encodings of S and S
′ are given by the following terms:
J S Ksa ≡ (ν l)( l 〈⊤〉 | ∏
i∈I1,i6=j1
J pii.Pi Ksa
| (ν r)
(
r | r∗.ϕsa (y) (l
′, s , ϕsa (x)) .test l then test l
′ then l 〈⊥〉 | l ′ 〈⊥〉 | s | J Pj1 Ksa
else l 〈⊤〉 | l ′ 〈⊥〉 | r
else l 〈⊤〉 | ϕsa (y) 〈l
′, s , ϕsa (x)〉
))
| (ν l)

l 〈⊤〉 | ∏
i∈I1,i6=j1
J pii.Qi Ksa | (ν s)(ϕsa (y) 〈l , s , ϕsa (z)〉 | s . J Qj2 Ksa)


J S′ Ksa = J {z/x} (Pj1) Ksa | J Qj2 Ksa
To emulate the source term step S 7−→ S′ first the receiver lock has to be reduced to enable a communication
over ϕsa (y). Then the test-statement and the sender lock are reduced to complete the emulation of the source
term step.
J S Ksa 7−→2 (ν l1, l2, s)( l1 〈⊤〉 | {l1/l}

 ∏
i∈I1,i6=j1
J pii.Pi Ksa


| (ν r)
(
test l1 then test l2 then l1 〈⊥〉 | l2 〈⊥〉 | s |
{
ϕs
a
(z)/ϕs
a
(x)
}(J Pj1 Ksa)
else l1 〈⊤〉 | l2 〈⊥〉 | r
else l1 〈⊥〉 | ϕsa (y) 〈l2, s , ϕ
s
a (z)〉
r∗.ϕsa (y) (l
′, s , ϕsa (x)) .test l1 then test l
′ then l1 〈⊥〉 | l ′ 〈⊥〉 | s | J Pj1 Ksa
else l1 〈⊤〉 | l ′ 〈⊥〉 | r
else l1 〈⊥〉 | ϕsa (y) 〈l
′, s , ϕsa (x)〉
)
| l2 〈⊤〉 |
{
l2/l
} ∏
i∈I1,i6=j2
J pii.Qi Ksa

 | s . J Qj2 Ksa )
7−→5 (ν l1, l2, s)
( {
l1/l
} ∏
i∈I1,i6=j1
J pii.Pi Ksa


| (ν r)
(
l1 〈⊥〉 | l2 〈⊥〉 |
{
ϕs
a
(z)/ϕs
a
(x)
}(J Pj1 Ksa)
r∗.ϕsa (y) (l
′, s , ϕsa (x)) .test l1 then test l
′ then l1 〈⊥〉 | l ′ 〈⊥〉 | s | J Pj1 Ksa
else l1 〈⊤〉 | l ′ 〈⊥〉 | r
else l1 〈⊥〉 | ϕsa (y) 〈l
′, s , ϕsa (x)〉
)
|
{
l2/l
} ∏
i∈I1,i6=j2
J pii.Qi Ksa

 | J Qj2 Ksa ) = T
By Corollary 1,
{
ϕs
a
(z)/ϕs
a
(x)
} J Pj1 Ksa ≡α J {z/x}Pj1 Ksa. To show that T ∼=sa J S′ Kma we stepwise reduce T by
ignoring junk. Since l1, l2, r , s /∈ fn
(J {z/x}Pj1 Kma ) ∪ fn(J Qj2 Kma ), we can reorder the term according to the
restrictions on l1, l2, r and the restriction on s can be omitted. The term
(ν r)
(
r∗.ϕsa (y) (l
′, s , ϕsa (x)) .test l1 then test l
′ then l1 〈⊥〉 | l ′ 〈⊥〉 | s | J Pj1 Ksa
else l1 〈⊤〉 | l ′ 〈⊥〉 | r
else l1 〈⊥〉 | ϕsa (y) 〈l
′, s , ϕsa (x)〉
)
is obviously junk, since it is closed and can not perform any step. Moreover, by Lemma 26, the terms
(ν l)
(∏
i∈I1,i6=j1
J pii.Pi Ksa | l 〈⊥〉) and (ν l)(∏i∈I1,i6=j2 J pii.Qi Ksa | l 〈⊥〉) are junk. So, by Lemma 22, we
conclude T ∼=sa J S′ Ksa.
Case of Rule Repm,s: Here S is a parallel composition of a replicated input and a sum and S
′ is the parallel
composition of the replicated input, the continuation of the replicated input, and the continuation of a
matching output guarded summand, i.e., there is a finite index sets I , some guards pii, and some processes
P,Qi ∈ Ps such that S = y∗ (x) .P |
∑
i∈I pii.Qi with pij = y 〈z〉 for some j ∈ I and x, y, z ∈ N , and
S′ = {z/x}P | Qj | y∗ (x) .P . The encodings of S and S′ are given by the following terms:
J S Ksa ≡ ϕsa (y)∗ (l , s , ϕsa (x)) .test l then l 〈⊥〉 | s | J P Ksa else l 〈⊥〉
| (ν l)

l 〈⊤〉 | ∏
i∈I1,i6=j
J pii.Qi Ksa | (ν s)(ϕsa (y) 〈l , s , ϕsa (z)〉 | s . J Qj Ksa)


J S′ Ksa = J {z/x} (P ) Ksa | J Qj Ksa | J y∗ (x) .P Ksa
To emulate the source term step S 7−→ S′, first the two subprocesses of J S Ksa communicate over ϕsa (y).
Then the test-statement and the sender lock are reduced to complete the emulation of the source term step.
J S Ksa 7−→ (ν l , s)( test l then l 〈⊥〉 | s | {ϕsa(z)/ϕsa(x)} (J P Ksa) else l 〈⊥〉
| ϕsa (y)
∗ (l , s , ϕsa (x)) .test l then l 〈⊥〉 | s | J P Ksa else l 〈⊥〉
| l 〈⊤〉 |
∏
i∈I1,i6=j
J pii.Qi Ksa | s . J Qj Ksa )
7−→3 (ν l , s)
(
l 〈⊥〉 |
{
ϕs
a
(z)/ϕs
a
(x)
}
(J P Ksa)
| ϕsa (y)
∗
(l , s , ϕsa (x)) .test l then l 〈⊥〉 | s | J P Ksa else l 〈⊥〉
|
∏
i∈I1,i6=j
J pii.Qi Ksa | J Qj Ksa ) = T
By Corollary 1,
{
ϕs
a
(z)/ϕs
a
(x)
} J P Ksa ≡α J {z/x}P Ksa. To show that T ∼=sa J S′ Kma we stepwise reduce T by
ignoring junk. Since l , s /∈ fn(J {z/x}P Kma )∪fn(J Qj Kma ), we can reorder the term according to the restriction
on l and the restriction on s can be omitted. By Lemma 26, then (ν l)
(∏
i∈I ,i6=j J pii.Qi Ksa | l 〈⊥〉) is junk.
Note that, by Lemma 17, the relation ∼=sa includes structural congruence. Thus, by Lemma 22, we conclude
T ∼=sa J S′ Ksa.
Induction Hypothesis: S1 7−→ S′1 implies ∃T1 ∈ Pa . J S1 Ksa Z=⇒ T1 ∧ T1 ∼=sa J S′1 Ksa
Induction Step: We have to consider the remaining three rules Par, Res, and Cong of Figure 2.
Case of Rule Par: Then S = S1 | S2 for some S1, S2 ∈ Ps, S1 7−→ S′1, and S
′ = S′1 | S2. By the induction
hypothesis there is some T1 ∈ Pa such that J S1 Ksa Z=⇒ T1 and T1 ∼=sa J S′1 Ksa. Since the encoding of the
parallel operator is rigid, i.e., J S Ksa = J S1 Ksa | J S2 Ksa and J S′ Ksa = J S′1 Ksa | J S2 Ksa, we can apply rule
Par to conclude from J S1 Ksa Z=⇒ T1 to J S Ksa Z=⇒ T1 | J S2 Ksa = T . By Definition 28, T1 ∼=sa J S′1 Ksa
implies C (T1) ≈˙
s
a C
(J S′1 Ksa) for all contexts C ([·]) ∈ Pa → Pa such that C (J 0 Ksa) ∈ Pa↾J · Ksa . SinceJ 0 Ksa | J S2 Ksa ∈ Pa↾J · Ksa , the quantification over C includes all contexts C such that C ([·]) = C′ ([·] | J S2 Ksa).
Because of that, we have C
′
(T1 | J S2 Ksa) ≈˙sa C′ (J S′1 Ksa | J S2 Ksa) for all contexts C′ ([·]) ∈ Pa → Pa such
that C
′
(J 0 Ksa) ∈ Pa↾J · Ksa . By Definition 28, we conclude T ∼=sa J S′ Ksa.
Case of Rule Res: Then S = (ν x)S1 for some x ∈ N and some S1 ∈ Ps, S1 7−→ S′1, and S
′ = (ν x)S′1.
By the induction hypothesis there is some T1 ∈ Pa such that J S1 Ksa Z=⇒ T1 and T1 ∼=sa J S′1 Ksa. Since
the encoding of restriction is rigid, i.e., J S Ksa = (ν ϕsa (x)) J S1 Ksa and J S′ Ksa = (ν ϕsa (x)) J S′1 Ksa, we
can apply rule Res to conclude from J S1 Ksa Z=⇒ T1 to J S Ksa Z=⇒ (ν ϕsa (x))T1 = T . By Definition 28,
T1 ∼=
s
a J S′1 Ksa implies C (T1) ≈˙sa C (J S′1 Ksa) for all contexts C ([·]) ∈ Pa → Pa such that C (J 0 Ksa) ∈
Pa↾J · Ks
a
. Since (ν ϕsa (x)) J 0 Ksa ∈ Pa ↾J · Ksa , the quantification over C includes all contexts C such that
C ([·]) = C
′
((ν ϕsa (x)) [·]). Because of that, we have C
′
((ν ϕsa (x))T1) ≈˙
s
a C
′
(
(ν ϕsa (x)) J S′1 Ksa) for all con-
texts C
′
([·]) ∈ Pa → Pa such that C
′
(J 0 Ksa) ∈ Pa↾J · Ksa . By Definition 28, we conclude T ∼=sa J S′ Ksa.
Case of Rule Cong: Then S ≡ S1 for some S1 ∈ Ps, S1 7−→ S′1, and S
′
1 ≡ S
′. By Lemma 20, the encoding J · Ksa
preserves structural congruence of source terms modulo ∼=sa. So S ≡ S1 and S
′
1 ≡ S
′ implies J S Ksa ∼=sa J S1 Ksa
and J S′1 Ksa ∼=sa J S′ Ksa. By Definition 28, for all contexts C ([·]) ∈ Pa → Pa such that C (J 0 Ksa) ∈ Pa↾J · Ksa we
have C (J S Ksa) ≈˙sa C (J S1 Ksa), i.e., especially J S Ksa ≈˙sa J S1 Ksa. Thus, by Definition 26, for each sequenceJ S Ksa Z=⇒ T there is a sequence J S1 Ksa Z=⇒ T1 for some T1 ∈ Pa such that T ≈˙sa T1. The same holds for all
Contexts C, i.e., since C (J S Ksa) ≈˙sa C (J S1 Ksa), for each sequence C (J S Ksa) Z=⇒ C (T ) there is a sequence
C (J S1 Ksa) Z=⇒ C (T1) for some T1 ∈ Pa such that C (T ) ≈˙sa C (T1). So, by Definition 28, T ∼=sa T1. By the
induction hypothesis T1 ∼=
s
a J S′1 Ksa. Since, by Lemma 15, ∼=sa is an equivalence, T ∼=sa T1, T1 ∼=sa J S′1 Ksa, andJ S′1 Ksa ∼=sa J S′ Ksa implies T ∼=sa J S′ Ksa.
⊓⊔
Lemma 31 (Operational Completeness). The encoding J · Kma fulfils operational completeness.
Proof. By Definition 9 it suffice to show that:
∀S, S′ ∈ Pm . S 7−→ S
′ implies ∃T ∈ Pa . J S Kma Z=⇒ T ∧ T ∼=ma,2 J S′ Kma
The lemma then holds by induction over the number of steps in S Z=⇒ S′. To prove the condition above, we perform
an induction over the proof tree that leads to the step S 7−→ S′.
Base Case: By the rules in Figure 2 each step on S is based either on Rule Taum,s, Comm,s, or Repm,s.
Case of Rule Taum,s: In this case S is a single sum, of which one summand is guarded by τ , and S
′ is the
continuation of this τ guarded summand, i.e., there are some finite index set I, some guards pii, and some
processes Pi ∈ Pm such that S =
∑
i∈I pii.Pi with pij = τ for some j ∈ I and S
′ = Pj . The corresponding
encodings are given by the following terms:
J S Kma ≡ (ν l)

l 〈⊤〉 | ∏
i∈I ,i6=j
J pii.Pi Kma | test l then l 〈⊥〉 | J Pj Kma else l 〈⊥〉


J S′ Kma = J Pj Kma
We observe that J S Kma can emulate the step S 7−→ S′ by reducing the test-statement in the encoding of
the j’s summand, i.e., by
J S Kma 7−→2 (ν l)

 ∏
i∈I ,i6=j
J pii.Pi Kma | l 〈⊥〉 | J Pj Kma

 = T.
We observe that T ≡ (ν l)
(∏
i∈I ,i6=j J pii.Pi Kma | l 〈⊥〉) | J Pj Kma , since, due to the renaming policy ϕma , the
name l is not free in J Pj Kma . So the term (ν l)(∏i∈I ,i6=j J pii.Pi Kma | l 〈⊥〉) is leftover, which is by Lemma
27 junk. By Lemma 22, we conclude that T ∼=ma,2 J S′ Kma .
Case of Rule Comm,s: Here S is a parallel composition of two sums and S
′ is the parallel composition of the
continuations of an input guarded summand of the first and a matching output guarded summand of the
second sum, i.e., there are two finite index sets I1, I2, some guards pii, and some processes Pi, Qi ∈ Pm such
that S =
∑
i∈I1
pii.Pi |
∑
i∈I2
pii.Qi with pij1 = y (x) and pij2 = y 〈z〉 for some j1 ∈ I1, some j2 ∈ I2, and
x, y, z ∈ N , and S′ = {z/x}Pj1 | Qj2 . Unfortunately the encodings of these terms are rather long:
J S Kma ≡ (νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up) (
(ν po , pi)
(
(ν l)
(
l 〈⊤〉 |
∏
i∈I1,i6=j1
J pii.Pi Kma
| (ν r)
(
pi 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , l , r〉 | r
∗ (l1, l2,−, s , ϕ
m
a (x)) .
test l1 then test l2 then l1 〈⊥〉 | l2 〈⊥〉 | s | J Pj1 Kma
else l1 〈⊤〉 | l2 〈⊥〉
else l1 〈⊥〉
))
| procLeftOutReq | procLeftInReq
)
| (ν po , pi)
(
(ν l)
(
l 〈⊤〉 |
∏
i∈I2,i6=j2
J pii.Qi Kma | (ν s) (po 〈ϕma (y) , l , s , ϕma (z)〉 | s . J Qj2 Kma ) )
| procRightOutReq | procRightInReq
)
| pushReq
)
J S′ Kma = (νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up) (
(ν po , pi)
(J {z/x}Pj1 Kma | procLeftOutReq | procLeftInReq)
| (ν po , pi)
(J Qj2 Kma | procRightOutReq | procRightInReq)
| pushReq
)
To emulate the source term step S 7−→ S′, the endings of the two sums in S have to interact with the
encoding of the parallel operator between them. At first the input and output register themselves to the
encoding of the parallel operator by pushing requests. These requests are then combined and a test on the
respective sum locks5 is induced by providing an output on the receiver lock. At least the test-statement is
reduced to complete the emulation of the source term step.
J S Kma 7−→3 (νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up , la, lb, r , s) (
(ν po , pi)
(
la 〈⊤〉 |
{
la/l
} ∏
i∈I1,i6=j1
J pii.Pi Kma

 | r∗ (l1, l2,−, s , ϕma (x)) .
test l1 then test l2 then l1 〈⊥〉 | l2 〈⊥〉 | s | J Pj1 Kma else l1 〈⊤〉 | l2 〈⊥〉 else l1 〈⊥〉
| procLeftOutReq | procLeftInReq | mi 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , la, r〉 | pi,up 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , la, r〉
)
| (ν po , pi)
(
lb 〈⊤〉 |
{
lb/l
} ∏
i∈I2,i6=j2
J pii.Qi Kma

 | s . J Qj2 Kma
| (νmi,up)
(
mi
∗ (y′, lr, r) . ([ y
′ = ϕma (y) ] r 〈lr, lb, lb, s , ϕ
m
a (z)〉 | mi,up 〈y
′, lr, r〉)
| (νmi) (mi,up ։ mi | procRightOutReq)
)
| po,up 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , lb, s , ϕ
m
a (z)〉 | procRightInReq
)
| pushReq
)
5 In order to avoid a deadlock caused by multiple simultaneous such tests on sum locks, the sum locks are ordered by
ensuring that always the left one is checked first.
7−→ (νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up , la, lb, r , s)
(
(ν po , pi)
(
la 〈⊤〉 |
{
la/l
} ∏
i∈I1,i6=j1
J pii.Pi Kma

 | r∗ (l1, l2,−, s , ϕma (x)) .
test l1 then test l2 then l1 〈⊥〉 | l2 〈⊥〉 | s | J Pj1 Kma else l1 〈⊤〉 | l2 〈⊥〉 else l1 〈⊥〉
| procLeftOutReq | procLeftInReq | pi,up 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , la, r〉
)
| (ν po , pi)
(
lb 〈⊤〉 |
{
lb/l
} ∏
i∈I2,i6=j2
J pii.Qi Kma

 | s . J Qj2 Kma
| (νmi,up)
(
mi
∗ (y′, lr, r) . ([ y
′ = ϕma (y) ] r 〈lr, lb, lb, s , ϕ
m
a (z)〉 | mi,up 〈y
′, lr, r〉)
| r 〈la, lb, lb, s , ϕ
m
a (z)〉 | mi,up 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , la, r〉
| (νmi) (mi,up ։ mi | procRightOutReq)
)
| po,up 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , lb, s , ϕ
m
a (z)〉 | procRightInReq
)
| pushReq
)
7−→6 (νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up , la, lb, r , s)
(
(ν po , pi)
( {
la/l
} ∏
i∈I1,i6=j1
J pii.Pi Kma

 | la 〈⊥〉 | lb 〈⊥〉 | {ϕma (z)/ϕm
a
(x)
} J Pj1 Kma
| r∗ (l1, l2,−, s , ϕ
m
a (x)) .test l1 then test l2 then l1 〈⊥〉 | l2 〈⊥〉 | s | J Pj1 Kma
else l1 〈⊤〉 | l2 〈⊥〉
else l1 〈⊥〉
| procLeftOutReq | procLeftInReq | pi,up 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , la, r〉
)
| (ν po , pi)
( {
lb/l
} ∏
i∈I2,i6=j2
J pii.Qi Kma

 | J Qj2 Kma
| (νmi,up)
(
mi
∗ (y′, lr, r) . ([ y
′ = ϕma (y) ] r 〈lr, lb, lb, s , ϕ
m
a (z)〉 | mi,up 〈y
′, lr, r〉)
| mi,up 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , la, r〉 | (νmi) (mi,up ։ mi | procRightOutReq)
)
| po,up 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , lb, s , ϕ
m
a (z)〉 | procRightInReq
)
| pushReq
)
= T
By Corollary 1,
{
ϕm
a
(z)/ϕm
a
(x)
} J Pj1 Kma ≡α J {z/x}Pj1 Kma . To show that T ∼=ma,2 J S′ Kma , we stepwise reduce
T by ignoring junk. By Lemma 25, we can ignore the requests pi,up 〈ϕma (y) , la, r〉, mi,up 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , la, r〉, and
po,up 〈ϕma (y) , lb, s , ϕ
m
a (z)〉. Next, by Lemma 28, we can ignore the term
r∗ (l1, l2,−, s , ϕ
m
a (x)) .test l1 then test l2 then l1 〈⊥〉 | l2 〈⊥〉 | s | J Pj1 Kma else l1 〈⊤〉 | l2 〈⊥〉
else l1 〈⊥〉 .
And, by Lemma 29, we can also ignore [ y′ = ϕma (y) ] r 〈lr, lb, lb, s , ϕ
m
a (z)〉, so
mi
∗ (y′, lr, r) . ([ y
′ = ϕma (y) ] r 〈lr, lb, lb, s , ϕ
m
a (z)〉 | mi,up 〈y
′, lr, r〉)
becomes mi ։ mi,up . Note that this forwarder and the following forwardermi,up ։ mi for an other instance
of mi may be necessary to emulate further source term steps, but, since they perform only invisible steps,
they do not influence the state of T modulo ∼=ma,2 in comparison to a fresh chain of right requests as in J S′ Kma .
At least, since la, lb, r , s /∈ fn
(J Pj1 Kma ) ∪ fn(J Pj2 Kma ), we can reorder the term according to the restrictions
on la, lb, r and the restriction on s can be omitted. By Lemma 27, then (ν l)
(∏
i∈I1,i6=j1
J pii.Pi Kma | l 〈⊥〉)
and (ν l)
(∏
i∈I1,i6=j2
J pii.Qi Kma | l 〈⊥〉) are junk. So, by Lemma 22, we conclude T ∼=ma,2 J S′ Kma .
Case of Rule Repm,s: Here S is a parallel composition of a replicated input and a sum and S
′ is the parallel
composition of the replicated input, the continuation of the replicated input, and the continuation of a
matching output guarded summand, i.e., there is a finite index sets I , some guards pii, and some processes
P,Qi ∈ Pm such that S = y∗ (x) .P |
∑
i∈I pii.Qi with pij = y 〈z〉 for some j ∈ I and x, y, z ∈ N , and
S′ = {z/x}P | Qj | y∗ (x) .P . Unfortunately, the encodings of S and S′ are again long:J S Kma ≡ (νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up) (
(ν po , pi)
(
(ν l , r , cr1 , cr2 , ro , ri)
(
r∗ (−,−, ls, s , ϕ
m
a (x)) .test ls then ls 〈⊥〉 | s | cr1 〈ϕ
m
a (x)〉 else ls 〈⊥〉
pi 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , l , r〉 | ri 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , l , r〉 | l 〈⊤〉 cr2 〈ro , ri〉
| cr1
∗ (ϕma (x)) .cr2 (ro , ri) . (νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , ro,up , ri,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up)
(
pushReqIn
| (ν po , pi) (J P Kma | procRightOutReq | procRightInReq)
| (ν ro , ri) (cr2 〈ro | ri〉 | pushReqOut)
))
| procLeftOutReq | procLeftInReq
)
(ν po , pi)
(
(ν l)

l 〈⊤〉 | ∏
i∈I2,i6=j
J pii.Qi Kma | (ν s) (po 〈ϕma (y) , l , s , ϕma (z)〉 | s . J Qj Kma )


| procRightOutReq | procRightInReq
)
pushReq
)
J S′ Kma = (νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up) (
(ν po , pi)
(
(νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up)
(
(ν po , pi) (J {z/x} (P ) Kma | procLeftOutReq | procLeftInReq)
(ν po , pi)
(J Qj Kma | procRightOutReq | procRightInReq)
pushReq
)
| procLeftOutReq | procLeftInReq
)
(ν po , pi) (J y∗ (x) .P Kma | procRightOutReq | procRightInReq)
pushReq
)
To emulate the source term step S 7−→ S′, the two subterms of J S Kma have to interact with the encoding
of the parallel operator between them. At first the replicated input and the output register themselves to
the encoding of the parallel operator by pushing requests. There the requests are combined and a test on
the sum lock of the sender is induced by providing an output on the receiver lock. Next the test-statement
is reduced. To complete the emulation of the source term step, at least the continuation of the replicated
input encoding is unguarded and placed within an adoption of the parallel operator encoding.
J S Kma 7−→3 (νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up , la, lb, r , s) (
(ν po , pi)
(
(ν cr1 , cr2 , ro , ri)
(
r∗ (−,−, ls, s , ϕ
m
a (x)) .test ls then ls 〈⊥〉 | s | cr1 〈ϕ
m
a (x)〉 else ls 〈⊥〉
| ri 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , la, r〉 | la 〈⊤〉 | cr2 〈ro , ri〉 | cr1
∗ (ϕma (x)) .cr2 (ro , ri) .
(νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , ro,up , ri,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up)
(
pushReqIn
| (ν po , pi) (J P Kma | procRightOutReq | procRightInReq)
| (ν ro , ri) (cr2 〈ro | ri〉 | pushReqOut)
))
| procLeftOutReq | procLeftInReq | mi 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , la, r〉 | pi,up 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , la, r〉
)
| (ν po , pi)
(
lb 〈⊤〉 |
{
lb/l
} ∏
i∈I2,i6=j
J pii.Qi Kma

 | s . J Qj Kma
| (νmi,up)
(
mi
∗ (y′, lr, r) . ([ y
′ = ϕma (y) ] r 〈lr, lb, lb, s , ϕ
m
a (z)〉 | mi,up 〈y
′, lr, r〉)
| (νmi) (mi,up ։ mi | procRightOutReq)
)
| po,up 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , lb, s , ϕ
m
a (z)〉 | procRightInReq
)
| pushReq
)
7−→ (νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up , la, lb, r , s)
(
(ν po , pi)
(
(ν cr1 , cr2 , ro , ri)
(
r∗ (−,−, ls, s , ϕ
m
a (x)) .test ls then ls 〈⊥〉 | s | cr1 〈ϕ
m
a (x)〉 else ls 〈⊥〉
| ri 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , la, r〉 | la 〈⊤〉 | cr2 〈ro , ri〉 | cr1
∗ (ϕma (x)) .cr2 (ro , ri) .
(νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , ro,up , ri,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up)
(
pushReqIn
| (ν po , pi) (J P Kma | procRightOutReq | procRightInReq)
| (ν ro , ri) (cr2 〈ro | ri〉 | pushReqOut)
))
| procLeftOutReq | procLeftInReq | pi,up 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , la, r〉
)
| (ν po , pi)
(
lb 〈⊤〉 |
{
lb/l
} ∏
i∈I2,i6=j
J pii.Qi Kma

 | s . J Qj Kma
| (νmi,up)
(
mi
∗ (y′, lr, r) . ([ y
′ = ϕma (y) ] r 〈lr, lb, lb, s , ϕ
m
a (z)〉 | mi,up 〈y
′, lr, r〉)
| r 〈la, lb, lb, s , ϕ
m
a (z)〉 | mi,up 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , la, r〉
| (νmi) (mi,up ։ mi | procRightOutReq)
)
| po,up 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , lb, s , ϕ
m
a (z)〉 | procRightInReq
)
| pushReq
)
7−→4 (νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up , la, lb, r , s)
(
(ν po , pi)
(
(ν cr1 , cr2 , ro , ri)
(
lb 〈⊥〉 | cr1 〈ϕ
m
a (z)〉
| r∗ (−,−, ls, s , ϕ
m
a (x)) .test ls then ls 〈⊥〉 | s | cr1 〈ϕ
m
a (x)〉 else ls 〈⊥〉
| ri 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , la, r〉 | la 〈⊤〉 | cr2 〈ro , ri〉 | cr1
∗ (ϕma (x)) .cr2 (ro , ri) .
(νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , ro,up , ri,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up)
(
pushReqIn
| (ν po , pi) (J P Kma | procRightOutReq | procRightInReq)
| (ν ro , ri) (cr2 〈ro | ri〉 | pushReqOut)
))
| procLeftOutReq | procLeftInReq | pi,up 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , la, r〉
)
| (ν po , pi)
( {
lb/l
} ∏
i∈I2,i6=j
J pii.Qi Kma

 | J Qj Kma
| (νmi,up)
(
mi
∗ (y′, lr, r) . ([ y
′ = ϕma (y) ] r 〈lr, lb, lb, s , ϕ
m
a (z)〉 | mi,up 〈y
′, lr, r〉)
| mi,up 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , la, r〉 | (νmi) (mi,up ։ mi | procRightOutReq)
)
| po,up 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , lb, s , ϕ
m
a (z)〉 | procRightInReq
)
| pushReq
)
7−→2 (νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up , la, lb, r , s)
(
(ν po , pi)
(
(ν cr1 , cr2 , ro , ri)
(
lb 〈⊥〉 | r
∗ (−,−, ls, s , ϕ
m
a (x)) .test ls then ls 〈⊥〉 | s | cr1 〈ϕ
m
a (x)〉 else ls 〈⊥〉
| ri 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , la, r〉 | la 〈⊤〉 | cr1
∗ (ϕma (x)) .cr2 (ro , ri) .
(νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , ro,up , ri,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up)
(
pushReqIn
| (ν po , pi) (J P Kma | procRightOutReq | procRightInReq)
| (ν ro , ri) (cr2 〈ro | ri〉 | pushReqOut)
)
| (νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , ro,up , ri,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up)
(
pushReqIn
| (ν po , pi)
( {
ϕm
a
(z)/ϕm
a
(x)
}
(J P Kma )
| procRightOutReq | procRightInReq
)
| (ν ro , ri) (cr2 〈ro | ri〉 | pushReqOut)
))
| procLeftOutReq | procLeftInReq | pi,up 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , la, r〉
)
| (ν po , pi)
( {
lb/l
} ∏
i∈I2,i6=j
J pii.Qi Kma

 | J Qj Kma
| (νmi,up)
(
mi
∗ (y′, lr, r) . ([ y
′ = ϕma (y) ] r 〈lr, lb, lb, s , ϕ
m
a (z)〉 | mi,up 〈y
′, lr, r〉)
| mi,up 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , la, r〉 | (νmi) (mi,up ։ mi | procRightOutReq)
)
| po,up 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , lb, s , ϕ
m
a (z)〉 | procRightInReq
)
| pushReq
)
= T
By Corollary 1,
{
ϕm
a
(z)/ϕm
a
(x)
} J P Kma ≡α J {z/x}P Kma . Unfortunately, this time it does not suffer to ignore
junk to prove that T ∼=ma,2 J S′ Kma , because in J S′ Kma there are two encoded parallel operators whereas in T
there is only one. Nevertheless, we start reducing T by omitting junk. Since the sum lock lb is instantiated
by false, by Lemma 25, the request po,up 〈ϕma (y) , lb, s , ϕ
m
a (z)〉 is junk. Moreover, by Lemma 29, the term
mi
∗ (y′, lr, r) . ([ y
′ = ϕma (y) ] r 〈lr, lb, lb, s , ϕ
m
a (z)〉 | mi,up 〈y
′, lr, r〉)
reduces to the forwarder mi ։ mi,up . Since la, lb, r , s /∈ fn(J {z/x}P Kma ) ∪ fn(J Qj Kma ), we can reorder the
term according to the restrictions on la, lb, and r and the restriction on s can be omitted. By Lemma 27,
then (ν l)
(∏
i∈I ,i6=j J pii.Qi Kma | l 〈⊥〉) is junk. By Lemma 22, we deduce T ∼=ma,2 T ′, where T ′ is:
T ∼=ma,2 (νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up)
(
(ν po , pi)
(
(ν l , r , cr1 , cr2 , ro , ri)
(
r∗ (−,−, ls, s , ϕ
m
a (x)) .test ls then ls 〈⊥〉 | s | cr1 〈ϕ
m
a (x)〉 else ls 〈⊥〉
| ri 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , l , r〉 | l 〈⊤〉
| cr1
∗ (ϕma (x)) .cr2 (ro , ri) . (νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , ro,up , ri,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up)
(
pushReqIn
| (ν po , pi) (J P Kma | procRightOutReq | procRightInReq)
| (ν ro , ri) (cr2 〈ro | ri〉 | pushReqOut)
)
| (νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , ro,up , ri,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up)
(
pushReqIn
| (ν po , pi)
( J {z/x}P Kma | procRightOutReq | procRightInReq)
| (ν ro , ri) (cr2 〈ro | ri〉 | pushReqOut)
))
| procLeftOutReq | procLeftInReq | pi,up 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , l , r〉
)
| (ν po , pi)
( J Qj Kma | procRightInReq
| (νmi,up) (mi ։ mi,up | mi,up 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , l , r〉 | (νmi) (mi,up ։ mi | procRightOutReq))
)
| pushReq
)
= T ′
Analysing T ′ we observe that in comparison to J S′ Kma the encoded subterms J {z/x}P Kma , J Qj Kma , and the
term representing J y∗ (x) .P Kma appear in the wrong order. However, since S′ ≡ S′′ = (y∗ (x) .P | {z/x}P ) |
Qj and ∼=
m
a,2, by Lemma 21, preserves structural congruence of source terms, we have J S′ Kma ∼=ma,2 J S′′ Kma ,
i.e., the order of these subterms does not matter. As in the case before, on the right side of the parallel
operator encoding there are the two forwarders mi ։ mi,up and mi,up ։ mi (for different instances of mi).
Again they are necessary to emulate further source term steps on the continuation J Qj Kma , but, since they
perform only invisible steps, they do not influence the state of T ′ modulo ∼=ma,2.
Moreover there is the request mi,up 〈ϕma (y) , l , r〉, to enable an emulation of a communication of Qj and
y∗ (x) .P . Note that there is also the request pi,up 〈ϕma (y) , l , r〉 at the right side of the parallel operator
encoding, but the request pi 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , l , r〉, which belongs to J y∗ (x) .P Kma , is missing. However, since by
mi,up ։ mi the request pi,up 〈ϕma (y) , l , r〉 is forwarded to mi 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , l , r〉 within a pure administrative
step and since this configuration is equal to one application of procLeftInReq on pi 〈ϕma (y) , l , r〉, which is
again a pure administrative step, these two requests in comparison to pi 〈ϕma (y) , l , r〉 do not influence the
state of T ′ modulo ∼=ma,2.
What remains as difference of T ′ and J S′′ Kma is the fact, that in T ′ the encoding of {z/x}P appears within a
branch of the replicated input encoding whereas in J S′′ Kma it appears as right branch of a parallel operator
encoding, i.e., it remains to show that T ′′ ∼=ma,2 J y∗ (x) .P | {z/x}P Kma , where
T ′′ = (ν l , r , cr1 , cr2 , ro , ri)
(
r∗ (−,−, ls, s , ϕ
m
a (x)) .test ls then ls 〈⊥〉 | s | cr1 〈ϕ
m
a (x)〉 else ls 〈⊥〉
| ri 〈ϕ
m
a (y) , l , r〉 | l 〈⊤〉
| cr1
∗ (ϕma (x)) .cr2 (ro , ri) . (νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , ro,up , ri,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up)
(
pushReqIn
| (ν po , pi) (J P Kma | procRightOutReq | procRightInReq)
| (ν ro , ri) (cr2 〈ro | ri〉 | pushReqOut)
)
| (νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , ro,up , ri,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up)
(
pushReqIn
| (ν po , pi) (J {z/x}P Kma | procRightOutReq | procRightInReq)
| (ν ro , ri) (cr2 〈ro | ri〉 | pushReqOut)
))
First, note that the term
(ν po , pi) (J {z/x}P Kma | procRightOutReq | procRightInReq)
exactly corresponds to the right branch of J y∗ (x) .P | {z/x}P Kma . If we compare pushReqIn with procLeft-
OutReq and procLeftInReq, then we observe that the former includes exactly the same forwarders as the later
but also some additional forwarders. The same holds for pushReqOut and pushReq. Note that the additional
forwarders ensures that each requests of each branch of the replicated input encoding is forwarded to each
next right branch, and so these additional forwarders are necessary in case there is more than one branch.
Also note that the given forwarders guarantee that each pair of requests, such that one is an input and the
other one an output request and both requests do not origin from the same sum, can be combined. Moreover,
note that the only request from the left side, i.e., of the encoding of the replicated input, is transmitted to
the right side, i.e., the only branch of the replicated input, by the request ri 〈ϕma (y) , l , r〉 and pushReqIn.
So these forwarders do not distinguish T ′ and J S′′ Kma modulo ∼=ma,2.
Since T ′′ and J y∗ (x) .P | {z/x}P Kma do only differ by the forwarding of requests but nevertheless allow for
the same combinations, we deduce that T ′′ ∼=ma,2 J y∗ (x) .P | {z/x}P Kma . Thus, by Lemma 15, we conclude
T ∼=ma,2 J S′ Kma .
Induction Hypothesis: S1 7−→ S′1 implies ∃T1 ∈ Pa . J S1 Kma Z=⇒ T1 ∧ T1 ∼=ma,2 J S′1 Kma
Induction Step: We have to consider the remaining three rules Par, Res, and Cong of Figure 2.
Case of Rule Par: Then S = S1 | S2 for some S1, S2 ∈ Pm, S1 7−→ S′1, and S
′ = S′1 | S2. By the induction
hypothesis there is some T1 ∈ Pa such that J S1 Kma Z=⇒ T1 and T1 ∼=ma,2 J S′1 Kma . The corresponding encodings
are given by the following terms:
J S Kma = (νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up) (
(ν po , pi) (J S1 Kma | procLeftOutReq | procLeftInReq)
| (ν po , pi) (J S2 Kma | procRightOutReq | procRightInReq)
| pushReq
)
J S′ Kma = (νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up) (
(ν po , pi)
(J S′1 Kma | procLeftOutReq | procLeftInReq)
| (ν po , pi) (J S2 Kma | procRightOutReq | procRightInReq)
| pushReq
)
Since J S1 Kma Z=⇒ T1 and since J S1 Kma is not guarded in J S Kma , we can use the rules Par, Res, and Cong
in the asynchronous calculus to show that:
J S Kma Z=⇒ (νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up) (
(ν po , pi) (T1 | procLeftOutReq | procLeftInReq)
| (ν po , pi) (J S2 Kma | procRightOutReq | procRightInReq)
| pushReq
)
= T
By Definition 28, T1 ∼=
m
a,2 J S′1 Kma implies C (T1) ≈˙ma,2 C (J S′1 Kma ) for all contexts C ([·]) ∈ Pa → Pa such
that C (J 0 Kma ) ∈ Pa↾J · Kma . Since J 0 | S2 Kma ∈ Pa↾J · Kma , the quantification over C includes all contexts C such
that:
C ([·]) = C′
(
(νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up)
(
(ν po , pi) ([·] | procLeftOutReq | procLeftInReq)
| (ν po , pi) (J S2 Kma | procRightOutReq | procRightInReq)
| pushReq
))
= C
′
(
C
′′
([·])
)
Because of that, we have C
′
(
C
′′
(T1)
)
≈˙ma,2 C
′
(
C
′′
(J S′1 Kma )) for all contexts C′ ([·]) ∈ Pa → Pa such that
C
′
(J 0 Kma ) ∈ Pa↾J · Kma . By Definition 28, we conclude T ∼=ma,2 J S′ Kma .
Case of Rule Res: Then S = (ν x)S1 for some x ∈ N and some S1 ∈ Pm, S1 7−→ S′1, and S
′ = (ν x)S′1.
By the induction hypothesis there is some T1 ∈ Pa such that J S1 Kma Z=⇒ T1 and T1 ∼=ma,2 J S′1 Kma . Since
the encoding of restriction is rigid, i.e., J S Kma = (ν ϕma (x)) J S1 Kma and J S′ Kma = (ν ϕma (x)) J S′1 Kma , we
can apply rule Res to conclude from J S1 Kma Z=⇒ T1 to J S Kma Z=⇒ (ν ϕsa (x))T1 = T . By Definition 28,
T1 ∼=
m
a,2 J S′1 Kma implies C (T1) ≈˙ma,2 C (J S′1 Kma ) for all contexts C ([·]) ∈ Pa → Pa such that C (J 0 Kma ) ∈
Pa↾J · Km
a
. Since (ν ϕma (x)) J 0 Kma ∈ Pa↾J · Kma , the quantification over C includes all contexts C such that
C ([·]) = C
′
((ν ϕma (x)) [·]). Because of that, we have C
′
((ν ϕma (x)) T1) ≈˙
m
a,2 C
′
(
(ν ϕma (x)) J S′1 Kma ) for all
contexts C
′
([·]) ∈ Pa → Pa such that C
′
(J 0 Kma ) ∈ Pa↾J · Kma . By Definition 28, we conclude T ∼=ma,2 J S′ Kma .
Case of Rule Cong: Then S ≡ S1 for some S1 ∈ Pm, S1 7−→ S′1, and S
′
1 ≡ S
′. By Lemma 21, the encod-
ing J · Kma preserves structural congruence of source terms modulo ∼=ma,2. So S ≡ S1 and S′1 ≡ S′ impliesJ S Kma ∼=ma,2 J S1 Kma and J S′1 Kma ∼=ma,2 J S′ Kma . By Definition 28, for all contexts C ([·]) ∈ Pa → Pa such that
C (J 0 Kma ) ∈ Pa↾J · Kma we have C (J S Kma ) ≈˙ma,2 C (J S1 Kma ), i.e., especially J S Kma ≈˙ma,2 J S1 Kma . Thus, by
Definition 26, for each sequence J S Kma Z=⇒ T there is a sequence J S1 Kma Z=⇒ T1 for some T1 ∈ Pa such
that T ≈˙ma,2 T1. The same holds for all Contexts C, i.e., since C (J S Kma ) ≈˙ma,2 C (J S1 Kma ), for each sequence
C (J S Kma ) Z=⇒ C (T ) there is a sequence C (J S1 Kma ) Z=⇒ C (T1) for some T1 ∈ Pa such that C (T ) ≈˙ma,2 C (T1).
So, by Definition 28, T ∼=ma,2 T1. By the induction hypothesis T1
∼=ma,2 J S′1 Kma . Since, by Lemma 15, ∼=ma,2 is
an equivalence, T ∼=ma,2 T1, T1 ∼=
m
a,2 J S′1 Kma , and J S′1 Kma ∼=ma,2 J S′ Kma implies T ∼=ma,2 J S′ Kma .
⊓⊔
If we analyse the proofs of the Lemmata 30 and 31, we observe that for each emulation there is exactly one
core step, i.e., there is exactly one core step for each of the rules Taum,s, Comm,s, and Repm,s and the emulation
of the remaining rules do not introduce additional core steps. This underpins our intuition of core steps (compare
to Section 2.3) that any emulation of a source term step is connected to exactly one core step. Moreover, any core
step marks exactly one emulation of a source term step by steering the emulation to the “point of no return”, i.e.,
to a point, from where no other sequence of steps can disable the completion of that emulation and from where any
possibility to emulate a conflicting source term step is ultimately withdrawn.
Lemma 32. Any emulation of a source term step includes exactly one core step and any core step steers the
emulation of a source term step to a point, from where it eventually has to be completed.
Proof. If we analyse the reduction rules in Figure 2, we observe that the result of a source term step is the unguarding
of one or two former guarded subterms. If we rely on this fact to mark the essence of a step, then an emulation
is characterised by the unguarding of the respective encoded continuations. Analysing the encoding functions in
Figure 3 and Figure 4 we observe that such encoded continuations are guarded either by a sender lock or a test-
statement. Note that, as proved in [Nes00] for J · Ksa and by the Lemma 11 and Lemma 12, neither pure nor impure
administrative steps can introduce deadlock.
The reduction of a summand guarded by τ is the only case of a reduction step that does not require the
interaction of a receiver and a sender (compare to rule Taum,s). Both encodings introduce a sum lock to encode a
sum and translate summands guarded by τ into a single test-statement, that tests the corresponding sum lock and
in case of success unguards the encoded continuation and provides a negative instantiation of the sum lock. Note
that to emulate such a source term for both encodings only two steps are necessary to reduce the test-statement.
The first consumes the instantiation of the sum lock. If this instantiation is positive we call that step a core step.
Note that before this step, an emulation of a conflicting source term step may change the instantiation of the sum
lock into a negative instantiation and thus withdraw the possibility to emulate the step. On the other side as soon
as the positive instantiation of the sum lock is consumed, there is, by Lemma 9 and Lemma 10, no possibility to
prevent that the second step necessary to complete the emulation eventually happens. So, whenever such core step is
performed, eventually the encoded continuation is unguarded. Moreover, the only way to instantiate the consumed
sum lock is to complete the emulation, which leads to a negative instantiation of that sum lock. By Lemma 5, there
is no chance to unguard a positive instantiation of that sum lock afterwards. Note that any source term step, that
is in conflict to the considered step on the τ guarded summand, have to reduce another summand of the same sum.
Remember that, by Lemma 26 and 27, encoded summands connected to a negative instantiation of a sum lock are
junk. So the consumption of the positive instantiation of the sum lock immediately rules out any emulation of a
conflicting source term step. Moreover, since there is no possibility to reach a positive instantiation of that sum lock
again, there is no possibility to emulate this source term step twice and any translated observable connected to this
sum lock, i.e., to this sum, is immediately withdrawn by the consumption of the positive instantiation. Because of
that, for any emulation of a source term step based on rule Taum,s there is exactly one core step and for any such
core step exactly one source term step is emulated.
In case of rule Comm,s the source term step is on an interaction of an input guarded and an output guarded
summand. The encoding of the continuation of the receiver is guarded by the second of a nested test-statement,
while the encoded continuation of the sender is guarded by a sender lock, which in turn is guarded by the nested
test-statement. In Example 1 we explain that reducing the first test-statement does not ensure, that the emulation
can be completed. However, as soon as the positive instantiation of the second sum lock is consumed we can repeat
the argumentation of the case above to show that the point of no return of that emulation is reached. We observe
that the consumption of the second positive sum lock instantiation is indeed the only core step necessary to emulate
this source term step. It immediately withdraw any possibility to complete the emulation of a conflicting source term
step, because it ensures that both consumed positive instantiations of sum lock are never restored. With that it also
immediately withdraws all translated observables on the summands of these to sums. Moreover, by Lemma 9 and
Lemma 10, the encoded continuations of the respective sender and receiver have eventually to become unguarded.
Thus again for any emulation of a source term step based on rule Comm,s there is exactly one core step and for any
such core step exactly one source term step is emulated.
In case of rule Repm,s the source term step is on an interaction of a replicated input and an output guarded
summand. The encoding of the continuation of the receiver is guarded by a single test-statement, while the encoded
continuation of the sender is guarded by a sender lock, which in turn is guarded by the single test-statement. As soon
as the positive instantiation of the second sum lock is consumed we can repeat the argumentation of the first case to
show that the point of no return of that emulation is reached. We observe that the consumption of the positive sum
lock instantiation is indeed the only core step necessary to emulate this source term step. It immediately withdraw
any possibility to complete the emulation of a conflicting source term step, because it ensures that the consumed
positive instantiation of the sum lock is never restored. With that it also immediately withdraws all translated
observables on the summands of that sum. Moreover, by Lemma 9 and Lemma 10, the encoded continuations of
the respective sender and receiver have eventually to become unguarded. Thus again for any emulation of a source
term step based on rule Repm,s there is exactly one core step and for any such core step exactly one source term
step is emulated. ⊓⊔
Based on this Lemma we prove operational soundness, by showing that each target term is part of an emulation
of some source term step.
Lemma 33 (Operational Soundness). The encodings J · Ksa and J · Kma fulfil operational soundness.
Proof. We start with J · Ksa. By Definition 9, we have to show that:
∀S ∈ Ps . ∀T ∈ Pa . J S Ksa Z=⇒ T implies ∃S′ ∈ Ps . ∃T ′ ∈ Pa . S Z=⇒ S′ ∧ T Z=⇒ T ′ ∧ T ′ ∼=sa J S′ Ksa
Note that T is a target term, i.e., T ∈ Pa↾J · Ks
a
. By Lemma 18, pure administrative steps do not influence the state
of a target term modulo ∼=sa, i.e., ∀T, T
′ ∈ Pa↾J · Ks
a
. T Z=⇒. T ′ implies T ∼=sa T ′. Because of that, it suffice to consider
impure administrative and core steps, i.e., steps on translated source term names or sum locks. Moreover note, that
steps on negative instantiations of sum locks reduce the corresponding test-statements to simple forwarders, that
immediately restore the information consumed to resolve this test-statement. Thus impure administrative steps on
negative instantiations of sum locks do not change the state of a target term modulo ∼=sa.
By Lemma 32, core steps indicate the border between the encoding of one source term and the encoding of its
reduction. While, pure administrative steps do not influence the state of a source term modulo ∼=sa, the core steps
do. Core steps finally rule out each way to reach one of the consumed translated observables and all translated
observables connected to the same sums. With that, they also rule out each emulation of conflicting source term steps
and accordingly the reachability of the corresponding translated observables and occurrences of X. On the other
hand, since all post-processing steps of all emulations are pure administrative steps, they ensure that eventually
the respective encoded continuations are unguarded. Because of that immediately after the core step all translated
observables and all reachable occurrences of X of the encoded continuations are reachable. Because of that, source
term steps and their emulations handle source term observables and their translated observables in exactly the same
way, i.e., they remove old and unguard new in the same way. So, if we consider only pure administrative steps and
a single core step, i.e., the sequence J S Ksa Z=⇒. T 7→7−→ T ′ Z=⇒. T ′′ for a source term S ∈ Ps, then each target term
in the sequence J S Ksa Z=⇒. T , including T , is congruent to J S Ksa modulo ∼=sa and each target term in the sequence
T ′ Z=⇒. T ′′, including T ′, is congruent to T ′′ modulo ∼=sa. By Lemma 32, the step T 7→7−→ T ′ marks the emulation of
a source term step. Thus, S must be able to perform a step, i.e., ∃S′ ∈ Ps such that S 7−→ S′, and the sequenceJ S Ksa Z=⇒. T 7→7−→ T ′ Z=⇒. T ′′ emulates this step by unguarding the encodings of the subterms of S′ and removing the
translated observables that refer to the observables removed from S during the step to S′. Moreover, note that,
since all post-processing steps are pure administrative steps, it is always possible to complete the emulation after
the core step. Thus ∃T ′′′ ∈ Pa such that T
′′′ is the result of the completion of the emulation of S 7−→ S′, i.e.,
T ′ Z=⇒. T ′′′ and T ′′′ ∼=sa J S′ Ksa.
Unfortunately, impure administrative steps complicate the situation. As described in Example 1 they can already
rule out some emulations on conflicting source term steps by disabling the reachability of some translated observables
(e.g. by consuming their respective positive instantiations of sum locks). If they rule out all emulations on conflicting
source term steps, then they behave like core steps and we are back to the situation descripted above. But, if they
only rule out some emulations on conflicting source term steps, we result in what we denote as intermediate state
(compare to Definition 23). Intermediate states are in general not congruent to any of the surrounding encoded
source terms modulo ∼=sa; neither to the encoded source term there we start our emulation attempt nor to any
encoding of the possible reductions. Note that the Definition 9 of operational soundness explicitly allows for the
presence of such intermediate states as long as we can ensure, that from each intermediate state a state, that
is congruent modulo ∼=sa to an encoded source term, is reachable. So let us have a closer look on these impure
administrative steps. By Definition 24, impure administrative steps are steps on translated source term names or
on sum locks. They prepare an emulation by unguarding and/or partially reducing a test-statement. Since for all
sum locks eventually an instantiation is restored, each of these test-stements is eventually resolved (compare to the
proof in [Nes00] that the encoding J · Ksa does not introduce deadlock).
So let us consider a sequence J S Ksa ˙Z=⇒. T 7→7−→ T ′ Z=⇒. T ′′. If the core step T 7→7−→ T ′ rules out any emulation
attempt except for the one it steers to the point of no return, then we can use the same argumentation as in the
case without impure administrative steps to show that ∃S′ ∈ Ps and ∃T ′′′ ∈ Pa such that S 7−→ S′, T ′ Z=⇒. T ′′′, i.e.,
T Z=⇒ T ′′′, and T ′′′ ∼=sa J S′ Ksa.
However, by performing several impure administrative steps in J S Ksa ˙Z=⇒. T , several emulations can be started by
unguarding and/or partially reducing test-statements before a single of them is resolved. In this case, the resolution
of one of these test-statements may not directly lead to a term congruent modulo ∼=sa to an encoded source term.
This can happen, if the source term can perform several sets of conflicting steps, i.e., there are at least two non
conflicting but parallel steps and for each of these steps there can be some conflicting alternatives. To reach again
a term, that is congruent modulo ∼=sa to an encoded source term, T has to finally decide on which of the started
emulations are completed and rule out all conflicting emulations. Note that, therefore in general it is not necessary
to resolve all unguarded or partially reduced test-statements. However, since the J · Ksa does not introduce deadlock,
all unguarded and partially reduced test-statements in T can be resolved, which definitely completes some of the
started emulations by core steps and rules out the completion of any remaining started emulation6. Thus ∃T ′ ∈ Pa
such that T ′ is the target term that is reached after all unguarded or started test-statements of T are resolved and all
necessary post-processing steps to complete the respective emulations are performed, i.e., T Z=⇒ T ′. Then for each
core step in the sequence T Z=⇒ T ′ there is one source term step of S or a reduction of S. Note that in J S Ksa ˙Z=⇒. T
several emulations are started, but, since there are no core steps, none of these emulations is completed. So S must
be able to perform all source term step, that correspond to an emulation completed in T Z=⇒ T ′, in parallel. Because
of that, we can split up S into n parallel subterms S1, . . . , Sn, where n is the number of emulations completed in
T Z=⇒ T ′. Then we can prove the lemma for the subterms using the cases above, i.e., we have J Si Ksa ˙Z=⇒. Ti implies
∃S′i ∈ Ps and ∃T
′
i ∈ Pa such that Si 7−→ S
′
i, Ti Z=⇒ T ′i , and T ′i ∼=sa J S′i Ksa. Since S can perform all these source term
steps in parallel, it can also perform them arbitrarily ordered in a sequence, i.e., ∃S′ ∈ Ps such that S Z=⇒ S′ and
S′ is structural congruent to the parallel composition of the reductions S′1, . . . , S
′
n. Then we use an argumentation
similar to the case of the Par rule in the proof of Lemma 30 to conclude that ∃T ′ ∈ Pa such that T Z=⇒ T ′ and
T ′i
∼=sa J S′i Ksa for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n implies T ′ ∼=sa J S′ Ksa.
Finally, let us consider an arbitrary sequence J S Ksa Z=⇒ T , which may even include core steps. Note that, in
opposite two the cases before, this sequence covers the case there already some emulations are completed while for
other emulations—possibly of parallel source term steps—up to now only test-statements are unguarded and/or
partially reduced. However, revisiting the argumentation of the case before, ∃T ′ ∈ Pa such that T Z=⇒ T ′ and T ′ is
the result from resolving all unguarded and partially reduced test-statements in T and performing all post-precessing
steps necessary to complete all emulations in J S Ksa Z=⇒ T Z=⇒ T ′, that are already driven beyond their point of no
return by the respective core step. By concentrating again only on the impure administrative and core steps—and
ignoring impure administrative steps that do not lead to a completed emulation in J S Ksa Z=⇒ T ′—we can split up
this sequence into subsequences of subsequent bundles of completed emulations, such that each such bundle can
not be further subdivided into such bundles. Then, if necessary, we split up these bundles into the parallel branches
of the corresponding source terms as in the case before. Repeating this, we result in a tree of completed emulation
of subsequently and parallel source term steps, where for each parallel source term step there is a branch in the
respective subtree. Now each line between a parent and its direct child node within this tree represents one of the
above considered cases. So we can conclude the proof by an induction over this tree. Thus, ∃S′ ∈ Ps such that
S Z=⇒ S′ and T ∼=sa J S′ Ksa.
The argumentation for J · Kma is similar to the argumentation for J · Ksa above. Of course, the Lemmata 18 and 30
have to be replaced in the argumentation by 19 and 31, respectively. Moreover note, that the combination of the
Lemmata 11, 12, and 32 proves that J · Kma does not introduce deadlock. Finally, in J · Kma there are no steps on
translated source term names, so there are less impure administrative steps. ⊓⊔
Lemma 34 (Divergence Reflection). The encoding J · Ksa reflects divergence.
Proof. By Lemma 32, emulations and core steps corresponds. Because of that, an infinite sequence J S Ksa 7−→ω with
infinite many core steps implies that infinitely many source term steps are emulated, i.e., that S 7−→ω. Because
of that, it suffice to show that each sequence T ˙Z=⇒. T ′ on target terms T, T ′ ∈ Pa↾J · Ks
a
between two core steps is
finite. The argumentation for the sequence of administrative steps J S Ksa ˙Z=⇒. T ′ before the first core step and for
the sequence of administrative steps after the last core step—in case of a terminating process—is then similar.
6 Note that the completion of emulations, that are up to now only started by performing some pure administrative steps,
possibly might not be ruled out by resolving these test-statements. However, since pure administrative steps do not
influence the state of a target term modulo ∼=sa, such emulations can be ignored.
A look at the definition of the corresponding renaming policy in Figure 3 suggests the following case split7 on
the links of the steps in T ˙Z=⇒. T ′.
Case of s: The name s is used by the encoding function to denote sender locks. By Definition 17, sender locks
are channels of multiplicity one, that are used as input but not as replicated input channels and within the
continuation of such an input there is no unguarded and unrestricted instantiation of a sum lock. Their purpose
is to guard the encoded continuations within the encoding of output guarded source terms. Since we consider
only terms with finite representation, there are only finitely many unguarded instantiations on sender locks in T .
Analysing the encoding function in Figure 4 we observe, that new instantiations on sender locks appear only in
the then-case of the (nested) test-statement in the encoding of input guarded source terms and in the encoding
of a replicated input. Because of that, new instantiations on sender locks can be unguarded only by a core step
followed by a pure administrative step to reduce the test-statement to the then-case. Some of these core steps
may have happened before T , but of course only finitely many. So within the sequence T ˙Z=⇒. T ′ only finitely
many new instantiations on sender locks can be unguarded. We conclude that within the sequence T ˙Z=⇒. T ′
there are only finitely many steps on sender locks.
Note that the encoded continuation of input guarded source terms or a replicated input appears in parallel to
such an instantiation of a sender lock within the then-case of a (nested) test-statement. Because of that, within
the sequence T ˙Z=⇒. T ′ only finitely many encoded source terms, i.e., continuations, can be unguarded.
Case of Outputs on Translated Source Term Names: Since we consider only terms with finite representa-
tions, there are only finitely many unguarded outputs on translated source term names in T . Analysing the
encoding function in Figure 3 we observer that there are only two ways to unguard a new output on a translated
source term name. First, they can be unguarded by unguarding an encoded source term as continuation of an
emulation. By the case before, within the sequence T ˙Z=⇒. T ′ only finitely many encoded source terms can be
unguarded, so there can only finitely many new outputs on translated source term names can be unguarded
that way. Second, in the else-case of the first test-statement in the encoding of an input guarded source term
there is such an unguarded output. To unguard this test-statement an instantiation of a receiver lock is con-
sumed, but no new is unguarded by the else-case of the first test-statement. Analysing the encoding function we
observer that all receiver locks are generated under restriction and initially there is exactly one instantiation of
each receiver lock. Moreover, receiver locks are never transmitted over these restriction and to unguard a new
instantiation (in the else-case of the second test-statement) a former instantiation of that receiver lock has to
be consumed. Because of that, in each target term there is at most one instantiation of each receiver lock. Thus,
reducing the nested test-statement to the else-case of the first test-statements, prevents any further unguarding
of this test-statement. Since in T there are only finitely many different guarded or unguarded replicated inputs
on receiver locks guarding such a nested test-statement, it is not possible to unguard initially many new outputs
on translated source term names that way. We conclude that within the sequence T ˙Z=⇒. T ′ only finitely many
outputs on translated source term names can be unguarded.
Case of r : The name r is used by J · Ksa to introduce receiver locks. Since we consider only terms with finite
representations, there are only finitely many unguarded instantiations on receiver locks in T . Analysing the
encoding in Figure 3 we observer that there are only two ways to unguard new instantiations on receiver locks.
First, they can be unguarded by unguarding an encoded source term as continuation of an emulation. By the
first case, within the sequence T ˙Z=⇒. T ′ only finitely many encoded source terms can be unguarded, so there can
only finitely many new instantiations on receiver locks be unguarded that way. Second, in the else-case of the
second test-statement in the encoding of an input guarded source term there is such an unguarded instantiation
on a receiver lock. However, to unguard such a nested test-statement an output on a translated source term name
has to be consumed. Since by the case before there are only finitely many such outputs, there is no possibility to
unguard infinity many instantiations on receiver lock this way. We conclude that within the sequence T ˙Z=⇒. T ′
there are only finitely many steps on receiver locks.
Note that in T there are only finitely many unguarded test-statements and new test-statements can only be
unguarded by unguarding an encoded source term or by a step on a receiver lock. Thus, since by the first
two cases only finitely many encoded source terms can be unguarded and by the current case there are only
finitely many steps on receiver locks, within the sequence T ˙Z=⇒. T ′ only finitely many new test-statements can
be unguarded.
7 Note that in most cases the considered names are restricted, so a simple alpha conversion may change them. Because of
that, as already in the proof of Lemma 9, the use of concrete names in the following case split should not imply that we
consider steps on these specific names. Instead the names refer to the meaning which is related to them by the encoding
function.
Case of Inputs on Translated Source Term Names: Since we consider only terms with finite representations,
there are only finitely many unguarded inputs on translated source term names in T . New inputs on source
terms names can only be unguarded by a step on a receiver lock. Since by the case before the number of steps
on receiver locks is finite, within the sequence T ˙Z=⇒. T ′ only finitely many inputs on translated source term
names can be unguarded. Moreover, since by the second case the number of outputs on translated source term
names is finite as well, there are only finitely many steps on translated source term names within the sequence
T ˙Z=⇒. T ′.
Case of l , l ′: Both names are used by the encoding function to refer to sum locks. The only steps on sum locks
are to reduce a test-statement. Note that in case of a nested test-statement two sum locks are reduced, i.e.,
there are two steps on sum locks. However, since by the third case there are only finitely many test-statements,
within the sequence T ˙Z=⇒. T ′ there are only finitely many steps on sum locks.
Case of t, f : t and f are used by the encoding function to implement booleans. As in the case of sum locks, all steps
on these names are used to reduce a test-statement. So again, since there are only finitely many test-statements,
within the sequence T ˙Z=⇒. T ′ there are only finitely many steps on t and f .
⊓⊔
Lemma 35 (Divergence Reflection). The encoding J · Kma reflects divergence.
Proof. By Lemma 32, emulations and core steps corresponds. Because of that, an infinite sequence of target term
steps J S Kma 7−→ω with infinite many core steps implies that infinitely many source term steps are emulated, i.e.,
that S 7−→ω. Because of that, it suffice to show that each sequence T ˙Z=⇒. T ′ on target terms T, T ′ ∈ Pa↾J · Km
a
between
two core steps is finite. The argumentation for the sequence of administrative steps J S Kma ˙Z=⇒. T ′ before the first
core step and for the sequence of administrative steps after the last core step—in case of a terminating process—is
then similar.
Since source term names are translated into values, never used as links, it suffice to consider steps on names
introduced by the encoding function. A look at the definition of the corresponding renaming policy in Figure 4
suggests the following case split8 on the links of the steps in T ˙Z=⇒. T ′.
Case of s: The name s is used by the encoding function to denote sender locks. By Definition 17, sender locks
are carried as third value of output requests. Their purpose is to guard the encoded continuations within the
encoding of output guarded source terms. Since we consider only terms with finite representation, there are
only finitely many unguarded instantiations on sender locks in T . Analysing the encoding function in Figure 4
we observe, that new instantiations on sender locks appear only in the then-case of the (nested) test-statement
in the encoding of input guarded source terms and in the encoding of a replicated input. Because of that, new
instantiations on sender locks can be unguarded only by a core step followed by a pure administrative step to
reduce the test-statement to the then-case. Some of these core steps may have happened before T , but of course
only finitely many. So within the sequence T ˙Z=⇒. T ′ only finitely many new instantiations on sender locks can be
unguarded. We conclude that within the sequence T ˙Z=⇒. T ′ there are only finitely many steps on sender locks.
Note that the encoded continuation of input guarded source terms appears in parallel to such an instantiation of
a sender lock within the then-case of a nested test-statement. Because of that, within the sequence T ˙Z=⇒. T ′ only
finitely many encoded continuations of encodings of input or output guarded source terms can be unguarded.
Case of cr1 , cr2 : These two names are used to link the encoded continuations of several reductions of the same
replicated input within a chain. Note that the first name denotes a chain lock carrying a translated source term
name (compare to Definition 20). Again, since we consider only terms with finite representations, there are
only finitely many instances, i.e., outputs, on these names. For each step on the chain lock a new output on
an instance of cr2 is unguarded. So the number of steps on instances of cr2 is bounded by the number of steps
on chain lock carrying a translated source term name. New instantiations of such chain locks are unguarded as
instantiations of sender locks only in the then-case of the test-statement in the encoding of a replicated input.
Because of that, new instantiations on such chain locks can be unguarded only by a core step followed by a pure
administrative step to reduce the test-statement to the then-case. Some of these core steps may have happened
before T , but of course only finitely many. So within the sequence T ˙Z=⇒. T ′ only finitely many new instantiations
on such chain locks can be unguarded. We conclude that within the sequence T ˙Z=⇒. T ′ there are only finitely
many steps on such chain locks and instances of cr2 .
8 Note that in most cases the considered names are restricted, so a simple alpha conversion may change them. Because of
that, as already in the proof of Lemma 10, the use of concrete names in the following case split should not imply that we
consider steps on these specific names. Instead the names refer to the meaning which is related to them by the encoding
function.
Because of that, within the sequence T ˙Z=⇒. T ′ only finitely many encoded continuations of encodings of replicated
inputs can be unguarded.
Case of po , pi , po,up , pi,up ,mo ,mi ,mo,up ,mi,up , ri , ro , ri,up , ro,up : All these names are request channels, i.e., there
are introduced by J · Kma to transport requests. Since we consider only terms with finite representations, there
are only finitely many unguarded requests in T . Moreover, by the two cases above, only finitely new requests can
be unguarded within the sequence T ˙Z=⇒. T ′ by unguarding source term encodings. Thus there are only finitely
many different unguarded requests within the sequence T ˙Z=⇒. T ′. We have already argued that the encodingJ · Kma puts much effort in restricting the way a request may take. We underpin this fact here, by proving that
these ways do not include cycles. Note that inputs on requests channels do only appear within the encoding of
the parallel operator or a replicated input (compare to Figure 4).
Let us consider the encoding of a parallel operator first. The terms procLeftOutReq and procLeftInReq transmit
all requests of the left side of a parallel operator encoding to the right side and upwards over the restriction
on the request channels. In procRightOutReq and procRightInReq the requests of the right side of the parallel
operator encoding are linked in two chains, one for input and one for output requests. Therefore the requests
of the right side are consumed, but a single copy of them is pushed upwards over the restriction on the request
channels again. Then all left requests can be received by the respective first member of the chain of requests of
opposite kind to the left request. Within these first members all left requests are consumed to combine them
with the respective request behind this member and a copy of this left requests is further pushed along the chain.
Now each member of that chain subsequently receives the left requests from its predecessor and sends a copy
to its successor. Since the chains have no cycles and can not be infinitely long, each left request is only finitely
often transmitted within each of these chains. In pushReqfor each left and right requests, that was pushed over
the restriction on request channels at the left and right side of a parallel operator, a single copy either under the
restriction of a surrounding parallel operator encoding or on free source term names is generated. Note that the
requests on free source term names can never be consumed. Moreover, for each parallel operator encoding there
is a parallel operator in the corresponding source term. Thus the parallel operator encodings cause the structure
of a finite binary tree, i.e., there are only finitely many instances of the terms procLeftOutReq, procLeftInReq,
procRightOutReq, procRightInReq, and pushReq. Note that because of the two first cases only finitely many new
encodings of parallel operators can be unguarded. Because of that and since a tree is free of cycles, within
the sequence T ˙Z=⇒. T ′ there are only finitely many steps on requests, that are induced by a parallel operator
encoding.
In the last case we prove, that only within T ˙Z=⇒. T ′ only finitely many encoded continuations of encodings of
replicated inputs can be unguarded. Because of that, there are only finitely many instances of encodedContinu-
ations. Within each of these instances all requests originate from the respective replicated input or a more left
instance of encodedContinuationsof the same replicated input encoding are copied twice by pushReqIn; one copy
is generated under a restriction of this instance of encodedContinuations to be combined with the requests within
this branch and one copy is prepared to be transmitted to the respective next right branch of that encoded
replicated input. All these first copies are proceed by procRightOutReq and procRightInReq as a request of the
left side of a parallel operator encoding, while each requests of the respective encoded continuation is proceed
by these terms as a right request. For each such right request in pushReqOuta single copy is generated and
the restriction of the surrounding parallel operator encoding. Moreover for each such left and each such right
request a single copy is generated under the binding of the encodedContinuations, that is the next one in the
chain. Since again there are no cycles, there are only finitely many steps on requests, that are induced by a
encodedContinuations. We conclude, that within the sequence T ˙Z=⇒. T ′ there are only finitely many steps on
requests.
Case of co , ci : These names implement chain locks carrying a request channel. They are used to allow for a new
request at the right side of a parallel operator encoding to be linked in the corresponding chain. By the third
case there are only finitely many such right requests and chains, so within the sequence T ˙Z=⇒. T ′ there are only
finitely many steps on such chain locks.
Case of r : The name r is used by J · Kma to introduce receiver locks. Since we consider only terms with finite
representations, there are only finitely many unguarded instantiations on receiver locks in T . Anything the
encoding in Figure 4 we observer that new instantiations on receiver locks are only unguarded due to a a
matching pair of requests. By the third case, there are only finitely many different requests and steps on request
channels within the sequence T ˙Z=⇒. T ′. Moreover we observe that no request is ever combined with itself and
no pair is combined twice. Because of that, within the sequence T ˙Z=⇒. T ′ only finitely many new instantiations
on receiver locks can be unguarded, i.e., there are only finitely many steps on receiver locks.
Note that in T there are only finitely many unguarded test-statements and new test-statements can only be
unguarded by unguarding an encoded source term or by a step on a receiver lock. Thus, since by the first
two cases only finitely many encoded source terms can be unguarded and by the current case there are only
finitely many steps on receiver locks, within the sequence T ˙Z=⇒. T ′ only finitely many new test-statements can
be unguarded.
Case of l , ls, lr, l1, l2: All these names are used by the encoding function to refer to sum locks. The only steps
on sum locks are to reduce a test-statement. Note that in case of a nested test-statement two sum locks are
reduced, i.e., there are two steps on sum locks. However, since by the case before there are only finitely many
test-statements, within the sequence T ˙Z=⇒. T ′ there are only finitely many steps on sum locks.
Case of t, f : t and f are used by the encoding function to implement booleans. As in the case of sum locks, all steps
on these names are used to reduce a test-statement. So again, since there are only finitely many test-statements,
within the sequence T ˙Z=⇒. T ′ there are only finitely many steps on t and f .
Case of y, y′, z: These names are used by the encoding function as values only, but never as links. So there are no
(administrative) steps on these names.
⊓⊔
Lemma 36 (Success Sensitiveness). The encodings J · Ksa and J · Kma are success sensitive.
Proof. We start with J · Ksa. By Definition 12, we have to show that ∀S ∈ Ps . S ⇓X iff J S Ksa ⇓X. Let S ∈ Ps be an
arbitrary source term. We prove both directions separately.
Case of S ⇓X implies J S Ksa ⇓X: By Definition 11, S ⇓X implies that there are some S′, S′′ ∈ Ps such that S Z=⇒ S′
and S′ ≡ S′′ | X. By operational completeness (Lemma 30), the sequence S Z=⇒ S′ can be emulated by J S Ksa,
i.e., there exists some T ∈ Pa↾J · Ks
a
such that J S Ksa Z=⇒ T and T ∼=sa J S′ Ksa. By Figure 3, J S′′ | XKsa = J S′′ Ksa | X.
Thus J S′′ | XKsa ⇓X. Since by Lemma 20 the encoding J · Ksa preserves structural congruence of source terms
modulo ∼=sa, S
′ ≡ S′′ | X implies J S′ Ksa ∼=sa J S′′ | XKsa. By Definition 28, then for all contexts C ([·]) ∈ Pa → Pa
such that C (J 0 Ksa) ∈ Pa↾J · Ksa we have C (J S′ Ksa) ≈˙sa C (J S′′ | XKsa). Then, by the first condition of Definition
26, C
(J S′ Ksa) ⇓X iff C (J S′′ | XKsa) ⇓X for all such contexts C. Thus J S′′ | XKsa ⇓X implies J S′ Ksa ⇓X. By the
same argumentation we conclude that J S′ Ksa ⇓X implies T ⇓X. Since J S Ksa Z=⇒ T , we conclude J S Ksa ⇓X.
Case of J S Ksa ⇓X implies S ⇓X: By Definition 11, J S Ksa ⇓X implies that either there is an unguarded occurrence
ofXin J S Ksa or there are some T, T ′′ ∈ Pa such that J S Ksa Z=⇒ T and T ≡ T ′′ | X. In the first case, since the only
way to obtain an occurrence of success in a target term is by J XKsa = X, we conclude that there is an unguarded
occurrence of success in J S Ksa. In the other case, by operational soundness (Lemma 33), then there are some
S′ ∈ Ps and T ′ ∈ Pa such that S Z=⇒ S′, T Z=⇒ T ′, and T ′ ∼=sa J S′ Ksa. Since T ⇓X and X can not be reduced, we
have T ′ ⇓X. By Definition 28, T ′ ∼=
s
a J S′ Ksa implies C (T ′) ≈˙sa C (J S′ Ksa) for all contexts C ([·]) ∈ Pa → Pa such
that C (J 0 Ksa) ∈ Pa↾J · Ksa . By the first condition of Definition 26, C (T ) ⇓X iff C (J S′ Ksa) ⇓X for all such contexts
C. Thus T ′ ⇓X implies J S′ Ksa ⇓X. Moreover, since T ′ includes an unguarded occurrence of success and since all
occurrences of X in target terms are due to the encoding J XKsa = X, the sequence J S Ksa Z=⇒ T ′ emulates a
sequence S Z=⇒ S′ of target terms unguarding an occurrence of X. So S′ has an unguarded occurrence of X, i.e.,
S′ ⇓X. We conclude S ⇓X.
The argumentation in case of J · Kma is similar to the argumentation of J · Ksa above. For the first case note that, by
Figure 4, the parallel operator is not translated rigidly but since J XKma = X and the encodings of the parameters
of a parallel operator appear unguarded within the encoding of the parallel operator, the unguarded occurrence of
X in S′′ | X implies that there is an unguarded occurrence of X in J S′′ | XKma . ⊓⊔
Theorem 1. The encodings J · Ksa and J · Kma are good.
Proof. By Figure 3 and Figure 4, both encodings are compositional. Name invariance is proved in the Lemmata
1 and 2. Operational correspondence follows by the Lemmata 30, 31, and 33. Lemma 34 proves that J · Ksa do not
introduce divergence, while Lemma 35 proves the same condition for J · Kma . Finally, by Lemma 36, both encodings
are success sensitive. Thus both encodings are good with respect to the five criteria introduced by Gorla. ⊓⊔
3 Degree of Distribution
In the following we prove that J · Ksa preserves the degree of distribution of its source terms, while J · Kma does not. For
a definition what it means to preserve the degree of distribution have a look at Definition 5 in [PN12]. Moreover, we
present an encoding function from pim (without replicated input) into pi
2
a , the asynchronous pi-calculus augmented
with a two-level polyadic synchronisation.
Note that for simplicity we omit in Figure 1 a structural congruence rule for replicated input. However, of course
a replicated input represents a not determined number of instances of the corresponding input guarded term in
parallel. In order to allow for the distribution of replicated inputs, we augment structural congruence by an additional
rule, i.e., ≡∗ is structural congruence ≡ augmented with the additional rule y∗ (x) .P ≡∗ y∗ (x) .P | y∗ (x) .P to split
up replicated inputs.
Lemma 37. The encoding J · Ksa preserves the degree of distribution.
Proof. Let S, S1, . . . , Sn, S
′
1, . . . , S
′
n ∈ Ps such that S ≡
∗ S1 | . . . | Sn and Si Z=⇒ S′i for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then,
by Definition 5 in [PN12], we have to show that:
∃T1, . . . , Tn ∈ Pa . ∃C ([·]1, . . . , [·]n) ∈ P
n
a → Pa . J S Ksa ≡∗ C (T1, . . . , Tn) ∧ (∀i ∈ [1, . . . , n] . Ti Z=⇒∼=sa J S′i Ksa)
Revisiting the argumentation in the proof of Lemma 20, the encoding J · Ksa preserves structural congruence of source
terms except for the rule P | 0 ≡ P , because it translates restriction, the parallel operator, and the match operator
rigidly. Moreover, because of the rigid translation of the parallel operator, even the additional rule y∗ (x) .P ≡∗
y∗ (x) .P | y∗ (x) .P is preserved. Thus S ≡∗ S1 | . . . | Sn implies J S Ksa ≡∗ J S1 | . . . | Sn Ksa = J S1 Ksa | . . . | J Sn Ksa,
i.e., we can choose Ti = J Si Ksa for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n and C ([·]1, . . . , [·]n) = [·]1 | . . . | [·]n. By operational
completeness (compare to Lemma 30), then Si Z=⇒ S′i implies J Si Ksa Z=⇒∼=sa J S′i Ksa for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n, i.e.,
Ti Z=⇒∼=sa J S′i Ksa. ⊓⊔
Lemma 38. Any good encoding, that translates the parallel operator rigidly and preserves enough of the structural
congruence on source terms to ensure that S ≡1 S1 | . . . | Sn implies J S K ≡2 J S1 | . . . | Sn K, preserves the degree
of distribution.
Proof. Let S, S1, . . . , Sn, S
′
1, . . . , S
′
n be terms of the source language such that S ≡1 S1 | . . . | Sn and Si Z=⇒ S′i for
all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then, by Definition 5 in [PN12], we have to show that:
∃T1, . . . , Tn ∈ Pa . ∃C ([·]1, . . . , [·]n) ∈ P
n
a → Pa . J S K ≡2 C (T1, . . . , Tn) ∧ (∀i ∈ [1, . . . , n] . Ti Z=⇒≍ J S′i K)
Since the encoding translates the parallel operator rigidly and preserves enough of the structural congruence on
source terms to ensure that S ≡1 S1 | . . . | Sn implies J S K ≡2 J S1 | . . . | Sn K, we have J S K ≡2 J S1 | . . . | Sn K =J S1 K | . . . | J Sn K, i.e., we can choose Ti = J Si K for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n and C ([·]1, . . . , [·]n) = [·]1 | . . . | [·]n.
By operational completeness (compare to Definition 9), then Si Z=⇒ S′i implies J Si K Z=⇒∼=sa J S′i K for all i with
1 ≤ i ≤ n, i.e., Ti Z=⇒≍ J S′i K. ⊓⊔
Lemma 39. The encoding J · Kma does not preserve the degree of distribution.
Proof. Consider the counter example S =
(
a | b
)
| (a | b). S can perform two different reductions, which are
independent of each other. So S ≡ S1 | S2 with S1 = (a | a) and S2 =
(
b | b
)
such that S1 7−→ 0 and S2 7−→ 0.
Of course, since J · Kma is good, J S Kma can emulate both steps in either order. But it can not emulate both truly in
parallel.
To prove this fact, let us assume the contrary, i.e., let us assume the encoding J · Kma preserves the degree of
distribution of S. Then, by Definition 5 in [PN12], we have:
∃T1, T2 ∈ Pa . ∃C ([·]1, [·]2) ∈ Pa × Pa → Pa . J S Kma ≡∗ C (T1, T2) ∧ T1 Z=⇒∼=ma J S′1 Kma ∧ T2 Z=⇒∼=ma J S′2 Kma
The encoding of S is given by:
J S Kma = (νmo ,mi , po,up , pi,up , co , ci ,mo,up ,mi,up) (
(ν po , pi)
(q
a | b
ym
a
| procLeftOutReq | procLeftInReq
)
| (ν po , pi) (J a | b Kma | procRightOutReq | procRightInReq)
| pushReq
)
We observe that for both source term steps their emulations require that the corresponding requests are combined
at the outermost parallel operator encoding, i.e., the one given above. Moreover, in both emulations the output
requests arrive at the left and the input requests arrive at the right side of this parallel operator encoding. Thus,
for both emulations the requests are proceed by procRightInReq.
procRightInReq = ci 〈mo〉 | ci
∗ (mo) .pi (y, lr, r) .
(
(νmo,up)
(
mo
∗ (y′, ls, s , z) . ([ y
′ = y ] r 〈ls, lr, ls, s , z〉 | mo,up 〈y
′, ls, s , z〉)
| (νmo) (mo,up ։ mo | ci 〈mo〉)
)
| pi,up 〈y, lr, r〉
)
Note that, since J a Kma and q b yma appear unguarded in q a | b yma , it is not difficult to distribute q a | b yma over
T1 and T2, because the respective context introduced by the corresponding parallel operator encoding is not used
within the considered emulations, i.e., they can be proved to be junk. The same holds for J a | b Kma . Moreover, since
none of the terms procLeftInReq, procRightOutReq, and pushReq of the outermost parallel operator encoding is of
any importance for the considered emulations, it does not matter whether we put them within T1 or T2. Note that
for each of the considered emulations it is necessary to transmit one left output request to the right side of the
outermost parallel operator encoding by the forwarder in procLeftOutReq. However, since this forwarder is guarded
by a replicated input we can use the rule y∗ (x) .P ≡∗ y (x) .P | y∗ (x) .P to distribute this forwarder, e.g. by placing
po (y, l , s , z) . (mo 〈y, l , s , z〉 | po,up 〈y, l , s , z〉) within T1 and the rest of the forwarder within T2. The only remaining
term to distribute is procRightInReq.
Since T1 Z=⇒∼=ma J S′1 Kma and T2 Z=⇒∼=ma J S′2 Kma , both T1 and T2 need the ability to proceed a request fromJ a | b Kma . Since the respective right requests are restricted the only possibility to process them is procRightInReq.
We observe that the main part of procRightInReq is guarded by a replicated input and can thus be distributed
as procLeftOutReq before. But there is only one unguarded instantiation of the corresponding chain lock ci 〈mo〉
and without it the remaining term guarded by the replicated input on this chain lock is useless. Because of that
procRightInReq can not be distributed, i.e., it is not possible to distribute the encoding of S such that J S Kma ≡∗
(ν x˜) (T1 | T2), T1 Z=⇒∼=ma J S′1 Kma , and T2 Z=⇒∼=ma J S′2 Kma .
Because of that J S Kma can not emulate both source term steps without sequentialising the linking of the respec-
tive right requests within the required chain. So J S Kma can not completely emulate the independent source terms
steps in parallel. ⊓⊔
Lemma 40. Any good encoding J · K preserves the criterion: For every S such that S = S1 | . . . | Sn and Si Z=⇒ S′i
for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there exists T1, . . . , Tn and a context C with n holes such that J S K ≡2 C (T1, . . . , Tn) and
Ti Z=⇒≍ J S′i K for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proof. Assume n ∈ N and S, S1, . . . , Sn, S
′
1, . . . , S
′
n are terms of the source language such that S = S1 | . . . | Sn and
(∀i ∈ [1, . . . , n] . Si Z=⇒ S′i). Moreover, for simplicity, let us assume, that S1 | . . . | Sn = (S1 | (. . . (Sn−1 | Sn) . . .),
but note that the actually orientation of the brackets is not import for the rest of the proof. Let C| ([·]1, [·]2) be
the context introduced by the encoding of the parallel operator, i.e., J P | Q K = C| (J P K , J Q K) for all P,Q in
the source language. Then J S K = C| (J S1 K , C| (. . .C| (J Sn−1 K , J Sn K)) . . .). So we can choose Ti = J Si K for all
i ∈ [1, . . . , n] and C (T1, . . . , Tn) = J S K. By operational completeness (compare to Definition 9), then Ti Z=⇒≍ J S′i K
for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n. ⊓⊔
Theorem 2. There is no good encoding from pim into pia that preserves the degree of distribution.
Proof. By the Theorem in [PSN11], any good encoding from pim into pia introduces additional causal dependencies.
Note that in [PSN11] slightly different definitions of pim and pia are used, i.e., they use !P instead of replicated input,
have no match in the source language, and no τ -prefix. However, revisiting the argumentation on the proof of the
Theorem in [PSN11] we observe that these details are not crucial.
A closer look at the definition of additional causal dependencies used in [PSN11] reveals, that they show that
any good encoding from pim into pia introduces causal dependencies between some emulations of independent source
term steps. As already stated in the discussion of [PSN11], because of this causal dependency some emulations
of independent source terms steps have to be sequentialised, i.e., the emulations can still be performed in either
order and even somehow overlapping but not completely independent. Note that this is exactly what we observe in
Lemma 39. Because of that, there is no good encoding from pim into pia that preserves the degree of distribution. ⊓⊔
Let pi2a be the asynchronous pi-culus augmented with poliadic synchronisation on channels composed by up to
two names as introduced by [CM03].
Definition 31 (pi2a). The set of process terms of the asynchronous pi-calculus with two-level poliadic synchronisa-
tion, denoted by Pa2 , is given by
P ::= 0 | (ν n)P | P1 | P2 | [ a = b ]P | y 〈z˜〉 .P | y (x˜) .P | y
∗ (x˜) .P
for some names n, a, b ∈ N , some finite sequences of names x˜, z˜ ⊂ N , and either y ∈ N or y = y1 · y2 for some
y1, y2 ∈ N .
J P | Q Km
a2
, (ν po,up, pi,up , i, o)
(
(ν po , pi)
( J P Km
a2
| po
∗ (y, l , s1, s2, z) . (y · o 〈l , s1, s2, z〉 | po,up 〈y, l , s1, s2, z〉)
| pi
∗ (y, l , r) .
(
y · i 〈l , r〉 | pi,up 〈y, l , r〉
) )
| (ν po , pi)
( J Q Km
a2
| po
∗ (y, ls, s1, s2, z) . (y · i (lr, r) .r 〈lr, ls, ls, s1, s2, z,⊤〉 | po,up 〈y, ls, s1, s2, z〉)
| pi
∗ (y, lr, r) . (y · o (ls, s1, s2, z) .r 〈ls, lr, ls, s1, s2, z,⊥〉 | pi,up 〈y, lr, r〉)
)
| po,up ։ po | pi,up ։ pi
)
J y 〈z〉 .P Km
a2
, (ν s1, s2)
(
s1 | s1
∗.po 〈y, l , s1, s2, z〉 | s2. J P Kma2)J y (x) .P Km
a2
, (ν r)
(
pi 〈y, l , r〉 | r
∗ (l1, l2,−, s1, s2, x, b) .
test l1 then test l2 then l1 〈⊥〉 | l2 〈⊥〉 | s2 | J P Kma2
else l1 〈⊤〉 | l2 〈⊥〉 | test b then pi 〈y, l , r〉 else s1
else l1 〈⊥〉 | test b then s1 else pi 〈y, l , r〉
)
Here ϕm
a2
is some arbitrary injective substitution such that ∀n ∈ N . ϕm
a2
(n) /∈ N , where
N = {po , pi , po,up , pi,up , l , ls, lr, l1, l2, s1, s2, r , o, i, y, y, z, t, f, b}. The remaining operators restriction, sum, τ guarded terms,
and X are translated as in J · Ks
a
or J · Km
a
again.
Fig. 6. Encoding J · Km
a2
from pim without replicated input into pi
2
a .
For simplicity, we do not consider replicated input on the source language. Then the encoding J · Kma2 , given in
Figure 6, is a good encoding from pim without replicated input into pi
2
a . Note that, to prove that J · Kma2 is correct
with respect to the criteria presented in Section 1.3, we can argument very similar as for J · Kma , because the main
feature, i.e., the way in which sum locks are ordered, is the same for both encodings. On the other side, as already
stated by [CM03], there is no good encoding from pim into pi
2
a , that translates the parallel operator rigidly. Note
that the separation result in [CM03] does not rely on replication, i.e., it also implies that there is no such encoding
from pim without replicated input into pi
2
a .
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